| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
Sir Russell Johnston: Often a false antithesis is made between the advisory Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU and the European Parliament; there are reports from the European Parliament of a sort of takeover. Does the hon. Lady agree that, even if WEU becomes more integrated into the European Union, that is no reason necessarily to abolish the advisory Parliamentary Assembly, which offers a useful outlet for national Parliaments to speak on defence matters in Europe?
Ms Quin: I agree. In any case, I do not envisage the abolition of the WEU Assembly, and I believe that
national parliamentarians who have built up expertise in that regard need to have a close dialogue with Members of the European Parliament, who come at it from a slightly different angle but who have an equal interest in parliamentary and public scrutiny of the matters being considered.
More generally, it appears that, despite the fears that some Members of the House occasionally express about competition between the European Parliament and national Parliaments, there is a great deal, especially in the short term, that can be done to improve joint scrutiny by both national and European Parliaments of many of the issues that are important in the eyes of the public, but are not publicly debated as much as we should like.
Mr. Wilkinson:
I wish to add a further point to that made by the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber (Sir R. Johnston). Is it not the case, though, that, as long as national Parliaments have responsibility for voting budgets for national defence, and as long as national Defence Ministers are answerable to those Parliaments--indeed, in some European Parliaments, the Defence Committees have very important roles--the purpose and function of the Assembly of WEU will be central to the formulation of a common European view on defence? That is not to say that there is no merit in Members of the European Parliament taking an interest; increasing interest in, and intelligent inquiry about, matters of defence, at whatever level in Europe, is all to the good.
Ms Quin:
Obviously the budgetary aspects are important, but that does not undermine the importance of the institutional links between the two bodies, which are now more necessary than ever before and which need strengthening.
We also believe in the idea of back-to-back sessions between the WEU and the relevant institutions of the Council of Ministers, as offering more co-ordination and better dialogue between the WEU and the European Union. That would make a great deal of sense.
The hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood also mentioned arms procurement. The Opposition can see important advantages in collaboration between European countries in arms production and in improving competition, but we have doubts about the way in which the system works at present. If a country is to have a 10 per cent. involvement in a project, it has to have 10 per cent. of the economic activity involved in the arms effort in question. That often seems to work against the interests of competitiveness and open tendering. Given the efficiency of some of our arms industries, we should bear this in mind when planning for the future.
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. David Davis):
Our debate takes place against the background of some important developments in the European security landscape. In Bosnia, British troops are playing a leading role in the success of IFOR--the NATO implementation force--which is the largest military operation in NATO's history. In NATO itself, important work on enlargement and the changes needed to adapt the alliance to new strategic realities is under way. There is also the intergovernmental conference, the agenda of which includes European security and defence.
I therefore congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) on his choice of subject and I welcome the debate which, for these reasons and for others that my hon. Friend outlined, is especially timely.
All the speeches in this debate have been of a high quality. Although I do not agree with everything that has been said, hon. Members have put their arguments cogently. I must tell my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) that building a bridge between him and the Liberal Democrat spokesman on this subject is beyond my meagre abilities--although, as he remembers, I have spent some time bridge-building with him in the past.
Because the debate is so timely, some of the issues it covers are highly sensitive, so I shall choose my language with care today, for reasons that the House will understand. I might add, for the benefit of the hon. Member for Gateshead, East (Ms Quin), that I am responding to the debate because, quite apart from its European dimension, my responsibilities cover international security, including NATO; the Western European Union; and nuclear weapons. There is no hidden agenda behind my appearance.
The term Europe's defence and security policy carries the risk of misinterpretation. Like many of the other catch-phrases--such as the European pillar of the alliance--it is something of a misnomer. I say that because our defence is not a purely European concern. It is primarily to NATO, a transatlantic organisation, that we owe the peace that we have enjoyed for the past 50 years, so when we consider Britain's role in European security and defence, it is right to start with our contribution to NATO.
That contribution remains substantial. On any measure, Britain more than pulls its weight. For example, our contribution to IFOR involves about 11,500 personnel--a much greater effort proportionate to population, gross domestic product or the size of our armed forces than any other nation has been able to make. We can all be rightly proud of the work of these service men and women. The shared values and interests on which the alliance was built remain as strong as ever. As Bosnia has shown, the American presence in Europe continues to be an essential contribution to security.
