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'--
(a)'.
Madam Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 61, 62, 77 to 86 and 96.
Mr. Streeter: These are minor, technical and consequential amendments to clause 62 and schedules 3, 8 and 10. They do not make policy changes, and I commend them to the House.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendments made: No. 61, in page 41, line 37, leave out 'and'.
No. 62, in page 41, line 39, at end insert
and insert
No. 14, in page 42, line 21, leave out
and insert
No. 15, in page 42, line 39, leave out
and insert
Amendment proposed: No. 63, in page 42, line 42, at end insert--
Amendment made to the proposed amendment:(a), leave out
and insert
Amendment, as amended, agreed to.
Mr. Streeter:
I beg to move amendment No. 64, in page 45, leave out lines 9 to 12.
Madam Deputy Speaker:
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 113, in page 46, line 14, at end insert--
No. 120, in page 46, line 14, at end insert--
Government amendments Nos. 65 and 66.
No. 114, in page 48, line 45, at end insert--
No. 121, in page 48, line 45, at end insert--
Government amendments Nos. 67 to 76 and 87 to 92.
Mr. Streeter:
Amendments Nos. 64 to 76 make drafting changes and minor corrections to schedule 2 but make no policy changes, and I commend them to the House.
If my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury(Mr. Brazier) moves amendments Nos. 120 and 121, which relate to the making of three-month restrictions on the making of property and other orders, I can accept them. That restriction may be of some benefit to couples who want to reconcile from the time of attending the information session to the time that the court can make a contested order. There will generally be six months to seek a reconciliation before a contested order is made. Once the court has made an order, reconciliation is still facilitated by the power of the court to vary orders on reconciliation. The court also has power to vary all types of property adjustment orders, and lump sum orders,made before a divorce or separation order is made. I cannot accept amendments Nos. 113 and 114 and ask my hon. Friend not to move them.
Amendments Nos. 87, 91, 92, 88, 89 and 90 are technical and sensible, and I commend them to the House.
Mr. Brazier:
Amendments Nos. 120 and 121 would provide three months' extra reflection and consideration in certain circumstances before final financial and property orders can be made. That provision has nothing to do with the total time taken before a divorce is granted but everything to do with trying to save marriages that may still be saveable after the couple have begun the divorce process.
In cases of domestic violence, eviction orders would be totally unaffected. In the same way, where there is genuine financial need, interim financial orders will also be unaffected.
The amendments would assist in saving saveable marriages because once the family home is broken up in a property order or financial orders have been made, the couple in question are a long way down the road of a marriage break-up. The House has made it absolutely clear that it wants pause for thought in divorce and has voted for, in most cases, 18 months to achieve it. It would be strange if it were possible in all circumstances after just three months for couples to start the machinery that will effectively break up their marriage.
This modest pair of amendments provide for three additional months, making six months, before the final property or financial order can be negotiated--subject to a string of let-outs. The Conservative Family Campaign's legal advisers say that those let-outs will probably apply in the majority of cases. There will be a let-out in cases that are uncontested and in which the court rules that exceptional circumstances make that just and reasonable--and the courts are only too willing to allow exceptional circumstances. None the less, in the residue of cases where divorce is contested and there are no special circumstances, people will be required to reflect for six months before they set their decision in concrete. That can only be a good thing and in line with the wishes of the House--which voted for a much longer period for divorce. I urge the House to support both amendments, which would halt the machinery of divorce a little longer.
Mr. Boateng:
We well understand what motivates the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) in tabling the amendments. In the real world, however, it is not possible for the parties to be held, as it were, frozen in suspended animation while the world goes on around them. That is not how it happens in the divorce process. As we have
'; and
Amendments made: No. 13, in page 42, line 6, leave out
(iii) the amendments of the Maintenance Orders Act 1950, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, the Finance Act 1985 and sections 42 and 51 of the Family Law Act 1986 extend also to both Northern Ireland and Scotland; and
(b) in Schedule 10, the repeal of section 2(1)(b) of the Domestic and Appellate Proceedings (Restriction of Publicity) Act 1968 extends also to Scotland.'.--[Mr. Streeter.]
'41 of the 1973 Act'
'(Welfare of children)'.
'41 of the 1973 Act'
'(Welfare of children)'.
'41 of the 1973 Act'
'(Welfare of children)'.--[Mr. Llwyd.]
'The fourth exemption
3A. The circumstances referred to in section 9(7)(d) are that--
(a) the requirements of section 41 of the 1973 Act have been satisfied;
(b) an occupation order or a non-molestation order is in force in favour of the applicant or a child of the family, made against the other party;
(c) the applicant has, during the period for reflection and consideration, taken such steps as are reasonably practicable to try to reach agreement about the parties' financial arrangements;
(d) the applicant has not been able to reach agreement with the other party about those arrangements and is unlikely to be able to do so in the foreseeable future; and
(e) a delay in making the order applied for under section 3--
(i) would be significantly detrimental to the welfare of any child of the family; or
(ii) would be seriously prejudicial to the applicant.'.--[Mr. Streeter.]
'41 of the 1973 Act'
'(Welfare of children)'.--[Mr. Llwyd.]
11.15 pm
'(1A) No financial provision order, other than an interim order, may be made under section 22A above before the end of the first six months of the period for reflection and consideration, unless--
(a) it is an order in the terms applied for to which the other party agrees; or
(b) it takes effect, in accordance with subsection (1), before the making of a divorce order or separation order, and the court is satisfied--
(i) that there are exceptional circumstances, and
(ii) that it would be just and reasonable for the order to be made earlier.'.
'(1A) No financial provision order, other than an interim order, may be made under section 22A above before the end of the first three months of the period for reflection and consideration, unless--
(a) it is an order in the terms applied for to which the other party agrees; or
(b) it takes effect, in accordance with subsection (1), before the making of a divorce order or separation order, and the court is satisfied--
(i) that there are exceptional circumstances, and
(ii) that it would be just and reasonable for the order to be made earlier.'.
'(1A) No property adjustment order may be made under section 23A above before the end of the first six months of the period for reflection and consideration, unless--
(a) it is an order in the terms applied for to which the other party agrees; or
(b) it takes effect, in accordance with subsection (1), before the making of a divorce order or separation order, and the court is satisfied--
(i) that there are exceptional circumstances, and
(ii) that it would be just and reasonable for the order to be made earlier.'.
'(1A) No property adjustment order may be made under section 23A above before the end of the first three months of the period for reflection and consideration, unless--
(a) it is an order in the terms applied for to which the other party agrees; or
(b) it takes effect, in accordance with subsection (1), before the making of a divorce order or separation order, and the court is satisfied--
(i) that there are exceptional circumstances, and
(ii) that it would be just and reasonable for the order to be made earlier.'.
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