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Mr. Trimble: I point out to the hon. and learned Gentleman that the example given earlier by the hon. Member for Falkirk, East (Mr. Connarty) referred to Palestine, not Israel. In Palestine, they do not have the same experience of using list systems as Israel. Israel is not a good advertisement for list systems because the way the system operates there has not been beneficial to the development of democracy or to the peace process.
The hon. and learned Gentleman referred to the problem for his party. I am happy to distinguish between his position and that of other small parties. My use of the term "bogus parties" was not by any means intended to refer to the hon. and learned Gentleman and his hon. Friends. I appreciate that if he wants to field candidates in all the constituencies, he will experience the difficulties that inevitably exist for smaller parties. I was once a member of a small party; and I am familiar with that experience.
We have to have a system that will do something to whittle out those groups that have no real support, particularly as one of the features of the list system--this is something that should be of interest to all hon. Members--is that it will shred the Unionist vote and shred the vote generally. This is exactly the feature that mars Israeli politics.
The single transferable vote system would have allowed people to express preferences and would have allowed votes to consolidate in a way that would have produced a much more coherent result. As the hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. Hunter) said, when and if we get to 10 June and find ourselves with 10-plus parties there, as well as two Governments, it will be much more difficult for the talks to move forward in a positive way, particularly when we bear in mind--as we do--the experience of 1992 when the efforts that we made at that time did not develop in a positive way.
I shall now consider some other areas in which we have reservations about this operation. The Command Paper entitled "Northern Ireland: Ground Rules for Substantive All-Party Negotiations" has been mentioned. I am sorry to see that the preamble contains statements that would mislead people who are ill informed and not familiar with the background. I refer to the phrase "following consultation".
The paper was originally produced with no consultation whatsoever and some small improvements have since been made. However, it still contains a scheme that we do not find acceptable. It is simply wrong to talk about this paper containing a broadly acceptable set of rules. It does not. It is largely a reproduction of the set of rules--in so far as there were rules--that operated in the 1992 inter-party talks and which largely contributed to the failure of the inter-party talks in 1992.
The Secretary of State may recall that the only times when we had any genuine progress in the 1992 talks was when we departed from the rules that are the basis of these rules. I think there lies a lesson that we want to do things
better than we did in 1992. We do not want to exclude the consideration of issues. The paranoia that has been displayed by some nationalist politicians on this matter is quite wrong.
We are quite prepared to address the whole range of issues, but we want to do it in a more fruitful way than we did in 1992. This set of ground rules, by leaning so much on the experience of 1992, is likely to be an obstacle, particularly as we find commentators in Dublin stating that these are now immutable and unchangeable. The Secretary of State is shaking his head. I hope that this will be made clear during the debate; we are not dealing with an immutable set of rules, but something that is still open for development and consultation, because we wish to see it develop. We wish to see changes towards the more fruitful ideas that we have explored.
There is reference in the ground rules to the unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire of August 1994. I shall not repeat the points that have been made in this regard as they have so ably been made by other hon. Members, particularly the hon. Member for Basingstoke and by the hon. and learned Member for North Down (Mr. McCartney) in his intervention. The ceasefire of August 1994 was not a genuine ceasefire. We cannot be content with the restoration of that equivocal operation and the matter must move on to more secure ground as rapidly as possible.
We should focus our attention on paragraph 13 of the Command Paper, which is in fact a paragraph taken from the communique issued by the Prime Minister and the Irish Prime Minister on 28 February. It is that joint communique that we should regard as the basis on which to strengthen and make genuine the ceasefire. That is the basis on which we should proceed. The quotation, in paragraph 13, of the communique is followed by a couple of paragraphs of turbid Anglo-Irishese, which do not add to the paragraph's meaning and are best ignored. We are best concentrating on the communique itself. If we follow that course, matters become clear.
There has been much discussion about "address" and what it means, along with other matters of that nature. There was complete lack of clarity in that discussion. The starting point is the beginning of the communique, which states that "all participants"--I assume that "all participants" will individually have to indicate their position--
that is unequivocal, because "at the beginning" means at the beginning, and that is the first item--
In my view the key phrase is "total and absolute commitment". That is "total and absolute commitment" to the Mitchell principles, which include the principle of
and the renunciation of the use of force, as well as the ending of "'punishment' killings and beatings". That was the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for East Londonderry (Mr. Ross).
The Mitchell principles go far beyond the ceasefire of August 1994. It is the Mitchell principles that constitute the key. Similarly, total and absolute commitment to the
principles is the key. There must be a procedure, and it must be sorted out well before 10 June. It is not sufficient, as the hon. Member for Redcar (Ms Mowlam) said, to leave matters until 10 June for the participants who then turn up. The result would be a shambles. We need, well before 10 June, to have a clear agreement on how a total and absolute commitment will be expressed. That must be done in clear and unequivocal manner.
Mr. Robert McCartney:
Is the hon. Gentleman able to think of any good reason why, in relation to absolute commitment to the principle of democracy in Northern Ireland and the need to address at the same stage decommissioning proposals, the words "need to" should be replaced by "must"?
Mr. Trimble:
Is there any difference? I am not sure that there is. The
suggests "must". It has to happen. It has to happen in a clear and unequivocal way. To make a total commitment to the principles of non-violence, including the disbandment of all paramilitary organisations, means more than uttering a form of words or signing one's name on a declaration, as is done in local government. It means following that commitment through with actions. That is made clear by the sixth principle, of ending paramilitary killings and beatings. The principles are not merely stated, because they must be followed by action. Therefore, there must be agreement. That is the significance of "address". There must be agreement on how actions will take place.
We must not expect actions to take place instantly. We expect that they will proceed, as the Prime Minister said, alongside talks. However, one expects to see at the beginning, or as the communique states, "at that stage", clear commitments on the actions that will follow to demonstrate that there is in truth a total and absolute commitment. It is essential that, well before 10 June, there is a discussion between the constitutional parties and the two Governments on the exact procedures that we shall follow on 10 June so that we can be sure that there is a commitment, that it is given in a clear way and that we do not find things disappearing in a cloud of obfuscation and Anglo-Irishese.
There is certainly one matter that the Governments must address urgently. One of the Mitchell principles is the need for disbandment or decommissioning to take place to the satisfaction of an independent commission. As the Mitchell principles state, that commission must have a clear legal basis. If any decommissioning of weapons is taking place, those who are giving up weapons have to be given a degree of immunity from criminal prosecution for possession of the weapons that they are surrendering. That requires legislation. My colleagues and I have drawn attention to that over a long period.
I understand that the Government have prepared legislation. I would welcome a response when the Minister replies. I was given to believe that it was intended that such proposed legislation would be introduced at the same time as the Bill, and that the two measures would proceed through the House at roughly the same time. Such legislation has not yet appeared. I should like an explanation for the delay.
Similarly, I would welcome an indication of the position on equivalent Irish legislation. If anything, that is more important. If decommissioning is to take place,
the bulk of it will take place in the Republic of Ireland. That is where the bulk of the weapons and bombs are. We need to have legislation to enable the international commission to inspect and verify decommissioning and the limited and tightly circumscribed amnesty that will run alongside it.
"would need to make clear at the beginning"--
"their total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence."
"total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations"
"need to make clear . . . total and absolute commitment to the principles of democracy"
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