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Dr. Gilbert: The question is whether we are expanding NATO to enhance our security or to enhance the security of the new candidate member states. The countries that are the most qualified are those that least need their security enhanced, whereas the countries that most need their security to be enhanced, such as the Baltic states, are those that are least qualified. Estonia, for example, has a terrible problem. It has a population of 1.5 million, no means of self-defence and 600,000 Russians.
Mr. Colvin: The right hon. Gentleman's point is valid. What he says proves that there should be no associate membership, no half membership and no semi-alliance status. A new member country will enjoy the rights and privileges of membership of the alliance and must share to the full its political and military obligations, including the mutual security obligation--the so-called article 5 guarantee of the Washington treaty.
There are 65 NATO headquarters around the world. There has been some discussion about restructuringand a reorganisation. The NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Solano, has recently been floating the idea of reorganising NATO's structures in the western Europe, Mediterranean and Iberian Atlantic area, as part of moves, perhaps, to bring Spain and France within NATO's integrated military structure. His suggestion that NATO might close down GibMed and the command centre on the rock of Gibraltar as a precondition for Spain joining the integrated military structure of NATO is, I believe, both premature and probably wrong.
When the Select Committee was examining the southern flank of NATO we, its members, visited both GibMed to see the facility within the Rock and NATO IBERLANT in Portugal. We were more impressed with the Gibraltar facility than with IBERLANT, where soon after our arrival the lights fused and the entire command system went down.
If there is to be any reorganisation, the command centre at Gibraltar should be retained and not the other one, even if that means that Spanish service personnel might one day be helping to man the command centre within the Rock. The long-term benefits to Gibraltar as a NATO base
would be significant. There would be the opening of the frontiers on a permanent basis, and there would be no more obstruction by the Spanish authorities. That would be very much in Gibraltar's favour.
As I have said, the members of the Select Committee visited Gibraltar as part of their southern flank study. The possibility of threats from north Africa must be reassessed before we start changing the existence of NATO structures within the region. There seems to be a crescent of crisis stretching all the way from Afghanistan to the western Sahara, with trouble all the way. There is a proliferation of arms along with a growth of fundamentalist tendencies and the collapse of some economies. There is trouble there which NATO will have to address. The security of the Mediterranean is becoming much more important. As the Russians find oil in the Caucasus the route for it will be out through the Mediterranean at the Straits of Gibraltar. That stresses again the importance of Gibraltar.
The problem that I have outlined calls for an extension of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe to cover north Africa so that we might try to help the economies of countries in that area and thus prevent from arising the circumstances that could trigger the military adventures to which I have referred. If the OSCE, which has 53 members already, is too cumbersome for that purpose, perhaps a southern partnership for peace, as suggested by the North Atlantic Assembly, could be set up.
Mr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East):
I welcome the opportunity to associate myself with the remarks of the hon. Member for Romsey and Waterside (Mr. Colvin), who is the Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence, of which I am a member. He presides over our proceedings with great elegance and considerable ability. However, his domestic analogy in relation to the postponement of procurement projects, which he likened to persuading one's wife that she should not have a new kitchen, found him treading on dangerous ground. I have met Mrs. Colvin and I would not like to be the man who stood in the way of her new kitchen. I suspect that the truth is that the hon. Gentleman does not stand very much in the way of anything that Mrs. Colvin wishes to do.
Mrs. Dunwoody:
Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
Mr. Campbell:
No. The hon. Member for Romsey and Waterside was on dangerous ground and I am on even more dangerous ground. It is time to move on.
We pay tribute in this debate every year to the armed services wherever they are called upon to serve. Over the years, as the tension ebbs and flows in Ulster, it has been obvious to us all that the lives of men and women serving on our behalf there are more or less at risk. Last week, at
Lisburn, once again there was injury and death. As has already been said, a brave man, Warrant Officer Bradwell, died in the course of serving his country.
We have an obligation to protect such men and women to the utmost of our ability. In the aftermath of the events at Lisburn, we must ask ourselves whether we are satisfied that, in that case, we did. It is extremely serious that terrorists were able to penetrate the security of the Army's headquarters in Northern Ireland.
I was glad to hear the Secretary of State say that there are Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary investigations. It will be in the nature of those investigations that hon. Members will not be entitled to know all that is discovered. Nothing would be more foolish in an investigation of security to make all the elements of the investigations public. I hope, however, that in due course the House will receive an assurance from the Secretary of State, or the appropriate Minister, that a full and comprehensive inquiry has been carried out. I hope also that if there are lessons to be learnt from that inquiry, those lessons will be learnt and that all the necessary steps will be taken.
Mr. Mans:
I am certain that the hon. and learned Gentleman agrees that a full inquiry should take place. Does he agree also that it was entirely inappropriate for Channel 4 News, when it reported the incident a day or two ago, to show on screen a complete plan of the barracks at Lisburn, and sensitive buildings in it, so anyone might know exactly what existed there and where to go?
