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Mr. Maclean: The hon. Member for Dulwich (Ms Jowell) made an interesting speech, but I am sorry that she spoilt it at the end with her ridiculous jibe. This Government introduced, in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, powers to increase the maximum penalty for cruelty to children--something that the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mrs. Golding) conveniently forgets when she trumpets the work that she is now doing for children.
The Government increased the penalty from two years to 10, and the Labour party voted against it. That happened on 18 January 1988, when, under the Criminal Justice Act, we increased the maximum penalty for cruelty to children to 10 years' imprisonment. I accept that the hon. Member for Dulwich was not in the House then, but other hon. Members were. I invite Opposition Members to check Hansard of 18 January 1988, when they will see that the Labour party voted against the Criminal Justice Act.
The Government increased the maximum penalty for dealing in hard drugs to life imprisonment. We increased the maximum penalty for taking a gun to a crime to life imprisonment. We gave the Attorney-General the right to appeal against lenient sentences, including lenient rape sentences, and the Labour party voted against it. I was not going to recite that list, Mr. Deputy Speaker--
Mr. Deputy Speaker:
Order. I would have welcomed it if the Minister had not done so, as the list has nothing to do with the new clause.
Mr. Maclean:
I am sorry to have strayed into that subject, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but the hon. Member for Dulwich should not have said that the Government betrayed rape victims. The Government made all the changes in the 1980s to make life easier for rape victims. They strengthened the police; they dramatically increased their numbers; they encouraged the police to introduce rape suites to help rape victims; they introduced the DNA national database--the first in the world. The hon. Lady should get her facts straight before making such silly jibes.
The new clauses deserve to be considered seriously, as they raise complex issues about the admissibility of evidence in sexual offences cases. I think that we would all agree that there is something particularly abhorrent about such crimes, and we are all aware of their dramatic
effect on the victims. The Government have introduced a range of measures to strengthen the powers of the police and the courts to prosecute those who commit such crimes. The national DNA database provides the police with a valuable new weapon to investigate such crimes.
We have removed the requirement for juries to be warned about convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of the victim of a sexual offence. We have announced tough new proposals for automatic life sentences for offenders who are convicted for a second time of a serious violent or sex offence unless there are genuinely exceptional circumstances. The Opposition have been in a quandary over our proposals for automatic life sentences and minimum mandatory sentences; they are not sure whether or not to support them.
The nature of sexual offences and the frequent lack of corroborating evidence makes it particularly difficult to prosecute successfully. There has been a reduction in the number of convictions, as a proportion both of the number of offences recorded and of the number of prosecutions. That is a matter of concern, but it is the product of a wide range of factors.
Recent research has suggested the need for a larger-scale study to ensure that we properly understand the problems and how best to tackle them. We intend to conduct such research. Despite the understandable desire to make it easier to secure convictions, it is essential to maintain a proper balance--to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial, and to ensure that the case against the criminal is properly tested.
The Government fully understand the concerns that have prompted the new clauses, but we are not convinced that they have been subjected to the rigorous examination necessary before changes can be made to such a complex and sensitive area of law. I shall consider first new clause 11. Often, those responsible for crimes of a sexual nature are known--or thought--to have committed other similar offences. I agree that it is important that juries should have the opportunity to hear that that has been the case where the judge believes it is in the interests of justice to do so.
It is worth correcting any misconception that sexual offences cannot be tried together. Under the 1971 indictment rules, charges for offences may already be joined in the same indictment. The particular nature of sexual offences and the frequent lack of corroborating evidence require a slightly more cautious approach to whether cases can be tried on the same indictment. A jury may find it more difficult to consider each charge separately, as they may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the extent and nature of the charges against the defendant.
The Indictments Act 1915, to which the new clause refers, gives the trial judge discretion to decide whether, on the particular facts before him, it would be appropriate for the charges to be tried together or severed. Before the judge can do that, it will first be for the Crown Prosecution Service to decide how the indictment against the accused is prepared.
In our view, a decision on severing an indictment remains an important judgment, which the trial judge is best placed to make based on all the circumstances of the case before him. He has the ability to consider a wide range of criteria before making his decision, which the new clause would remove.
That ability was reinforced in a recent ruling by the House of Lords in a case involving multiple sexual offences against different victims. The ruling in Regina v. Christou reinforced the right of the courts to try cases together even when the evidence is not corroborative, and has provided useful guidance on the factors that trial judges should take into account when making such decisions.
The new clause is unsound in two respects. First, it is seriously defective because it would disapply section 5 of the Indictments Act 1915 altogether in relation to sexual offences. Among other things, section 5 allows the courts to order the amendment of defective indictments. Those might include the fact that the trial would become too unwieldy if all the charges were tried together. The court's powers in respect of trying cases together are to be found in section 5(3) rather than section 5 as a whole.
The second and more serious flaw is that new clause 11 would unnecessarily restrict the discretionary powers of judges to rule on the extent of indictments that come before them. It would do this by requiring that decisions were made on the grounds of prejudice alone and can only be made at the request of the defence. Presently, the judge can act on his own initiative, and may take account not only of whether the indictment is prejudicial but of other important issues, such as the impact on victims of ordering two or more trials. We believe that judges should retain their existing discretion to decide upon those important matters.
The question that faces us on new clause 12 is whether it would improve the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. I believe that it is clear that section 2 of that Act represents an additional hurdle to be cleared after common-law tests of relevance have been met, and that its main purpose--the prevention of mud-slinging attacks on the complainant's reputation--is plain.
The most difficult issue in practice, however, is the degree to which sexual history may be relevant to the issue of consent, and it is on that question that the greatest scope for dispute over individual judicial decisions arises. The Court of Appeal has in a number of cases, and notably in Regina v. Viola in 1982, provided guidance on how the existing provisions should be applied. The Court of Appeal said that the general aim should be to exclude questioning relating to the credit of the complainant but generally to admit that which is relevant to an issue in the trial.
New clause 12 seeks to prevent irrelevant questioning about a victim's previous sexual history by defining the circumstances in which the judge may exercise his
discretion. It would also extend that provision to victims of all sexual offences. Cross-examination about previous sexual experience is more likely to be an issue in rape cases--hence the need for the special provisions in the 1976 Act. It is not clear that a major extension of the present situation to all sexual offences is justified.
Section 2 of the 1976 Act is a straightforward provision that allows a proper balance to be struck between giving the complainant some protection from oppressive and irrelevant questioning, while safeguarding the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Mr. D. N. Campbell-Savours (Workington):
On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I do not wish to raise an issue of contempt, but it is a contempt of the House to misrepresent proceedings of the House of Commons. You will have heard the Minister tell the House that, on 18 January 1988, Labour Members of Parliament voted against increasing penalties during proceedings on the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
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