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Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): I should say that I was asked by the then Speaker to lead the first Inter-Parliamentary Union delegation to Zaire, in 1990. Do the Government realise that the writ of Kinshasa may not in operate in eastern Zaire, and that they will have to talk to the warlords or the governors of different provinces, especially if there is to be any type of opposed entry?

Where on earth are all those rocket launchers and other arms coming from? If British troops are to be sent, we had better find out who the arms suppliers are, because that sophisticated weaponry was certainly not made in Africa. It may be right or it may be wrong to go in, but I fear that the commitment will still be there long after I cease to be a Member of Parliament and--although he is a much younger man--long after the Secretary of State ceases to be a Member of Parliament. Once we are in, how do we get out of that place?

Mr. Portillo: First, I respect very much the hon. Gentleman's experience of Zaire. He is absolutely right to say that the writ of Kinshasa does not apply in eastern Zaire; we understand that perfectly. In my statement, I said rather carefully that we would seek the acquiescence of the Governments of the area, although I realise that there are warring factions. Our intention, however, is to enable food to reach people who are starving, which may very well involve us in having to stand up to some of those bandits and militias, some of whom are well armed.

I understand the fears expressed by the hon. Gentleman, and the fears expressed generally in the House. I could add another hundred reasons for thinking long and hard about the situation, and a hundred reasons for not taking any action. Finally, however, we must face the situation that confronts us. I do not believe that we have time to continue debating those issues. There are dangers, difficulties and uncertainties, but the begging need to do what we can to help those people is what must now guide us.

Mr. David Howell (Guildford): Does my right hon. Friend accept that it must be right to do everything we can, as swiftly as we can, to deal with the tragedies in that very dangerous and complex area of central Africa? Will he accept my congratulations on the fact that he has applied already a very strict series of questions to himself and to his proposals? I hope that he will continue applying them, because they are based on our very hard-won experience in other areas. Moreover, as he knows, things can go disastrously wrong, as the American operation in Somalia went wrong.

It is very early for the Secretary of State to answer all the questions he has been bombarded with, but will he undertake, before the final deployment begins, to inform the House whether we are sending troops on a peacekeeping mission, a peace-enforcing mission, or a mission that begins by protecting aid workers and ends up enforcing peace? We must have those absolutely basic concepts clear in our minds before the troops depart, and I am sure that he will give the House that information before they do.

Mr. Portillo: My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that things can go wrong, and I am pleased that he

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agrees with the list of questions that we are applying to the matter. Further information would, of course, have to be given to the House before British troops deployed, other than the reconnaissance troops whom I have already mentioned.

Let me make one thing clear: I said in my statement that this would be a chapter 7 operation, and chapter 7 of the UN charter enables participating troops to follow the rules of engagement that are necessary not just for peacekeeping but for enforcement. They are more robust rules, which allow forces to do more to protect themselves and to secure the mission. I think that chapter 7 rules are absolutely appropriate.

Mr. Peter Shore (Bethnal Green and Stepney): I agree with the Secretary of State that an aid mission is essential, and I support the purposes to which he has subscribed. However, I have one serious doubt; he touched on it, but I would like him, if he could, to say a little more about the central question of disarming the militias.

As the right hon. Gentleman rightly said, it will be impossible to get the refugees back into Rwanda unless the militias are dealt with, but that is a task for the slightly longer term. The immediate problem will be if the militias prevent the humanitarian aid from being delivered. I recall that that was the problem in Bosnia, which drove us from a UN action to a NATO enforcement action. Will the Secretary of State take full account of that in his forward planning for this operation?

Mr. Portillo: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his support. The outline of the answer to his question is at least clear. We are deploying under chapter 7, which gives us the more robust rules of engagement; our objective is to enable aid to reach the people who are starving; and if some people stand in our way, they must be prepared to face the consequences of their action.

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden): I, too, agree with my right hon. Friend, and appreciate especially his careful assurances that there will be no hasty deployment. However, he will be aware that some people will probably put him under pressure to ensure that deployment takes place rather more quickly than those who give him military advice might like, on the ground that every day or week of delay means that thousands of people are dying. Will he assure the House that, whatever the date of deployment, we shall not embark on the exercise unless we have the full and wholehearted co-operation of the United States forces' logistic command?

Mr. Portillo: I thank my right hon. Friend warmly for his support. It is, of course, of great importance to me and to the success of the mission that the United States is fully involved. It is involved as a participant country, but I want to make it clear that the Canadians accept that strong United States support for their headquarters and command elements will be necessary for the mission to be a success. We have the assurance of the United States' involvement, which also distinguishes this operation from Bosnia in the days of the United Nations' UNPROFOR mission.

Mr. Mike Gapes (Ilford, South): I think most of us would endorse the action taken so far, but does the Secretary of State accept, first, that the way in which the discussions have taken place at the United Nations and

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elsewhere proves once again the need for a long-term strategy to reform the way in which the UN deals with such crises? It is no good having to go through this process every time something happens; there needs to be continual earmarking and planning so that we can move more quickly, rather than having to delay while people are suffering or starving.

Secondly, does the right hon. Gentleman accept that there might be a problem in trying to feed the millions of people affected by this conflict while at the same time attempting to move them from where they are now back to Rwanda and Burundi? In those circumstances, is he considering air drops or other means of getting the food through, rather than waiting for the militias to be disarmed to enable the food to be got through?

Mr. Portillo: We shall consider any measure that will help to get food to the starving people, but we must be guided by the agencies, United Nations and civilian, that will have the task of supplying the food. Air dropping into an area with a large number of people in an insalubrious camp could cause a riot and deaths. One has to be extremely careful when planning such operations. We shall do whatever seems best in the circumstances.

I understand the hon. Gentleman's comments on the workings of the United Nations from an idealistic point of view, but, because the operations are so complicated, they are bound to rest on the leading nations of the world. Those nations are bound to want command and control to be under a recognised nation with the capability to carry it out.

It pains me to say so, but, for the time being, the United States is clearly not willing to put its troops under United Nations command. It is willing for them to be put under United States command or under the command of a friendly nation with which it can participate fully, giving it a good say in the rules of engagement and the command and control procedures.

Mr. Tim Rathbone (Lewes): Looking to the future, what conversations has my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State had with his counterparts in southern Africa? It will be for those countries and their neighbours to take over part of the burden. In particular, what conversations has he had on the cost of their taking over part of that burden? Those countries, unfortunately, are not blessed with a Consolidated Fund such as that which we can draw from.

Mr. Portillo: I have had no conversations with my opposite numbers, but there have been discussions between the military that have produced the results that I have mentioned. There has been an encouraging response from the countries of southern Africa.

As for the cost, the formula should be that those that can afford it should contribute. Some rich nations do not yet feature on the list of troop contributors. There are certain big names among them--we can all think of some. I very much hope that they will be major contributors, and will, in particular, help the African countries to participate and to follow on.

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