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The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Mr. James Arbuthnot): We have still not heard an answer to the question posed by my hon. Friend the Member for North Tayside (Mr. Walker). Is the hon. Gentleman committing himself to additional expenditure? He is accusing the Government of cutting resources. He can fudge as much as he likes about expenditure being whatever is necessary, but is he committing himself to additional expenditure?

Dr. Clark: I do not think that the cavalry has come to the Government's rescue. Let me say it again. At the last election, we pledged that we would provide whatever resources are necessary for the defence of Britain. I think that that is pretty clear and in a moment I will say how we shall reach a conclusion about what is necessary for the security of our nation.

One of the criticisms of the Government by politicians on both sides of the House and certainly by professionals in the military has been its failure to grasp the very nettle that the Government raised about taking key strategic decisions. It is remarkable that, of all the countries in the world, we are the only one that has not had a strategic defence review. The Government played around at the edges. We know that the Government had "Options for Change"--although they initially failed to involve the chiefs of staff in that, such was their confidence in them.

Later, the defence costs study was announced not by the Defence Secretary but by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. As I have told the House before, it was a

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defence costs study, not a defence needs study. What else could we expect from the Government? Decisions are made not on strategic or defence criteria but mainly on criteria demanded by the Treasury.

Mrs. Dunwoody: Will my hon. Friend ask Ministers again whether they intend to go ahead with the privatisation of national air traffic services, even though there has been no consultation with the RAF or the civil aviation authorities? Only those who seek to make enormous amounts of money for themselves from privatisation have been consulted.

Dr. Clark: My hon. Friend raises a pertinent point. It was not good enough for the Secretary of State to avoid answering the very direct question that she put to him earlier. I hope that the Minister will address that. I hope that it is not another example of selling the nation's assets to the friends and bankers of the Conservative party.

A Labour Government would be prepared to face up to the responsibility. We shall establish a strategic defence review. We have made it clear in our documents and discussions that the review will not be a cost-cutting exercise. It will report within six months of its establishment and will provide not only a blueprint for our security but stability for our armed forces and defence industry. On top of that, Labour will institutionalise long-term strategic thinking in the MOD. That is critical and I wish that the Government had faced up to that reality. Without it, there can be no strategic plan to the size and shape of our forces.

Mr. Soames: Will the hon. Gentleman define what he means by stability for the armed forces?

Dr. Clark: It is the opposite of the situation that prevails under the Government. The armed forces complain that they have no sense of direction. They do not know what is being asked of them. They know only that they get more and more commitments, based on no strategic plan, with fewer and fewer resources.

Mr. Portillo: Is the hon. Gentleman claiming that the armed forces and the chiefs of staff favour a defence review?

Dr. Clark: I would not expect the chiefs of staff, given their constitutional position, to come out against the declared policy of the Government because they, like us and the Government, believe that the Defence Secretary is the constitutional head of our defence effort, not of the military.

Mr. Peter Hardy (Wentworth): Does my hon. Friend accept that a sensible, properly conducted review would not only serve this country's interest but might provide material with which we could persuade our European partners to carry a fairer share of the burden? Unfortunately, over the past few years, the Government have seemed most reluctant to do anything to persuade them to change their approach.

Dr. Clark: My hon. Friend again makes a powerful added argument for a strategic defence review.

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I know that the Government will not have it, but many members of the armed forces feel let down by them. There are many examples, such as the treatment of our Gulf war veterans. I heard what the Defence Secretary said about that. For three and a half years, we have argued that the Government have a moral duty fully to investigate the occurrence of illnesses among our Gulf war veterans. It is a moral duty because we asked our soldiers to serve in that conflict. We must do all that we can to ascertain whether there is something wrong with those soldiers. If we have to send our troops to the Gulf again, we would owe it to them to be able to give them assurances about their health.

There may or may not be a Gulf war syndrome but there appears to a concentration of unexplained illnesses among our soldiers who served in the Gulf. Three and a half years ago, I called for an independent medical inquiry and a full epidemiological study to examine the allegations. Three and a half years later, Ministers are still dragging their feet. It is clear that the Government had made up their mind before any medical research had been undertaken. That is the action of a Government who are not committed to the welfare of our armed forces. It was only after concerted pressure from veterans' groups and from the House that the Minister of State for the Armed Forces conceded and established an epidemiological study this January. It is a scandal that such grudging and limited action has been taken more than five years after the Gulf war.

Last week, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces wrote to the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee to point out that an error had been made in evidence given by the Ministry about the Gulf war. Concern was expressed about the use of organophosphate chemicals, about which I learnt much when I was handling the agricultural portfolio and which have had a devastating effect on many sheep farmers. Many of the symptoms associated with those chemicals have been experienced by Gulf war veterans.

I read carefully what the Minister of State for the Armed Forces said. He accepted full responsibility and in December 1994 told the hon. Member for Romsey and Waterside (Mr. Colvin):


note the use of the personal pronoun--


    "that one OP pesticide was used to treat Iraqi prisoners of war and that, while OP insecticides were available to British Forces in the Gulf, they were not used."

The Minister discovered that that information was wrong. In my exuberance, I may have offended him and I apologise. I retract the comment that I made about him but I want to challenge him on several specific points. He knows, or should know, that that information was wrong because an Army document of 31 March 1991 headed, "Post Operational Report: Hygiene--4th Armoured Brigade", made it clear that organophosphates had been used.

Will the Minister confirm that paragraph 1 of that document begins:


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    Will he further confirm that paragraph 3 states:


    "Soldiers SOP"--

standard operating procedure--


    "Equipment--inferior issue to junior ranks . . . NBC canisters had expired, no bergens"--

rucksacks--


    "issued, soldiers had to locally purchase this essential item"?

The next paragraph states:


    "No hygiene equipment was sent to theatre with the deployment of the fourth brigade."

Perhaps the Minister can now understand why I was angry. He should have read that document, which should have been available for him in his red box in December 1994 with the memorandum that went to the Select Committee.

Mr. Robathan: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Dr. Clark: First let me make this important point.

The truth is that at no time was personal protective equipment issued to those troops applying the insecticides--often organophosphates. Furthermore, orders were given that nuclear, biological and chemical suits should not be worn for insecticidal spraying since that would undoubtedly have led to a degradation of the equipment. In other words, the integrity of the equipment was placed above the safety of our soldiers. I do not apologise for my anger, but I apologise for the words I used against hon. Members. If that information was withheld, however, what else is being withheld from the public?

Mr. Robathan: The hon. Gentleman raises a serious matter which needs a full airing. Can the hon. Gentleman please inform the House who wrote the report and what rank he held? That report contains serious, devastating comments, but if it was just written by one person, who perhaps did not have the full facts at his fingertips, it is important to know that. If it was written by someone in a more senior position, that is also important to know.


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