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8.7 pm
Mr. Andrew Hunter (Basingstoke): It is a privilege to take up the remarks of the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Sir J. Molyneaux). Not for the first time, and I am sure not for the last, I find that I substantially agree with the greater part of his speech. I detect, however, one area of disagreement, with which I shall deal later. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not take exception to what I shall say.
As for the substantial business of the evening, the issue is somewhat academic. There is no alternative. Indeed, there are no options. The Northern Ireland Act 1974 must be renewed. When we debate the other hardy annuals, the emergency provisions and prevention of terrorism legislation, hon. Members sometimes make the point that they wish different circumstances would prevail and that the day would come when renewal would no longer be necessary. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State said in his opening remarks, the same argument applies to the measure that is before us.
We look forward to the day when there need no longer be direct rule in Northern Ireland. We look forward, of course, to the time when the democratic deficit can be addressed positively by the establishment of acceptable forms of government in the Province. Whatever our analysis of the present situation in Northern Ireland, and whatever our personal future agendas on Northern Ireland, we can agree that, for the time being, there is no alternative but to renew the 1974 Act.
As for the present situation, from one point of view, as the saying goes, it is a case of "I think we'll have to think it out again"; it is time to go back to the drawing board. The bomb last Saturday certainly brought destruction to Manchester. It also blew apart many of the illusions that had dogged the so-called "peace" process for many months.
As I see things, we are, in a manner of speaking, back at base. In effect, we are starting out again. In that context, I shall make just three brief observations. I shall state them simply and then expand them. First, in prevailing or foreseeable circumstances, the Provisionals' participation in the process has come to an end. Secondly, the talks should continue without the Provisionals. Thirdly, we should revise our priorities; security issues should now share equal prominence with the search for political agreement between the constitutional parties.
First--regarding the Provisionals' participation in the process--it is, I contend, self-evident that the Manchester bomb has underlined and reinforced Sinn Fein-IRA's self-exclusion from the process. Both in prevailing and in
foreseeable circumstances it seems that that self-exclusion is now absolute. The leader writer in The Independent on Monday made the point when he wrote:
Mr. Adams says that he will not be deflected from the search for peace. Of course, if he is serious, he can begin immediately. He can unequivocally and unreservedly condemn those who planted the bomb in Manchester and those who murdered Garda Officer McCabe. He can publicly renounce, denounce and repudiate the IRA, but he will not do that. Unless he does, talk of "unauthorised" IRA operations and divisions within the Republican movement count for nothing, and Sinn Fein-IRA's self-exclusion will remain absolute.
Moreover, the renewing of a so-called "ceasefire" at some point in the future as the key to entry into negotiations is surely now woefully inadequate. The first point is that the Provisionals are out; we can regard their self-exclusion as absolute. The second point is that the talks must go on. Faced with the Provisionals' self-exclusion, there is a choice for the two Governments and the other parties: either to call it a day, pack their bags and go home, or to continue without Sinn Fein.
I strongly reject the argument that talks without Sinn Fein are not worth the candle. I welcome the Government's decision to press on, and I understand that that is the decision of the other parties as well. First, the primacy of importance that some commentators and politicians have hitherto given to Sinn Fein's participation has been misplaced. It is highly questionable that an agreement involving Sinn Fein was ever achievable. It is even more questionable now.
I do not believe that the Provisionals have ever been interested in compromise, and they are not interested now. They are not prepared to accept anything short of what can be sold to their supporters as a transitional package leading clearly and inevitably to a united Ireland; an irreversible step on the road to that united Ireland, regardless of the wishes of the majority of the people of
Northern Ireland. It is self-evident that such a transitional package would be unacceptable to all Unionists, both on the mainland and in Northern Ireland--and rightly so.
Secondly, talks without Sinn Fein are effectively a revival of the three-strand talks, the so-called Brooke initiative of 1991--I refer to my right hon. Friend the Member for City of London and Westminster, South(Mr. Brooke)--which my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State resumed in 1992. On this, I have a slight difference of understanding from the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley, as I do not believe that the exercises were fruitless. He made a point about the breakdown on strand 1 issues. My understanding is that agreement was well and truly in sight but the Social Democratic and Labour party--I regret that no member of it is here to correct or answer me on this point--changed its position, to the surprise of others, at the last moment. I believe that it was possible during those talks--I believe that it is possible now--dimly to discern potentially promising areas of common ground and common thinking between Unionists and nationalists. I believe that it is worth exploring that ground again.
Sir James Molyneaux:
I can set the hon. Gentleman's mind at rest. I was not implying that the talks were a complete failure, because, as he said, much ground work was done. The phrase used at the time, as the Secretary of State will remember, was that they were "banked". They are still there. The only difference between the hon. Gentleman and me is that I was far too delicate to apportion the blame to my neighbours from the SDLP, who are not here at the moment.
Mr. Hunter:
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that clarification.
I was listing the reasons that I believe that negotiations, talks, without Sinn Fein should be pursued, and the last reason I have for holding that position is my belief that an agreement reached by the representatives of 85 per cent. of the people of Northern Ireland is better than no agreement at all. The resolution of Northern Ireland's "democratic deficit" is highly desirable. Moreover, an agreement by the 85 per cent. on the form of Government within the Province and on the structures for communication and co-operation with the Republic would further isolate the men of violence. I argue that it is not unreasonable to hope that Unionists and constitutional nationalists can find substantial areas for agreement through negotiations. My second point, then, is that negotiations should proceed with Sinn Fein.
My third and final point is this. I believe that we should revise our priorities in an important respect. That is not a thought that I have previously shared with my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State, but I do not think that he will consider it heretical, because he alluded to much of what I believe in his opening remarks.
The reality is that the IRA is at war with the British and Irish people. Since 9 February, IRA active service units have planted no fewer than seven bombs on the mainland, and more can be expected. They have murdered two people, and they could have murdered many more. They have injured more than 300 people--I fear, scarring and psychologically traumatising some for life. The cost of repairing the damage by those bombs is in the region of half a billion pounds, and this campaign has not been as intensive as some in the past.
The IRA safely stores the greater part of its arsenal of weapons and explosives in the Republic of Ireland.
Mr. Thomas McAvoy (Glasgow, Rutherglen):
Will the hon. Gentleman explain what he means when he says that the IRA "safely stores" its arms in the Republic?
"The whole point of this process as originally envisaged was that it included Sinn Fein and the IRA. It is very hard to see how they can be brought back for a long time."
The leader writer in The Guardian on the same day made precisely the same point:
"There is no evidence that they"--
Sinn Fein--
"can deliver peace, and plenty of evidence that they intend to continue with war. Unless and until that changes, there is no point in talking to them in the current process."
After the Manchester bomb and after the shooting of the Garda officers in the Republic, there should be no illusions. There is no place in a civilised society for Sinn Fein-IRA, let alone in negotiations seeking to create in Northern Ireland new relations based exclusively on non-violence and democracy. It beggars belief. In Northern Ireland, they have threatened, intimidated, tortured and murdered. In England, they bomb shoppers on a Saturday morning. In the Republic of Ireland they shoot policemen. At the same time, they have the audacity to claim that they want peace and to take the gun out of Irish politics. There is no place for such people in negotiations, and there never can be while that mind set prevails.
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