House of Commons Hansard Debates for 6 Dec 1996 (pt 17)

Mr. Stephen: You'll be lucky.

Mr. Page: I always travel in hope.

The hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green was slightly confused about our policy on inward investment and the fact that we give parts of the country a choice. We do not believe in the corporate state or in telling companies that they have to go to a certain area and cannot go anywhere else. If the hon. Lady looks back in time to a period under a Government who did get involved in directing companies to which areas they should go, she will find a list of failures.

Most of the problems in the steel industry were caused by the steel companies being directed to go to certain parts of the country. The failure of the Bathgate plant shows how the motor industry was interfered with. The same is true of the Fort William pulp mill and the Invergordon smelter. I remind the House of the huge success of the policy of giving direction when the Government of the day got involved in the National Enterprise Board--what a disaster. I do not believe that a single project made any money.

This has been a valuable debate. I hope that hon. Members will take away one key message--the recipe for success is to let enterprise flourish at home and abroad. That is how we will keep our economy dynamic and competitive and help British companies become world beaters in overseas markets, and it is why we shall keep the world's investors knocking at our door. Our agenda for trade liberalisation is a vital component of that. When my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade goes to Singapore today, I, the House and the country will be looking to him to press that agenda and advance our goal of global free trade. I am confident that British business, now set free, will be able to do the rest.

Mr. Bowen Wells (Lord Commissioner to the Treasury): I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

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SCOTTISH GRAND COMMITTEE

Ordered,

That the Order of the House [15th November] be amended, by leaving out paragraph (2) and inserting--

'(2) at the meeting of the Committee on Monday 9th December--
(a) notwithstanding the provisions of Standing Order No. 94D(2)(b) (Scottish Grand Committee (ministerial statements)), proceedings on any ministerial statement which may be made relating to E. coli in Scotland shall be brought to a conclusion not later than three-quarters of an hour after their commencement and proceedings on any ministerial statement which may be made relating to public expenditure in Scotland shall be brought to a conclusion not later than half an hour after their commencement;
(b) proceedings on the substantive Motion for the Adjournment of the Committee shall lapse at a quarter past Two o'clock; and
(c) notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3) of Standing Order No. 94E (Scottish Grand Committee (bills in relation to their principle)), the Chairman shall put any Question necessary to dispose of any Motion which may then be made in relation to the Scottish Legal Services Ombudsman and Commissioner for Local Administration in Scotland Bill at a quarter past Three o'clock, if not previously concluded'.--[Mr. Wells.]

2.14 pm

Sir John Gorst (Hendon, North): The Government's plans for dealing with emergency arrangements in the Edgware district came on to the agenda shortly after the 1992 general election, and they have been there ever since. The issue has broadened from one relating to the facilities provided by a hospital to the local population, and now encompasses the whole question of how individual Members of Parliament can represent the unanimous wishes of their constituents to Ministers. Above all, it raises the question: what can a Member of Parliament do if, having received assurances from Ministers, and made them public, he discovers that such assurances will not be honoured or have been seriously distorted?

The matter goes to the heart of the relationship between a Member of Parliament and the Government of the day. Over broad swathes of public policy, Members of Parliament are expected to defer to the power of the Executive because of the Executive's greater knowledge, superior resources and wider strategic grasp. On the other hand, it has always been acknowledged that, in understanding and interpreting local sentiment, a Member of Parliament has a unique authority--one that no Department can ever match. When, in addition to that, Members of Parliament have negotiated a settlement with a Minister that safeguards their constituents, it is no light matter to discover that the Executive proposes to misconstrue--let alone ignore--the terms of that settlement.

No Member of Parliament can retain a shred of legitimacy with his constituents if he is prepared to accept such a one-sided relationship. To do so would render the constituency Member of Parliament a redundant species. One might as well have a bureaucrat, nominated by the Government--a cipher who would see it as his duty to sacrifice the interests of his constituents to the convenience of the Executive.

The facts of the matter that I am raising are plain. From 1992 to 1994, I argued privately with local health authority officials against their plans for Edgware general hospital. The plans enjoyed no local support whatever--and that is universally conceded. I also took delegations to see Ministers, and I had a comprehensive Adjournment debate on the subject on 18 March 1994. I left no stone unturned to explain the special features that justified the pleas being made to Ministers.

At that stage, Ministers took refuge in the doctrine of the unripe time. Repeatedly, over many months, Ministers claimed that the matter had not reached their level for a decision and they would not intervene. Then, in the spring of 1995, after less than a week's reflection, brushing aside all protests and arguments put to her, the then Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for South-West Surrey (Mrs. Bottomley), sanctioned the closure of the accident and emergency department. The time had become ripe to ignore my constituents' wishes and needs completely. Naturally, I then voted against the Government.

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When a new Secretary of State was appointed, my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Dykes) and I, who have never accepted the foolish decision, headed another delegation to Richmond house. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was reassuring and emollient; he promised to look again. The necessary adjustments, although significant and vital for my constituents, required only a modest change by the Government.

Six months elapsed. Nothing seemed to be happening; so my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, East and I, conscious of the rapid approach of the safe waters of the summer recess--safe waters, that is, for the Government--had another meeting with the Secretary of State. This time, we received specific assurances and promises: there would be a casualty department capable of saving lives. In June this year, we had at last obtained promises that a potentially life-saving casualty unit would replace the existing A and E department when it closes early next year. Alas, that is not, unfortunately, the end of the story. Less than another six months later, we are now told something entirely different. We are informed that we are back to a MATS--a minor accident treatment service--unit. We are back to a service that will do little more than bandage cuts and bruises.

I cannot see how, in honour, the Government can deny any of this. Indeed, I assume that they will be reduced to claiming that my hon. Friend and I have deluded ourselves; that we have got into a semantic muddle; that, although promised merely a MATS unit, we mistakenly supposed that the Secretary of State was promising us a casualty unit; or, least plausible of all, that if a MATS unit is sufficiently embellished with frills, such as GPs, longer hours and extra funds, it somehow upgrades itself--in short, that it becomes something that it is not. I am afraid that none of that will wash. The range of our discussions would make such an elementary confusion illogical and implausible.

I do not rest my argument purely on an appeal to logic. I made careful and detailed notes of what the Secretary of State promised us in our talks with him during that evening of 11 June. I propose to quote from the notes that I made immediately after the meeting, only pausing to say that the Secretary of State will, no doubt, have his own record of the meeting. One of his officials was present and taking notes. I have little doubt that, if the two versions were published, they would prove to be virtually identical.

From my notes, the crucial point of the discussion is clear. What I noted is as follows:

"Having referred throughout to 'emergency service', 'emergency unit' and so on the Secretary of State concluded by saying that 'casualty department' was his preferred phrase to describe what we had been discussing. It was best understood by everyone. He also favoured the phrase because it distinguished between an A and E Trauma Centre and a MATS Unit".

I shall repeat the last passage: