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Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): I think that other hon. Members want to thank the members of the Committee for the work that they have done. Often, colleagues remain absolutely unpraised for having worked very hard on the House's behalf.
Armies may march on their stomachs, but they also march on their feet. To speak anecdotally, I have been told by a constituent that the British footwear is nothing like as good as that of the Americans. Did the Committee see any evidence of that? Should there be an improvement in footwear for such operations?
Mr. Colvin:
That is a useful intervention. I can confirm that the Defence Committee has expressed concern about footwear for very many years and has noted in earlier visits to Bosnia that British soldiers were buying other countries' military footwear--often Canadian footwear, which is a good design. Perhaps my hon. Friend the Minister can confirm that, as I have been told, something has now been done about footwear. I believe that the Army has at last agreed on a new design of boot. I see that my hon. Friend is itching to get to his feet--no doubt not wearing the new footwear. Perhaps he can enlighten the House.
The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Nicholas Soames):
I endorse what the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) said about the hard work of the Select Committee, which has clearly produced a very valuable report. What he said about footwear was certainly true in the past, but it is now very much untrue. The new design of footwear for the Army is, by common consent, as my hon. Friend would agree, by far the best that it has ever been. Indeed--I am sure that he will want to comment on this later--this generation of soldiers are the first who have worn with pleasure on operations the kit with which they have been issued.
Mr. Colvin:
I am delighted that my hon. Friend was able to confirm what I said. I thank him and the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) for their kind remarks about the Defence Committee. Not only do we go out to find what is happening on the ground, but I have a feeling that we have a reputation for producing more constructive reports than any other Select Committee.
Sir Russell Johnston (Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber):
I remind the hon. Gentleman that he said that other contingents were envious of the food served to the British Army. Is that also true of the French contingent?
Mr. Colvin:
It was indeed true. We did not have an opportunity to sample the French food. Had we had such an opportunity, we probably would not have been able to take advantage of it, because we had fed so well with the British troops. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention.
This debate is about estimates, so it is appropriate to ask who pays for the IFOR operation in Bosnia. The latest estimates of the additional cost of British forces serving
with IFOR is £85 million for 1995-96 and £120 million for 1996-97. This is a debate on expenditure, so it is appropriate to ask where that money will come from. In previous years, under UNPROFOR, the additional cost was borne by the Foreign Office and eventually reimbursed by the United Nations. The cost of IFOR is currently being borne by the Ministry of Defence. Although that may make sense in the short term, it could have serious implications for defence spending on other projects.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State told the Select Committee on 12 June that he would seek reimbursement from the contingency reserve only if the cost of IFOR took defence spending this year over the planned level. That means that if non-IFOR expenditure by the MOD falls short of the planned target for the year--often the result of delayed equipment purchases--the MOD will bear the full cost of IFOR. The result of that must be that permission to carry over any underspending from this year to next year will be affected. Thus, the cost of Bosnia will almost certainly be at the expense of other defence spending--probably on equipment, and as was mentioned in business questions, we are awaiting announcements on a number of major procurement decisions. When we were visiting Washington, we noted that the United States had introduced a contingency element in the Pentagon's budget for such peacekeeping operations, and I believe that the United Kingdom should do the same.
A debate on Bosnia at this time would not be complete without some reference to war criminals. Some have questioned whether the British forces in IFOR should actively seek to arrest them. It is only fair to put on record the difficulty for force commanders of actively seeking out indicted men such as Messrs Karadzic and Mladic. In so far as their whereabouts are known, those two individuals are heavily protected, and any attempt to arrest them would inevitably involve the IFOR soldiers in fighting in which injuries and loss of life might occur. Judging by past experience of arresting Bosnian Serb generals, such an incident could pose a serious threat to stability, which would affect not only the personal safety of the soldiers but the path through the precarious elections now due, through to eventual peace in Bosnia.
We therefore concluded that it would be reasonable in the short term for IFOR to afford a higher priority to maintaining peace in Bosnia than to the active pursuit of war criminals, but that people suspected of such crimes would not be able to hide for ever.
Mr. David Winnick (Walsall, North):
I pay tribute, as I have done before, to the British forces in IFOR. However, does the hon. Gentleman accept a viewpoint different from the one that he has expressed, which is in the Committee's report? That viewpoint is that there will be and can be no lasting peace in former Yugoslavia unless the war criminals are brought to justice. Bearing in mind the fact that the crimes and atrocities that those people have committed are some of the worst since the Nazis committed their crimes, also in Yugoslavia, as well as elsewhere, should not a different instruction be given, despite all the difficulties that the hon. Gentleman has mentioned--an instruction that those notorious war criminals should be brought to justice?
Mr. Colvin:
There is every difficulty in doing so at the moment, but the House would wish that those people could be brought to justice before the deadline date for elections on 14 September, because their presence at that time could have a disruptive effect on the elections. From a personal point of view, I agree with the hon. Gentleman that their being brought to justice is essential for the long-term prospects for peace in Bosnia.
What about the future? It is almost certain that, before the House returns after the summer recess, Bosnia is bound to have featured heavily in the news. We should not be deluded by the relative peace so far into thinking that the British forces serving there are safe. In two months' time, the elections are due to be held in Bosnia, and the sheer mechanics of running them will place added strain on the peacekeeping forces and pose greater risks for them.
In a country in which four fifths of the population no longer live in the place where they were registered to vote in 1991, soldiers are bound to become involved in potential clashes as people try to return to areas where they are unwelcome. If the Minister of State for Defence Procurement catches your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, perhaps he will bring us up to date with the arrangements being set up by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe for the elections.
In the early stages, it was thought that people would have the right only to go back and vote in their original towns, but it is now proposed that they have an alternative--to vote where they currently live. That will present all sorts of difficulties for the 1 million or so Bosnians now living overseas, and the House would welcome the opportunity to be told about the election arrangements.
Whatever the results of the elections, it is clear that IFOR will not be able to withdraw completely by the end of its mission on 20 December. Judgments will have to be made after the elections on the scale and pace of the reduction in the peacekeeping forces. That makes some successor force almost inevitable. We believe that it should continue to be a NATO-led force and that it should involve the participation--at least on an equal basis--of the principal countries involved in IFOR.
Precipitative withdrawal before a lasting peace was established would be disastrous for Bosnia. That is why, even if our armed forces are overstretched without commitment, they must continue--perhaps on a smaller scale.
Mr. Nicholas Winterton (Macclesfield):
My hon. Friend asked who ultimately would meet the cost of the British contribution to IFOR in Bosnia. Will he continue to ask questions about the cost of an on-going presence in Bosnia? Will he join me in speculating as to whether the costs that we have to meet from the defence budget might be holding up other decisions such as that in respect of the requirement by the RAF of a replacement maritime patrol aircraft, which is particularly important to British Aerospace? The project would create thousands of jobs and benefit hundreds of firms in the north-west. Does he feel that current costs may prejudice the taking of such an urgent decision?
Mr. Colvin:
No. I congratulate my hon. Friend on getting in yet another plug about a procurement decision of considerable interest to his constituency, which will affect jobs in his region.
However, other factors are far more significant for the defence budget. For example, the rumours--and they may be no more than that--of cuts in the defence budget of some £400 million, which may have exercised the minds of members of the Cabinet who were discussing the matter this morning, are more relevant.
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