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Zaire
3.31 pm
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Michael Portillo): With permission, Madam Speaker, I would like to make a statement about Zaire.
The Great Lakes region of Africa is facing a complex emergency and a potential humanitarian catastrophe. Throughout this century, violent clashes have occurred periodically between local tribes and Tutsis of Rwandan origin who have lived in Zaire for generations, who are known as Banyamulenge. Those tensions have been aggravated by the arrival in Zaire of more than 1.2 million refugees fleeing conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi.
Despite efforts by the international community, and the Government of Zaire, those refugees have been unwilling to return to Rwanda. The presence among them of up to 50,000 armed militia has been a destabilising factor in the region. Violence flared earlier this year, when Tutsi and other groups were attacked by armed Hutu militia, who are known as Interahamwe and who carried out the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and also by elements of the Zairean army.
The current crisis was precipitated by Zaire's decision to withdraw citizenship from the Banyamulenge, and its threat to expel them from Zaire. The Banyamulenge retaliated by counter-attacking in areas close to the borders with Rwanda and Burundi, and they captured the main towns in Kivu province. Zaire has portrayed the conflict as an invasion by Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Rwanda says that all its troops that had been supporting the rebels have now withdrawn.
During the past 24 hours, fighting in the region is reported to have intensified. One thing at least is clear: if no action is taken, we could be facing a huge humanitarian tragedy. The United Nations has estimated that the death toll could rise in the next week to between 10,000 and 20,000 a day.
More than 800,000 refugees are reported to have left their camps, and 250,000 Zaireans have also left their homes. The UN Secretary-General's humanitarian co-ordinator is leading the humanitarian effort, and the UN Secretary-General is drawing up urgent plans for a humanitarian task force and planning an international conference to address the political causes of the conflict. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees organisation is struggling to distribute what aid it can. Our own Overseas Development Agency has done an excellent job and is in close contact with UN agencies and non-governmental organisations but, without help, the agencies will not be able to avert the impending disaster.
On 9 November, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for nations to plan for a multinational force to protect humanitarian relief and to promote refugee repatriation. Repatriation must feature in any lasting solution to the crisis. Because of the complexity and urgency of the task, the United Nations is looking to western nations to provide forces in the first instance.
Britain has been actively involved in contingency planning since last Friday. Canada has now emerged as the lead nation for a multinational force, and the United States, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Britain among western nations have indicated a willingness to participate. We understand that a number of African
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A statement from Washington last night made clear the United States' views on the key points relating to the mission. First, there is a need to assess fully the threat before deploying, and also a need to have the consent of the Governments of the nations in the area.
Secondly, the mission should be to facilitate the delivery of aid by civilian relief agencies and to allow the voluntary repatriation of refugees by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The mission would not include disarming the militias or policing the refugee camps.
Thirdly, the force will operate under chapter 7 rules of the UN charter, which permit an active enforcement role. It would not be a blue-hatted operation.
Fourthly, the participants would bear their own costs, and additional arrangements would need to be made to support participation by African nations, but non-troop-contributing countries which can afford it should also help to bear the costs.
Fifthly, the humanitarian mission should be of short duration--about four months. The exit strategy would then be to transfer responsibility for a more stable situation to other nations, whose task would be to ensure that the conditions of today did not recur.
Sixthly, the United States has made it clear that it would wish its involvement to be around Goma airfield, in establishing an air bridge to the region and providing a security corridor from Goma to the Rwandan border.
Those principles provide a good starting point for us to develop a full plan before the time our forces could deploy. Senior British military planners are in New York today working to develop joint thinking between the allies.
There are important additional questions to be settled. First, of course, is what level of force might be required were our entry into Zaire to be opposed, and how many would be needed to enable relief to reach those furthest scattered refugees. We need to settle detailed objectives flowing from the broad principles spelled out in Washington. In particular, we will need to agree critical matters such as the rules of engagement.
No British forces will be sent unless the Government are satisfied that the objectives are clear and attainable; that the prospects of handing on to a follow-on force are good; that command and control is clear; and that British forces are sufficient and well enough armed to protect themselves and to save lives.
Complex as those issues are, we must prepare ourselves now for action, since the urgency is great. I have authorised a small number of reconnaissance troops to travel to the area to assess the conditions that British forces would face. I have shortened the notice to move of certain units centred on the joint rapid deployment force.
The House will rightly ask why Britain should become involved in a place far from our country and where no vital national interest is engaged. It is because we are a civilised nation. We can that see people are about to die in their thousands, and we are one of the few nations on earth that has the military capability to help at least some of them. We recognise our humanitarian obligations. We take pride in our permanent membership of the
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Britain often faces such calls to action. I believe that we should respond out of our deep concern for our fellow man and with a sense of pride that Britain's armed forces can make a difference.
Dr. David Clark (South Shields):
The whole House is shocked by the extent and the horror of the humanitarian suffering in the Great Lakes region of Africa, which we have seen on our television screens. The international community simply could not stand idly by; rightly, it has been moved to act to alleviate that suffering. When the United Nations proposed the use of military force to try to facilitate the aid effort, it was appropriate that Britain should offer to play her part. Our troops are well trained and highly respected and they will acquit themselves very professionally. I know that all hon. Members wish them well in their very difficult task. [Hon. Members: "Hear, hear."]
It is a very risky venture, and we must ensure that we minimise the risk to our armed forces. Can the Secretary of State assure the House not only that will there be a clear mission objective but that there will be no mission drift such as we saw in Somalia? Will he assure the House also that contingency plans for an exit strategy are being worked upon in case that is needed? Is the Secretary of State certain that we have learnt the lessons of Bosnia and that sufficient troops will be made available and sent, with robust rules of engagement and the equipment to defend themselves?
Can the Secretary of State give the House a rough idea of how many British troops may be sent collectively to the region and what type of troops they will be? Is he thinking of front-line troops, paratroopers, the Marines or mainly support services?
The Secretary of State listed some very sensible proposals outlined by the United States Administration, and I press him for the Government's views on them. Do we basically endorse the American notion of the mission? In particular, the Americans' first point is that the operation can be undertaken only if it has the consent of the Governments in the region. Do we have any idea about the current position as to gaining that consent?
Can the Secretary of State be more forthcoming about the command and control of the British troops? I understand that United States troops will be under overall Canadian command but tactically under United States command. Will that be the case with the British troops also?
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