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Animal Experiments
6. Mr. Tony Banks: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which species of animals are currently being used by his Department or contractors in connection with the development of weapons, vehicles, vessels, aero planes and hardware. [353]
Mr. Arbuthnot: My Department does not use animals in connection with developing weapons or offensive capabilities. Where absolutely necessary it does use a number of animal species to help develop protective measures and procedures to safeguard service personnel against the hazards that they may face on the battlefield and elsewhere.
Mr. Banks: Would the Minister care to answer the questions about the species of animals that have been used; about how many experiments are being done on them; and about how many inspections are carried out by the Home Office? Those are the answers that we need to know. Many people will find it grotesque that animals should be used to find more efficient ways of killing other human beings--or of protecting human beings.
Mr. Arbuthnot: That is just what I have said does not happen. We do not use animals in connection with developing weapons or offensive capabilities. All the work that we do complies with the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. That involves inspections, announced and unannounced, by the Home Office. I have also set up an additional safeguard; I recently set up the independent Animal Welfare Advisory Committee to oversee animal welfare arrangements at Ministry of Defence research establishments. We do not perform animal experiments where it is possible to use any alternative--and would not wish to.
Mr. Wilkinson: Does my hon. Friend recall that Max Hoffmann described British first world war soldiers to General Ludendorf as "lions led by donkeys"? Can he assure the House, in the context of British participation in the projected European armaments agency--based on Franco-German armaments agencies--to develop weapons and equipment for the British armed forces, that there will be no question of Her Majesty's Government proving mulish or bovine in the pursuit of an objective that may militate against increased competition and access to British markets of high-quality American defence equipment?
Mr. Arbuthnot: Mulish or bovine? There will be no question of that.
Saddam Hussein
7. Mrs. Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the cost of Britain's contribution to the US and allied offensive against Saddam Hussein in September 1996. [354]
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Michael Portillo): The US military response in September to Saddam Hussein's aggression in northern Iraq, did not directly involve British forces. As a contingency measure some forces were put at higher readiness. The full costs of these cannot be separately identified, but included the deployment of two VC10 tankers to Cyprus at a cost of £88,000.
Mrs. Clwyd: Why has the Department not replied as promised to points raised during the defence estimates debate? A Minister said then that any points that had not been answered would be answered in writing, but I am still waiting for a reply.
It would have cost $3 million to bring peace to northern Iraq in January this year, but the allies--of which Britain is one--delayed. In September, the United States spent at least $200 million--a part of which must have been paid by this country--on an exercise that has done nothing except consolidate Saddam Hussein in northern Iraq. Is that good value for money?
Mr. Portillo:
My hon. Friend the Minister of State will write to the hon. Lady, who makes a number of assumptions that I do not share. She believes that a vigorous and expensive diplomatic effort to bring the Kurds together would necessarily have resulted in peace, but I am not sure that that would have been the case. One of her points in a recent speech was that a budget cut made it difficult for the Americans to pursue their diplomatic effort, and she suggested that we needed a more expensive diplomatic effort. She assumes that Saddam Hussein would not have chosen some other opportunity to remilitarise and to repress the population, but I believe that he would have seized any opportunity at any time to test the willpower of the international community. Money was required for a demonstration by the United States--backed by the United Kingdom--that we would not allow Saddam Hussein to get away with aggression, and I believe that money spent in that way is money well spent.
Mr. Brazier:
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the costs of allowing Saddam Hussein to achieve his long-term goal--sovereignty over the area that produces most of the world's oil--would be literally incalculable? Would not it be totally wrong for us to stand back and leave the entire responsibility for containing that dangerous, powerful and evil man to the United States alone?
Mr. Portillo:
I entirely agree that that would be a catastrophically expensive option, and the United States deserves--and, under this Government, receives--our support. As it turned out, the method used to demonstrate to Saddam Hussein that he would not be allowed to get away with remilitarisation did not involve the direct participation of British forces, but we were pleased to make certain contingency arrangements and to allow the United States to use Diego Garcia.
Bosnia
8. Mr. Churchill: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement about British forces in Bosnia beyond the end of 1996. [355]
Mr. Portillo: If there were any international military force in Bosnia in 1997, we would expect it to be NATO-led and we would expect the UK to play its part alongside our allies.
Mr. Churchill: Does my right hon. Friend agree that IFOR has proved to be a powerful demonstration of NATO effectiveness, and that a key ingredient of its success has been the full participation of United States forces? Does he further agree that all the efforts made by our Government, our service men and women and our allies in the past four years would come to nothing if the United States does not extend its commitment to maintaining the peace in Bosnia beyond the end of the year?
