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Mr. Jopling: On a point of order, Sir Geoffrey. The Committee has just had a Division in which more than 100 Conservative Members voted against the guts of the Bill. I ask the Leader of the House, who is in his place, to reconsider the Bill when things have cooled down a little. [Hon. Members: "Hear, hear."] I ask my right hon. Friend to reconsider whether the Bill ought to be proceeded with.
The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Sir Geoffrey Lofthouse): That matter is not for the Chair. We must move on.
Clause 7
Mr. Roger Sims (Chislehurst): I beg to move amendment No. 3, in page 4, line 40, leave out 'first' and insert 'second'.
The First Deputy Chairman: With this, it will be convenient to discuss also the following: Amendment No. 7, in page 5, line 14, at end add--
'(9A) Where an application for a divorce order is made by one party, subsection (9D) applies if--
(a) the other party applies to the court, within the prescribed period, for time for further reflection; and
(b) the requirements of section 9 (except any imposed under section 9(3) are satisfied.
(9B) Where any application for a divorce order is made, subsection (9D) also applies if there is any child of the family under the age of sixteen when the statement is received by the court.
(9C) Subsection (9D) does not apply if--
(a) at the time when the application for a divorce order is made, there is an occupation order or a non-molestation order in force in favour of the applicant, or of a child of the family, with a power of arrest attached under section 44; or
(b) the court is satisfied that delaying the making of a divorce order would be significantly detrimental to the welfare of any child of the family.
(9D) If this subsection applies, the period for reflection and consideration is extended by a period of one year, but without invalidating the application for a divorce order.'.
Amendment No. 8, in page 5, line 14, at end add--
Amendment No. 17, in page 5, line 14, at end add--
Amendment No. 18, in page 5, line 14, at end add--
Clause 7 stand part.
Mr. Sims:
The amendments to which amendment No. 3 is linked refer to the period that should elapse between a statement of intention to divorce being lodged and the divorce itself. On Second Reading--[Interruption.]
The First Deputy Chairman:
Order. Hon. Members should leave the Chamber quietly--and I ask the hon. Members who are holding a sub-committee in the right-hand corner of the Chamber to hold it somewhere else.
Mr. Sims:
On Second Reading, I supported the Bill's proposal for a period of consideration, so that mediation and reconciliation, if possible, can take place before divorce is finalised. I shall listen to hon. Members who propound arguments in support of the other amendments, as to whether 12 months or a longer period would be appropriate. I want to go further back in the process, and I invite the Committee to consider how soon after a couple have married they should be permitted, to use the language of the Bill, to make
It is common ground among hon. Members that the family is the foundation of our society, and that the basis of the family is marriage. Of course two people can live together and produce children without any civil or religious ceremony having taken place--the state cannot prevent that--but a couple's public commitment to each other in a religious or civil marriage ceremony must surely add to the stability of their relationship to the benefit of the man and the woman, the children of the marriage and society.
Ideally, such a commitment should be lifelong, not only on religious grounds--promises made before almighty God should be inviolable--but because it must be in the interests of a stable society that marriage be permanent. We must acknowledge that sometimes, with the best will in the world, things do not work out and the marriage breaks down. If it is desirable for the state to have a formal, public procedure for marriage, there should be a formal, public procedure to enable a couple who feel that their marriage has broken down to break that contract--and to do so as far as possible on mutually acceptable terms, with appropriate arrangements with regard to property and, especially, children. The Bill is all about doing that, and we have been debating and will continue to debate the best way for procedures to be followed.
When framing legislation, it is important to consider--to use the expression that has been employed a number of times this afternoon--the messages that the Committee is
sending about the institution of marriage and its status. Our legislation should surely be saying how important and solemn is the undertaking into which a couple enter on marriage, and how important and solemn is the breaking of the marriage contract.
Mr. Rowe:
My hon. Friend raises an enormously important point. Does he agree that, for a variety of benevolent motives, we have over years unpicked the vast majority of the secular benefits of being married, so that, when people enter into a solemn marriage, the state's investment in that relationship is a great deal less than it used to be?
Mr. Sims:
I cannot dispute that point--in fact, I strongly agree with my hon. Friend--but I fear that if I were to go into the matters behind his intervention, I would quite properly be ruled out of order. God forbid that that should happen to me, a member of the Chairmen's Panel.
