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Bosnia
8. Mr. Jack Thompson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what contingency plans are being prepared for the withdrawal of British forces from Bosnia after 20 December. [30890]
Mr. Portillo: IFOR's mandate expires at the end of the year and we intend to withdraw UK forces at the same time as our NATO allies.
Mr. Thompson: Does the Secretary of State agree that the current situation in Bosnia does not bode well for the withdrawal of our troops on 20 December? Perhaps the whole situation needs to be re-examined. That date is only six months ahead. The families of British forces in Bosnia regard 20 December as a significant date because it is close to Christmas. Many expect that the serving forces will be back home for Christmas. Would it not be appropriate to renegotiate with our allies in Bosnia and seek a more distant date to take account of the present situation?
Mr. Portillo: First, I should be frank with the hon. Gentleman and say that 20 December is the date on which the IFOR mandate ends. He should not read into that that the forces will be home on that date. That is the day that the operation ends. I anticipate that the ending of IFOR will lead to a withdrawal of troops over weeks, and possibly months, after that.
The hon. Gentleman is right to say that many aspects of the Bosnian situation do not bode well. What is important is that the international community develops an overall political strategy to deal with the many parts of that problem--humanitarian problems, the need for reconstruction, the need to rebuild the economy, the need to prop up the Croat-Muslim federation, and the need to provide police forces and training. As a small part of that, we need to consider what, if any, need there may be for a military presence in 1997. It would, however, be premature to reach conclusions about that now.
Mr. Colvin:
Will my right hon. Friend confirm that British troops will continue to be involved in the implementation force in Bosnia after the 20 December
Mr. Portillo:
Yes. I cannot conceive of any operation in Bosnia of a military sort that is not a NATO operation. I believe it is essential that in any NATO operation in Bosnia the United States should be involved alongside, and on the same terms as, her allies in the alliance.
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
The Secretary of State will recall that the purpose of deploying NATO forces, including British troops, in former Yugoslavia was to bring peace and stability, and to assist in the reconstruction of the civilian infrastructure of that country. If, without undue risk to British troops, we can continue to help to fulfil those objectives as part of a NATO force, should we not now express our willingness to do so? That of itself would assist stability and civilian reconstruction.
Mr. Portillo:
Although I respect the hon. and learned Gentleman's point of view, I think that the point is debatable. I am not sure that announcing an open-ended commitment to a military presence in Bosnia would be helpful in creating stability. On the contrary, it might stop the necessary concentration of minds among the former warring factions on the idea that eventually they have to make a peace for themselves. I also believe that what the implementation force was set up to do will have been achieved by December: the forces will have been separated, they will have gone back to barracks and they will have surrendered their weapons, which will be in points of storage.
The question is: what is needed in 1997? As I have already said today, what is most needed is an overall political strategy; as part of that we can consider whether any military operation is necessary.
Mr. Renton:
I have listened carefully to what my right hon. Friend has just said, but is there not a real problem to do with the fact that, of the moneys pledged for the reconstruction of Bosnia, only about 20 per cent. has thus far appeared? Does not that mean that, at the end of the year, the situation in Bosnia may be such that it will be difficult for IFOR troops to withdraw? Will my right hon. Friend therefore urge all his colleagues in government to bring pressure to bear on the countries that are not paying the moneys that they have pledged to reconstruction, so that they get on and pay up promptly?
Mr. Portillo:
My right hon. Friend reinforces my point that we need not just a military option for Bosnia but a total package of international help, including money and reconstruction. While it is possible to conceive of a 1997 military operation which is part of a political strategy, it would be unacceptable to conceive of a 1997 military operation instead of a political strategy.
Dr. David Clark:
Has the Secretary of State had time to read today's excellent Select Committee report on Bosnia, outlining serious inadequacies in medical provision, the provision of housing and the provision of sanitary facilities? Will he assure the House that the MOD's shortcomings outlined in the report will be rectified and that the mistakes experienced in the IFOR
Mr. Portillo:
I fear that the hon. Gentleman has shown a lack of feel for the complexities of a military operation. It is outstanding that, within a one-month period--between December last year and January this year--we deployed approximately 13,000 soldiers, in the dead of winter, in the interior of Bosnia. We got them there, we kept them supplied and we provided them with ammunition, equipment, housing, sanitary facilities and medical facilities--and the hon. Gentleman has said that they were not exactly what he would have liked them to be. We learn lessons from every military operation, and we shall learn lessons from this one. For the hon. Gentleman to give the impression that this operation has been anything but an outstanding success for our forces and for the logisticians who supported them is unworthy of him.
9. Mr. Winnick:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the current role of the implementation force in former Yugoslavia. [30891]
Mr. Portillo:
IFOR has made excellent progress in implementing the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement. It is now putting increased effort into supporting civil programmes, such as the rebuilding of schools, hospitals and public utilities.
Mr. Winnick:
Given the good work of IFOR, does the Secretary of State agree that it is important for the future of Bosnia that the notorious war criminals, Karadzic and the general, as well as some war criminals on the Croatian side, are brought to justice? Will IFOR undertake that task? Does the Secretary of State accept that the chief prosecutor at the war crimes tribunal in The Hague has stated time and time again that war criminals who are wanted for terrible crimes against humanity should be brought to justice as quickly as possible?
Mr. Portillo:
Yes, they should be brought to justice. I can conceive of no lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina unless those people are brought to justice, unless the evidence against them is heard and unless a verdict is reached in each case. As the hon. Gentleman has heard during the course of these exchanges, IFOR has a primary duty: the separation of the forces and now the provision of a secure environment in which the elections can be held. Within IFOR's mandate, IFOR has made it perfectly clear that it recognises its duty to hand over war criminals to the authorities so that they may be brought to justice.
Mr. Key:
Given the outstanding success of Britain's contribution to IFOR, will my right hon. Friend ensure that, in future deployments in peacekeeping and peace enforcement, notice will be taken of, and advice will be sought from, the protection and life sciences division of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency? We would then have the best possible and the healthiest troops in the field, which would avoid some of the minor problems that were encountered by our forces in Bosnia.
Mr. Portillo:
My hon. Friend has made a valuable suggestion. He speaks with great authority and with the benefit of having visited Bosnia. In addition, he has the long experience of a large number of service people in his constituency. I will consider what he said very carefully.
Mr. Donald Anderson:
Is it not clear that, without the military's backing, the work of IFOR in underpinning its work and all the grand civilian work of reconstruction could not proceed, and the peace would disappear? Is it not clear that an IFOR mark 2 or some form of military backing must continue after December if peacemaking and reconstruction are to continue?
Mr. Portillo:
I respect the hon. Gentleman's views, but I cannot go any further than I already have this afternoon in my statements. I ask the hon. Gentleman to recognise that, if it is his view that there can be no proper civil operation without military back-up, it is my view that there could not be a military operation with any chance of success unless it were part of an over-arching political strategy by the international community.
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