Mr. Campbell:
Anything that reduces the security of those who continue to serve on our behalf in Northern Ireland is to be deprecated. It was an editorial judgment which I certainly would not have made.
Towards the end of his speech, the Secretary of State reminded us, correctly, that in Bosnia NATO had not been seriously tested. In the Gulf war, to which the right hon. Gentleman also alluded, we were not seriously tested either. It is important to realise that the capacity to continue to fight a high-intensity conflict depends on adequate numbers of men and items of equipment and clear political objectives. One of the reasons why we have been successful in Bosnia is the number of men and the quantity of equipment available and the clarity of the political objectives--in sharp contrast to those of the previous four years under the aegis of the United Nations Protection Force.
It is important to realise that, if we maintain our high-intensity warfare capability, modifying our troops and our approach to peacekeeping or peacemaking may not be easy, but such changes can be made. If, on the other hand, we maintain our forces and equipment at the peacemaking and peacekeeping level, it is impossible to move from that to the level of high-intensity warfare.
It is the proud boast of Canada that its troops have participated in every United Nations peacekeeping operation since they began. However, as a consequence of that wholly laudable commitment, the configuration of Canada's armed forces has been geared to peacekeeping and peacemaking, so that its capacity to fight high-intensity warfare has been substantially eroded.
It is no secret that I, along with some of my hon. Friends, believe in far greater integration with our European partners in defence matters. Nothing that has
happened in the past year--since we last debated these matters--has persuaded me otherwise. I say again, as I said then, that these issues will be driven by economics rather than by institutions. Against the background of reducing defence budgets in Europe, we shall be able to maintain a range and depth of capability only by greater co-operation. It has at last been recognised that the European defence industry must be much more cohesive so that it can compete sensibly with the much larger and more powerful defence industry of the United States.
Common procurement and force specialisation will, of necessity, be the way ahead for European defence. We already have common procurement in the Eurofighter--to which I shall return in a moment--and in the common new generation frigate. Operational co-operation already takes place: the Franco-British air group, Franco-British nuclear co-operation--which, I am led to believe, takes place at a higher and more detailed level than is publicly known--the recently formed Dutch-Belgian joint naval command, the new Franco-Belgian naval accord, the Eurocorps and the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force are the components of organic policy development.
Let us be clear and lay a myth. No country will give up the right to determine when and where its troops will fight. That is a responsibility that national Governments and national Parliaments can never vacate, nor should they. Imagine France, with its proud military history, agreeing that a determination as to how and when French troops should fight should be made elsewhere. Imagine Germany, cautiously emerging from the constitutional presumption against its forces operating outside its boundaries, agreeing that such decisions should be made elsewhere.
Will the European security and defence identity develop further? Of course it will, and for the reasons that I have already given. On these occasions, I am always reminded of the remarks made in May 1994 by the Foreign Secretary who, as Secretary of State for Defence, was quoted in The Daily Telegraph as saying that the evolution of an EC defence policy was an inevitable consequence of Maastricht. Later that year, the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Witney (Mr. Hurd), spoke to the Franco-British Council and called for practical co-operation in European defence
During the summer, the Prime Minister told us that we had a moral duty not to take too much of citizens' resources by way of unnecessary taxation. This is an interesting philosophical issue. Does that moral duty create a higher obligation than the obligation to provide for the aged, the sick and the poor?
I have a moral question for the Prime Minister. Why does this country continue to permit arms exports to Indonesia? Hawk jets, Scorpion tanks and water cannon are already exported, and further exports are being
contemplated. There is evidence that the water cannon have been used in Jakarta against pro-democracy demonstrators.
Once such equipment leaves the United Kingdom, we have no control over its use, no matter what undertakings have been given. Are we prepared to accept the word of an Administration who say that they will not use equipment for a particular purpose, when at the same time they are engaged in the brutal suppression of the civil rights of the people of East Timor? I feel that, given Indonesia's ever worsening record on human rights, it is wrong for the United Kingdom to continue those exports. I say that as one who has supported British Aerospace, both on the Eurofighter and, more recently, by my robust opposition--along with other hon. Members, some of whom are in the Chamber--to the suggestion that we should lease in F16 aircraft rather than embark on the mid-life update of the Tornado. I will take no lessons from anyone about the need to assist British Aerospace, but I do not believe that the future of that company depends on, or should depend on, the export of Hawk aircraft to Indonesia.
If the debate has underlined anything, it has underlined the need for a general election. On the Conservative side of the House there is complacency, while on this side--perhaps the hon. Member for Motherwell, North (Dr. Reid) will not be cheering quite so much in a moment--there is caution. If we are to have a fundamental, full-scale strategic defence review, we must accept in advance that if it throws up circumstances in which an increase in expenditure is required, we must be prepared to make that increase and spend the money. That is the part of the jigsaw constructed by the hon. Member for South Shields (Dr. Clark) which has never been entirely clear.