Mr. Portillo: Clearly, the international community must be involved in Bosnia next year, and my hon. Friend's assumption--that that will involve a military component--is shared by many others. Any military component must involve the United States, and the US Administration have made it perfectly clear that a NATO operation would have to involve the US. The importance of alliance solidarity is well recognised by the US Administration, but they are waiting, as we all are, for the decisions--whatever they may be--to be ratified at the London conference at the beginning of December.
Dr. Reid: The Secretary of State will know that the presence of our troops in Bosnia has helped to save thousands of lives. If there is to be a continued presence, the Opposition will support British troops participating with our major allies on the ground. Does he accept that when the winter snows have melted and the refugees have returned, the tasks and conditions confronting any military force will change considerably and that it would be easy for such a force to be sucked into a civilian policing role? Will he therefore give an assurance that if our troops are to participate in Bosnia after the end of the year, they will have clear objectives, rules of engagement and tasks that will be within the competence and expertise of a military force and will not replicate tasks that should be carried out by a civilian police force?
Mr. Portillo: Of course, if there is to be a military presence next year, it will have clear objectives and the military will be asked to perform tasks suitable to the military. I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's support for the policy that we have been pursuing. I am also grateful that Labour policies were not pursued over the past 17 years, so that the troops were available to send to Bosnia.
Mr. Mans: Does my right hon. Friend agree that, if British forces are to be in Bosnia next year, they must be properly funded? Will he impress on his Cabinet colleagues--particularly the Chancellor--that that money must come from outside the defence budget or, if it is to
come from inside the defence budget, that it must be in addition to funds that would have been made available were our forces not to be in Bosnia next year?
Mr. Portillo: It is, indeed, recognised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the costs of the IFOR mission are eligible for a claim on the reserve.
Gulf War Syndrome
9. Ms Eagle: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on his policy concerning Gulf war syndrome. [356]
Mr. Soames: The health and well-being of our service personnel is our prime concern. A very substantial body of work is being undertaken, including that by the Medical Research Council and in co-ordination with the United States authorities, on illness that may be associated with Gulf service. We retain an open mind and are determined to get to the root of this difficult and extremely complex question.
Ms Eagle: Is it not disgraceful that it took five years to discover that highly dangerous organophosphate pesticides were used by our Gulf war troops without protection and that that might have caused some of the problems of Gulf war syndrome? Will the Minister explain why he was not aware of that until recently?
Mr. Soames: The hon. Lady will know that those matters were aired during the statement on the defence estimates. I am happy to say again to the House that I share the profound concern of everyone that the information should have come to light so late. We deeply regret that it had not been brought to our attention before now and that such a highly pertinent factor should have been ignored. The hon. Lady probably goes too far when she says, in a general way, "without protection"--we do not know that it was without protection. The work that we have laid in hand--very extensive, important, detailed and thorough inquiries--will define and find out exactly the circumstances in which OPs were used. I give hon. Lady my assurance that, the minute that that information is to hand, I shall bring it to the House.
Dr. Goodson-Wickes: The House will be aware of the well-justified reputation of the Ministry of Defence as a good and caring employer. In that context, my hon. Friend will be aware that two of the possible factors put forward as causes of the alleged Gulf war syndrome--inoculations and insecticides--were employed to protect our troops. I congratulate my hon. Friend on the vigorous way in which he has dealt with this difficult matter, but will he give an assurance that he is making the maximum possible effort to speed up research, both on purely scientific grounds and to offset the understandable emotions generated by the issue?
Mr. Soames: I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend, who served in the Gulf along with my hon. Friend the Member for Blaby (Mr. Robathan). Both my hon. Friends are aware of the difficulties that arise in time of war, when everyone is under great pressure and action has to be taken to secure the health and welfare of our service
men and women. I give my hon. Friend the assurance he asked for: we will get to the bottom of the matter, which is why we have commissioned the finest medical research brains in the land--the Medical Research Council--to recommend what further research we should do. As soon as I have all that information to hand, I shall bring it to the House so that hon. Members can make their own judgment. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the views that he expressed.
Dr. David Clark: Does the Minister understand that withholding from the House for five and a half years information about the use of organophosphates on our troops in the Gulf, was not only inexcusable but emphasises the Government's half-hearted attempts to tackle the problem of Gulf war syndrome? Is he absolutely satisfied that the excellent work of Dr. Coker and his single medical assistant will be sufficient to examine and diagnose more than 1,000 personnel who served in the Gulf?
Mr. Soames: The hon. Gentleman always spoils a sensible case, ruining it with his presentation. He and the rest of the House should be extremely cautious about making links between what is important new information and a broad range of illnesses, which may or may not constitute a syndrome. As for the suggestion that we deliberately withheld such information, that is a gratuitous insult and a foolish thing to say. I have told the hon. Gentleman, as I have told the House, that no one regrets more than I do the fact that that information did not come to our attention earlier.
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