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Mr. Don Foster: We understand the right hon. Gentleman's difficulty in giving categorical PFI assurances, and we accept those that he has given. However, what assurances are the Government giving as to the £54 million expected from the health service and the £20 million from the HEFC?
Mr. Brooke: They are part of the existing plan. I cannot be more definitive. If the hon. Gentleman wants to enter into correspondence with the Bill's promoters, he is free to do so. I have sought, from somewhat sparse knowledge, to reply as fully as I can to the debate. The HEFC for England has approved the business case, subject to the testing of the PFI process--so we cannot answer the question, "Will it be PFI?"
The hon. Member for Southwark and Bermondsey asked whether the enterprise is cost driven. Both UMDS and KCL started their dialogue by academic argument--they wanted merged departments. They needed to persuade the funding council that that was the way forward, rather than the council putting a gun to their head. The proposed physical location is the best option to achieve that end. The HEFC is not dictating the solution, but it requires proper academic and financial valuations before it gives its seal of approval.
Mr. Simon Hughes:
Although it is clearly good for students learning medicine and dentistry to see out-patients, it is as important for them to see in-patients. What is the logic of having academic teaching and students on the Guy's site and most of the in-patients on an entirely different site?
Mr. Brooke:
One disadvantage for my hon. Friend the Member for Chislehurst (Sir R. Sims) and myself is that my hon. Friend the Minister spoke early in the debate, so
The Bill's purpose is to secure a merger that would not be achieved by a federation, as was half hinted. If one expects an organisation such as King's to commit£70 million raised through the sale of its property to a new location on the Guy's site, that must be done with proper control and capacity for planning. I again commend the Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time, and committed.
As amended (in the Standing Committee), again considered.
Madam Speaker:
I remind the House that with this we are considering amendment Nos. 41 and 42.
Mr. Brooke:
I shall resume where I was interrupted by a most worthwhile Bill, which I am happy to say has now been carried.
At the moment of interruption, I was saying that I am conjoined in the new clause and the consequential amendments with my hon. Friend the Member for Eltham (Mr. Bottomley). He raised the same matters in Committee, where he was unable to move what is now new clause 11 but stated his intention to pursue the matter further on Report.
My hon. Friend warned me that the intercalated nature of the debate could prevent his being present in the Chamber, but he is with me in spirit. As the heart of the new clause lies in harmonising the law in Scotland with that provided for elsewhere in the Bill--notably in reducing the three years in Scotland to the single year provided in the Bill--I should make it clear that I do not have a single drop of Scottish blood and that, if I trample in any way on Scottish sensibilities, I hope that it will be attributed to the insensitivities of a Sassenach, albeit laced with Welsh and Ulster blood.
I tabled the new clause because media constituents asked me to do so at the last possible moment in the passage of the Bill. I acted immediately, without undertaking any research, to enable a debate to take place. As the matter was debated in Committee, I do not propose to rehearse all the arguments deployed there, but I want to give the Minister--who is a graduate of King's college and was most welcome in the previous debate--the chance to expand his arguments against the propositions of my hon. Friend the Member for Eltham, which were deployed in a necessarily helter-skelter manner in Committee.
On 6 June, my hon. Friend the Member for Eltham asked whether the Scottish Law Commission, which my hon. Friend the Minister prayed in aid in his remarks, could show why six years was needed in Scotland. My hon. Friend the Minister said that the Scottish Law Commission did not see the merit of reducing the period to one year, but he did not explain why. As the debate was to be revisited in a week's time, my hon. Friend the Member for Eltham asked the Minister to invite the Scottish Law Commission to send him the justification for leaving the period as it was. The Minister did not make such a commitment; instead he explained the problem of changing the law applying to Scotland without a Scottish Minister present in Committee and promised to consult Scottish Ministers the following week before the Committee returned to the subject, which satisfied my hon. Friend.
The following week, the Minister stated that the new clause would change Scottish law on the discretionary power of the courts to override the time limit. He said that the Government saw no reason to change that provision. He said that he had consulted Scottish Ministers, as he had promised, and had been assured that it had been fully considered and added that, in the light of comments received during consultation on the Bill in Scotland, there was no evidence that change was required in Scotland. He alluded to the Scottish Law Commission as part of the consultative process, but yet again he did not rehearse its views, as my hon. Friend had requested a week earlier.
My hon. Friend the Member for Eltham concluded the debate by reminding the Committee that it had not heard why three years were better for Scotland and it is my purpose--as it was my hon. Friend's intent--to return to
the issue in order to get a clear answer from the Government. As I implied at the beginning of my speech, the issue has exercised a number of media organisations in my constituency.
Mr. Boateng:
The right hon. Member for City of London and Westminster, South (Mr. Brooke) does the House a service by enabling us to return to this topic. Circumstances required us not to spend as much time on it as perhaps some of our number would have liked in Committee.
'(1) The Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 18A (limitation of defamation and other actions), for subsection (1) substitute--
"(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) below and section 19A of this Act, no action for defamation shall be brought unless it is commenced within a period of one year after the date when the right of action accrued."
(3) In section 19A (power of court to override time-limits, etc).
(a) for subsection (1) substitute--
"(1) Where a person would be entitled, but for any of the provisions of section 17 or section 18 and 18A of this Act, to bring an action, the court may, if it seems equitable to do so, allow him to bring the action (or to bring any specified cause of action to which the action relates) notwithstanding that provision."
(b) after subsection (1) insert--
"(1A) In acting under this section in respect of causes of action falling within section 18A of this Act, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to--
(a) the degree to which the operation of section 18A of this Act prejudices the pursuer or any person whom he represents;
(b) the degree to which any decision of the court under this section would prejudice the defender or any person whom he represents;
(c) the length of, and the reasons for the delay on the part of the pursuer;
(d) where the reason or one of the reasons for the delay was that all or any of the facts relevant to the cause of action did not become known to the pursuer until after the end of the period mentioned in section 18A--
(i) the date on which any such facts did become known to him; and
(ii) the extent to which he acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the facts in question might be capable of giving rise to an action; and
(e) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, relevant evidence is likely--
(i) to be unavailable, or
(ii) to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the period mentioned in section 18A.
(1B) In the case of an action for malicious falsehood brought by a personal representative, the references in subsection (1A) above to the pursuer shall be construed as including the deceased person to whom the cause of action accrued and any previous personal representative of that person."
(4) The amendments made by this section apply only to rights of action arising after the section comes into force.'.--[Mr. Brooke.]
Question again proposed, That the clause be read a Second time.
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