If I have another criticism of the debate, it is the remarkable absence of any long-term thinking--perhaps that is due to the closeness of the general election. During the summer, the Canberra commission on the elimination of nuclear weapons published its report. Hon. Members may not agree with everything in that report, but it represents a detailed analysis of the steps that could be taken to achieve multilateral nuclear disarmament. No one has so far seen fit to refer to that.
We are left with the conclusion that the Government tend to stagger from one public expenditure settlement to another. It is true that announcements were made in the summer about the replacement of the maritime control aircraft, which I support, the conventionally armed stand-off missile and the anti-armour missile. I seek the assistance of the Minister of State for Defence Procurement on a technical point. As I understand it, the anti-armour weapon on the Apache is the Hellfire, whereas for fixed-wing Royal Air Force aircraft it is to be Brimstone. Have we lost something by not using the same anti-armour weapon both for rotary wing and for fixed wing? If not in this debate, perhaps the Minister might advise me by letter whether there is anything in what I just said.
We also know that the operational effectiveness of the armed services has been inhibited by a shortage of spares, reduced opportunities for training and a lack of manpower. For example, for the Royal Air Force,
expenditure on Tornado spares has fallen by one third, resulting in the cannibalisation of aircraft. In December 1995, six out of 36 aircraft at Bruggen were serviceable.
I understand from the announcement in the White Paper that we are coming home from Germany. When I suggested that last year, Ministers dismissed it. Now it is Government policy. It makes good financial sense.
On spares, I sometimes feel that we have not learnt the lesson of the Gulf war, to which the right hon. Member for Dudley, East (Dr. Gilbert) referred. It took three armoured divisions in Germany to produce one that was capable of going to war in the Gulf. We should have taken that serious lesson into account. After "Options for Change", so considerable has been the draw-down in forces that there is no reservoir from which to draw. In relation to spares, I believe that our situation is dangerously fragile.
On recruitment, the Army is only now recovering from the mistakes that were made during "Options for Change". Manpower shortage inevitably exacerbates overstretch. In the spring of 1996, 25 per cent. of the Army were deployed, while 11 per cent. were either preparing for, or were on leave after, operations.
I was glad to hear the Secretary of State confirm that if there is a military follow-on force in Bosnia--a follow-on force to IFOR--the United Kingdom will be part of it. I think that today is the first time that that commitment has been made publicly. There was, however, one caveat. He said, in response to my intervention, that a United States presence was also necessary. He did not specify whether he meant a United States presence on the ground or a United States presence by offering or contributing assets of another kind.
I am in no doubt that IFOR's effectiveness has been as a result of the United States' presence on the ground. It seems to me that if we are to have an effective and successful follow-on force under the aegis of NATO, a component from the United States on the ground will be fundamental. We must not have a return to the morass, over which UNPROFOR was obliged to preside, of ambiguous objectives and inadequate resources.
On the Navy, only reduced deployments in the Adriatic have allowed the achievement of the guidelines that apply to time spent in home port.
One had a sense that there was a touch of Dr. Pangloss in the Secretary of State's speech--all is for the best in the best of possible worlds. I hope that he will not regard it as overly personal if I say that, outside the ranks of the adoring blue-rinsed matrons in the Bournemouth conference hall, not many people believe that; certainly not the Defence Committee, which was unanimous in its conclusion that no more reductions in expenditure are tolerable. One might put the question slightly differently and say: if further cuts in expenditure are to be effected, tell us which commitments are to be abandoned.
The emergence of the use--much more widely than was appreciated--of organophosphates in the Gulf has been mentioned. It is fair to say that Ministers have not been slow to criticise their critics on this topic, but I believe that the House will be united in a desire to ensure that we do the best for the veterans of the Gulf conflict, and that we do the best that we can to ensure the fullest investigation of the contribution, if any, that the extended use of organophosphates has made to the condition of those who now claim to be suffering from Gulf war syndrome.
I have a number of questions that I wish to put to the Government. They are not for answer today, but they should lie at the very heart of the investigation and, in due course, the information should be given to the House. The first question is simple: who gave the instruction to use organophosphates? At what rank was the decision made? Were civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence aware that organophosphates were being used? If so, at what level within the Department? Were detailed instructions issued to minimise contact with service men and women? What investigation was carried out to determine whether it was safe to use organophosphates in the amounts in which they appear to have been used?
"putting our military assets . . . at the service of European defence".
Since those days, the emphasis of the Government's language has changed from time to time, no more so than when they are under the influence of the sea breezes of seaside conference towns. The march of events and the pressure of economics remain inexorable. In my judgment, the development of a European defence policy is an inevitable consequence with which we shall all have to learn to live, however enthusiastic or unenthusiastic we may be about the concept.
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