If we were to say that, if a couple have married, there can be no question of divorce for 10 years, that would certainly demonstrate the importance of the commitment, but I fear that it might be seen as a deterrent to marriage. If, on the other hand, it was suggested that we should tell people that they can get married and, if it does not work out, be divorced in three months, we would surely oppose that on the ground that it would devalue the institution of marriage. So what should be the minimum period between a wedding taking place and the point at which a statement of intention to divorce can be lodged? What length of time would be reasonable and practicable and yet at the same time demonstrate the seriousness of the marriage vows?
Before the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, that period was three years, which I suggest is about right, but that Bill sought to reduce the period to one year. I opposed that proposal and sought a compromise of two years. Despite my arguments and my vote, the period on the face of the Act is one year. That is now the minimum period.
We have asked the question so often, but it is appropriate--what messages does that convey to the sort of young people about whom my right hon. Friend the Member for Mitcham and Morden (Dame A. Rumbold) spoke so eloquently in the previous debate? Are we not telling people, in effect, that, if they are thinking of marriage, they can give it a go, but they should not worry if it does not work out because, in 12 months' time, they can get out of it? Are we saying that marriage can be entered into on a trial basis rather than for life? All of us who have been married will know that the first year can be difficult, especially if a baby arrives. To allow the lodging of divorce petition after one year, as now, seems to me to be to allow it far too soon.
Whatever other changes will be made by the present Bill, it still proposes that that one-year period shall remain. That is enshrined in clause 7(6), which reads:
'(9A) Where an application for a divorce order is made by one party, subsection (9D) applies if--
(a) the other party applies to the court, within the prescribed period, for time for further reflection; and
(b) the requirements of section 9 (except any imposed under section 9(3) are satisfied.
(9B) Where any application for a divorce order is made, subsection (9D) also applies if there is any child of the family under the age of sixteen when the statement is received by the court.
(9C) Subsection (9D) does not apply if--
(a) at the time when the application for a divorce order is made, there is an occupation order or a non-molestation order in force in favour of the applicant, or of a child of the family, with a power of arrest attached under section 44; or
(b) the court is satisfied that delaying the making of a divorce order would be significantly detrimental to the welfare of any child of the family.
(9D) If this subsection applies, the period for reflection and consideration is extended by a period of six months, but without invalidating the application for a divorce order.'.
'(9A) Where an application for a divorce order is made by one party, subsection (9D) applies if
(a) the other party applies to the court, within the prescribed period, for time for further reflection; and
(b) the requirements of section 9 (except any imposed under section 9(3) are satisfied.
(9B) Where any application for a divorce order is made, subsection (9D) also applies if there is any child of the family under the age of sixteen years when the statement is received by the court.
(9C) Subsection (9D) does not apply if the court is satisfied that the case is one of exceptional hardship suffered by the applicant or of exceptional depravity on the part of the other party; but in determining the application the court must have regard to the interests of any child of the family and to the question whether there is a reasonable probability of reconciliation during the additional period mentioned in subsection (9D).
(9D) If this subsection applies, the period for reflection and consideration is extended by a period of one year, but without invalidating the application for a divorce order.'.
'(9A) Where an application for a divorce order is made by one party, subsection (9D) applies if
(a) the other party applies to the court, within the prescribed period, for time for further reflection; and
(b) the requirements of section 9 (except any imposed under section 9(3)) are satisfied.
(9B) Where any application for a divorce order is made, subsection (9D) also applies if there is any child of the family under the age of sixteen years when the statement is received by the court.
(9C) Subsection (9D) does not apply if the court is satisfied that the case is one of exceptional hardship suffered by the applicant or of exceptional depravity on the part of the other party; but in determining the application the court must have regard to the interests of any child of the family and to the question whether there is a reasonable probability of reconciliation during the additional period mentioned in subsection (9D).
(9D) If this subsection applies, the period for reflection and consideration is extended by a period of six months, but without invalidating the application for a divorce order.'.
"a statement of marital breakdown".
"A statement which is made before the first anniversary of the marriage to which it relates is ineffective for the purposes of any application for a divorce order."
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