The end of the cold war does not mean that we no longer need to be ready to defend ourselves and to keep the Atlantic community together. For the British Government, a strong NATO remains the key; it informs everything that we do.
The experience in Bosnia has also shown that a greater European contribution is one of the most effective ways of keeping NATO strong. Two thirds of IFOR's personnel
are European. France is fielding a substantial contingent--testimony to the strength that NATO will draw from France's welcome decision to participate more fully in the alliance. European countries outside NATO--Finland, Sweden, Russia and nine central European countries--are also making significant contributions.
The challenge that we face with IFOR, with future NATO operations and at the intergovernmental conference is to allow the widest possible range of European countries to contribute to security, but that must be done in a way that strengthens the Atlantic alliance. That, I believe, was the thrust of my hon. Friend's speech this morning.
The hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber (Sir R. Johnston) asked me a question about Bosnia. The United Kingdom is committed to keeping the balance of armaments at the lowest possible level consistent with regional security in that part of the world. The parties have committed themselves to agreed levels of armaments. The agreement was signed in Florence at the Bosnia review conference on 14 June. The NATO-led implementation force has agreed to verify compliance with the agreement, so compliance will not be, as the hon. Gentleman seemed to imply, voluntary. Verification will be done in conjunction with Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe arms control experts, leading to a verified reduction in the armaments held by some, particularly the Bosnian Serbs. Some room will be left for rearming by the Bosnian-Croat Federation, however.
Sir Russell Johnston:
The fact that General Mladic is still at large and confident enough to go to Belgrade without being arrested--and still in charge of the Bosnian Serb army--leads many of us to doubt whether he will co-operate in any large-scale reduction in armaments.
Mr. Davis:
I will not be drawn any further on this--nor would the hon. Gentleman expect me to be. My point stands.
Britain is leading the way towards the new flexibility goals in three key areas. First, the Atlantic alliance has not stood still as the world has changed around it. The end of the cold war and subsequent regional instability have changed the strategic environment radically. Since the fall of the iron curtain, Britain has played a key role in moving NATO towards the more flexible structure that is now required. The landmark decisions taken by NATO Ministers in Berlin on 3 June were a mark of our success. They pave the way for reform of NATO's command structure, allowing it to respond quickly and effectively to future regional crises such as the one that occurred in Bosnia.
Agreement on the combined joint task force concept will allow NATO headquarters facilities to be deployed systematically for operations involving NATO and non-NATO countries. The decision to build a European security and defence identity within NATO will allow the Western European Union to provide political control and strategic direction for European operations drawing on NATO assets, capabilities and planning.
The last point is of fundamental importance. It means, in effect, that a European identity can be built in partnership with NATO, using common structures. It also means that NATO will be able to draw strength from the desire of Europeans to do more for their security--both
in operations involving all the allies and, more rarely, when the United States does not wish to be directly involved in European operations under WEU political control. This ends the prospect of any European Union identity competing with NATO--that is an important point.
Secondly, no one would claim that the Western European Union has been a central player in European security during the past 50 years, important though its actions have been. It gained useful experience in operations in the Gulf and in Yugoslavia. It will need more experience, and robust machinery for control and direction of operations using NATO assets, if it is to fulfil the role accorded to it at Berlin.
That role will not involve operations of the scale and complexity of IFOR. Such tasks must continue to be carried out by European countries working together with our north American partners. The Western European Union should be able to carry out smaller peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks, working closely with NATO and the European Union. Giving the WEU the necessary operational capability to do just that has been the top priority for the British presidency of the WEU in the first half of this year.
We have made considerable progress over the past six months. This is summarised in the declaration of the Western European Union Ministers at Birmingham on 7 May, a copy of which has been deposited in the Library. In short, we have developed working links with NATO. The conclusion of a security agreement between the two organisations last month means that the WEU will be able to receive classified NATO intelligence and information in the future.
