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4.8 pm

Mr. Andrew Hunter (Basingstoke): I listened to the hon. Member for Redcar (Ms Mowlam) with great interest. I do not substantially or significantly disagree with anything that she said, with one exception. That relates to what was said by the hon. Member for North Down (Mr. McCartney). I personally support the argument, which he briefly summarised, that the foundation of the Mitchell report is most substantially undermined by the fact that it was formulated on the understanding that Sinn Fein-IRA was genuinely committed to a peaceful solution.

We know that Mitchell was wrong in drawing that conclusion at the time, although the evidence, of course, was not immediately available. In that sense, his entire report is established on a misunderstanding. Greater significance should be given to that in our wider consideration of the process, and of the point that we have reached.

Mr. Seamus Mallon (Newry and Armagh): Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that the Mitchell report's basic principles were reiterated in the joint communique of 28 February issued by the two sovereign Governments; that they quoted from Mitchell's two basic principles long after the ceasefire had been broken and long after that period of peace had ended; and that, in effect, when it was announced in the House, the joint communique was supported by the hon. Gentleman, who is now finding fault with it?

Mr. Hunter: The hon. Gentleman is reading too much into my observation. Of course I stand by the position adopted by the Government in February and to which I have referred many times, as have other hon. Members. I was merely supporting the point made by the hon. Member for South Down, who said that, in that one respect, Mitchell was demonstrably wrong; but I certainly stand by the report's wider context, and it is essential that we build on it in the negotiations that are taking place. I hope that that at least partially reassures the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Mallon: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Hunter: I ask the hon. Gentleman to forgive me, but I will not give way again on the subject. Let us advance.

The decommissioning of illegally held weapons is central to the Government's policy on Northern Ireland, and the Bill is self-evidently central to implementing the Government's policy on decommissioning. As the explanatory memorandum states, the Bill gives expression to the

"guidelines on the modalities of decommissioning contained in the Report of the International Body."

It is profitable, however, to view the Bill in the wider context of the process as a whole, as did the hon. Member for Redcar and my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

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The entire policy was launched with the Downing street declaration, the third anniversary of which is in sight. The greater part of the declaration still stands as the guiding principles that should determine the way forward. The declaration extolled the virtue of

"an agreed framework for peace"

In that declaration, both Governments committed themselves to seeking

"peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement",

and undertook

"to encourage, facilitate and enable such agreement."

The declaration also made it clear that the principle of non-violence lay at the heart of the envisaged process. In paragraph 10, both Governments confirmed that only

"democratically mandated parties that establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and have shown that they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate fully in democratic politics."

The Government have consistently argued that, if an organisation is truly committed to exclusively peaceful methods, it no longer has any need for weapons and explosives, and that a commitment to decommissioning is a logical expression of a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods. I have supported that position to the best of my ability.

As we all know, the decommissioning issue has arguably caused more dissent, ill-feeling and rancour between the participants in the process and between commentators on the process than any other single issue. There should never have been any misunderstanding about the Government's position on decommissioning, either before or after the international body's report. On many occasions, my right hon. and learned Friend summarised the position that the Government held on decommissioning until the early part of this year, which was most succinctly expressed in the so-called "Washington principles".

Hon. Members will recall the hostile reaction to that policy position, which was adopted by Irish nationalists, north and south, and by Republicans. It is worth recording, and right to recall in a debate on this Bill, that the Government were then accused--unjustly--of inserting preconditions that had not previously existed, of moving the goalposts, of changing rules after the contest had started, and of much else. The same accusations are being made today.

Hon. Members may recall that, in June 1995, Mr. Adams, in an interview with The Irish Times, stated:

"the demand for the surrender of IRA weapons as a precondition to negotiations by the British Government was never mentioned before August 31st, 1994."

Many others echoed that point; and, today, they are re-editing the same theme in their accusations.

The record should clearly contain the fact that, two months before the Downing street declaration, in a radio programme broadcast by Radio Telefis Eireann, my right hon. and learned Friend stated that the British position included prior decommissioning. I have a transcript of the relevant section, and recordings of the broadcast are available from RTE.

On the same day as the Downing street declaration was published--in Dail Debates, volume 437, column 776--the Irish Foreign Minister acknowledged:

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"Questions were raised on how to determine a permanent cessation of violence. We are talking about the handing up of weapons."

The most graphic demonstration--to eliminate any shadow of doubt--that Mr. Adams himself knew the Government's position was that he condemned it publicly. In The Irish Times, of 8 January 1994--less than a month after the Downing street declaration, and 18 months before he claimed that the British Government had made up a new policy--Mr. Adams personally wrote:

"Mr. Mayhew goes on to say, 'Well, the exploratory dialogue will be so that we can discuss with Sinn Fein how the IRA will hand over its weapons.


"So, I say to myself, 'This is what they want. They want the IRA to stop so that Sinn Fein can have the privilege, 12 weeks later, having been properly sanitised and come out of quarantine, to have discussions with senior civil servants on how the IRA can hand over their weapons."

Decommissioning must begin before the start of substantive dialogue--the Government said it, and the Irish Government said it. Mr. Adams knew the score, and he condemned it.

Mr. Robert McCartney: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that, in addition to the parliamentary brief, Prof. Paul Bew has set out, in extenso, all the occasions on which Adams and representatives of the Irish Government acknowledged in publications and in statements in the Dail, on RTE and in other media that decommissioning was a necessary and integral part of any peace process?

Mr. Hunter: I am aware of that work, and I corresponded with Prof. Bew about it more than once. I readily confess that I borrowed frequently from his research.

In the course of time, the Government's policy changed, from an insistence on prior decommissioning to not merely considering but implementing Mitchell's suggestion that decommissioning might take place in parallel with talks. The merits or otherwise of the policy change were argued, and can still be argued, at very great length. However, the fact remains that decommissioning in parallel with talks--Mitchell's compromise to end the impasse--is the Government's position, which is one from which no Government should retreat.

One understands that the Government are under pressure from the Irish Government--which is reflecting and expressing the opinion of virtually all nationalist politicians, north and south, and of the Sinn Fein political leadership, that further concessions should be made and a fast-track route to negotiations offered to Sinn Fein.

The Government, in the judgment of many of my colleagues--it is a judgment I share--should stand firm in their insistence on Mitchell's decommissioning in parallel. They should also stand by the policy position which the two Governments jointly adopted in the aftermath of the Mitchell report--the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) referred to it. For the Provisionals to be readmitted to the process, there must be an unequivocal restoration of the ceasefire, and the Provisionals, over a period that cannot be specified in advance, must establish their unequivocal commitment to peaceful means.

To put it another way, and to reflect wording that I have heard the hon. Member for Redcar (Ms Mowlam) use, the genuineness of a future Provisional ceasefire

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should be judged by the quality of the Provisionals' words and deeds, not just by the passing of a predetermined number of weeks or months.

Mr. Harry Barnes (North-East Derbyshire): Does it not follow that that period could therefore be very short if we were to consider the quality of words and deeds? If there is an end to punishment beatings and to people being placed in exile, if the whereabouts of the bodies of the disappeared is explained, and if there are signs that Sinn Fein-IRA is moving quickly, there could be three simple steps and an open door into the talks provided in the Prime Minister's recent statement.

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