We have promoted practical co-operation between the WEU and the EU where it makes sense for the two organisations to work together, such as in relation to evacuation planning and Mostar. We have established within the WEU a situation centre and an intelligence section, both of which are vital if the WEU council is to have the up-to-the-minute information that is needed to make operational decisions.
We have made it easier for the widest possible range of European countries to contribute to the work of the WEU by agreeing to procedures for the participation of neutral countries in WEU operations, by allowing the central European associate partners to play a greater role and by strengthening relations with Russia and the Ukraine. I am grateful for the recognition that all these measures received in the Defence Committee's recent report on the WEU, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood referred.
These developments, and the decisions taken by NATO Foreign Ministers at Berlin, are of fundamental importance for the intergovernmental conference--which is the third area that I intend to address. Defence is one of the issues that Maastricht agreed should be reviewed at the IGC. In our view, there is no urgent need to rewrite the provisions of the Maastricht treaty that deal with defence. The IGC is not central to the future of European defence--the success of IFOR and NATO adaptation is much more important to the evolution of what is sometimes called the European security architecture. The
IGC must avoid decisions that are driven by institutional theology rather than operational logic--that is an important point.
Arrangements for European security and defence must respond not only to a desire for bureaucratic or institutional tidiness, but to the real security challenges that we face in the years ahead. That is why we will continue to oppose proposals that aim at an eventual merger of the EU and WEU, or subordinating the WEU to the authority of the EU. Those approaches are simply not practical--they would be a recipe for less effective, not more effective, European action.
Not all members of the EU are full members of the WEU. It would be wrong for countries that do not share obligations to defend each other's territory as enshrined in article V of the Washington treaty and to have an equal say in decisions on defence binding those who do. The Berlin Foreign Ministers' communique makes quite clear that NATO assets and capabilities are to be made available on a case-by-case basis for European operations under the control and direction of WEU.
It is not realistic to expect allies to make these assets available if the EU ultimately gives the orders. The EU has neither the expertise nor the purely intergovernmental structure necessary for the life-and-death decisions that are needed during military operations. There can be no question of the Government allowing the Commission, the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice a say in decisions affecting the safety of British forces; the IGC can complement the progress already made in NATO and the WEU towards effective and credible arrangements open to a wide range of European countries.
Last year, the Prime Minister set out in the House our approach to defence at the IGC. He made clear that keeping NATO strong as the bedrock of European security would be our first priority. That remains the case, and it will always remain the case. He underlined our determination to develop European defence co-operation in the WEU as a means of strengthening NATO. He proposed a reinforced partnership between the EU and an autonomous WEU so that the political, economic and military elements of European crisis management could be properly co-ordinated.
I shall now address some of the specific points that hon. Members have raised during the debate and, first, I refer to co-operation in defence equipment procurement. We play a full and active part in the western European armaments group, which is the main forum for the discussion of issues related to European armaments co-operation. We are also exploring with France and Germany the conditions for cooperation within the armaments structure that they have pioneered. Both countries have agreed in principle to United Kingdom participation. This is good news for British industry and for the British taxpayer. Discussions with France and Germany are at a preliminary stage at this point. We hope to start work soon on an intergovernmental memorandum of understanding that will define in more detail how the armaments structure will work.
We believe that intergovernmental decision-making remains the correct approach to this and to all other policy areas related to defence, but we have no desire for a "Fortress Europe" to develop. We value our transatlantic defence trading relationship and we will continue to conduct business with the United States where that best
suits our requirements. We remain committed to value for money and to competition in our procurement. European protectionism is a recipe for stagnation, as the hon. Member for Gateshead, East said.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood raised the question of a specifically European nuclear deterrent. I see no advantage in addressing this issue outside the transatlantic framework. Nuclear deterrence is bound up with the defence of our territory and that of our allies. Collective territorial deterrence is a matter for Europeans and north Americans working together in NATO. No Government are seriously suggesting that that should change--we certainly are not.
I agree that to give the EU military responsibilities for which it is not equipped would impede the task of extending stability and prosperity to the east. It would create a new obstacle to EU membership for central European countries and it would unnecessarily provoke Russian fears--a point that was touched on by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough and by my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood.
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |