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Mr. Bennett: My amendment No. 6 is in this group. As the Minister is keen to keep the Bill as general as possible to catch all forms of possible harassment, why cannot he keep the possible defence equally general under clause 4(3)(c)? It seems much better to have
- "the pursuit of his course of conduct was reasonable"
Mr. Maclean: Amendments Nos. 30 and 31 are unacceptable. They would prevent any activity that is not carried on reasonably for the prevention or detection of crime or under any enactment. Many activities, such as journalism, doorstep selling and political canvassing, may cause harassment but are legitimate if undertaken reasonably. We proposed in our consultation paper, which was published in the summer, that such activities should
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be protected, and the response was overwhelming agreement. The Bill recognises that and safeguards those activities by providing a defence for any activities that, in the particular circumstances, were reasonable. The amendments would do away with that safeguard and make illegal all sorts of legitimate activities, which would make the scope of the Bill far too wide. That is why we cannot accept the amendments.8.45 pm
I listened closely to the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George), and I have considered amendment No. 28 carefully. The civil law relates to disputes between two parties; there is no question of public policy being involved. When investigators are examining a matter of tort, it would be wrong to give either party to a dispute special privileges under the criminal law. The amendment does not wreck the Bill but it is unnecessary. If the action of a party to a dispute is reasonable, it will be covered by the general defence provided in clause 1(3)(c):
Furthermore, someone must claim that they have been harassed. Many of the activities of private investigators mentioned by the hon. Member for Walsall, South involved the person under investigation being unaware of the presence of the private investigator. That person could not fear alarm or distress; there is no harassment and no need for a defence. Only if a person under investigation became aware of being followed, or claimed that he was being stalked, and it happened a second time and the person tried to take action, would it be for a court to decide whether the activities of the private investigator were reasonable.
I cannot give precise examples--the hon. Gentleman quoted many--but it would always depend on the facts of the case: how the private investigator went about the activity that is challenged in court. As so many activities could be undertaken and challenged, I cannot give examples of whether one activity was reasonable and another not; it would depend on the actions of the person concerned and the effect that they had on the victim.
Clause 1(3)(c) is adequate for all those involved in legitimate crime prevention activity, such as private investigators or private security personnel; that would also apply to all other people. On Second Reading, we discussed whether it would be legitimate conduct for a Member of Parliament to badger an organisation to get an answer for a constituent. If constituents tried to solve problems, could they badger someone? Of course they could. If someone tried to claim that such a constituent's activity was unreasonable, it would be for a court, if it ever came to it, to decide whether the behaviour involved in an attempt to badger an organisation for an answer--or get something fixed, or goods delivered on time or services provided--was reasonable.
Amendment No. 6 would provide a general defence to the offence of pursuing a course of conduct that causes another to fear violence. The Bill already provides
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The similar general defence of acting reasonably in the case of the lower-level offence of causing harassment has been provided in recognition of activities such as journalism and political proselytising, which may cause harassment but are legitimate and should be protected. That consideration does not apply to the higher-level offence of causing fear of violence. It is clearly not reasonable to put someone in fear of violence through doorstep selling or religious or political proselytising. We should keep that defence for exceptional circumstances, and those circumstances are clearly set out in the Bill. For the reasons that I have given, I hope that hon. Members will withdraw their amendments.
Mrs. Maddock:
I accept from the way in which the Minister gently rejected my amendments, given the vigour with which he has rejected others, that he understood my points. I listened carefully to his remarks about what constitutes reasonable conduct. I hope that his reassurances are right. I suspect that questions about what is reasonable conduct will be raised again in another place. In view of his comments, and of the time, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Bennett:
I have some doubt about the words "A person" at the very beginning of the clause. On Second Reading, the Government were keen to suggest that the Bill covered harassment not only by individuals but by groups. Opposition Members were especially concerned about racial harassment, in which a group of people could be either actively or passively involved. Can the Minister explain how the phrase "A person" covers activities, such as racial harassment or families warring with their neighbours, for which groups are responsible? Should not we perhaps use a phrase such as "a group of persons acting with common intent"?
Mr. Maclean:
We believe that the wording is adequate to deal with those cases in which individuals may be harassing someone, perhaps for racial motives. It is best to leave the wording "A person", bearing in mind that the majority of the classic stalking problems that we are dealing with involve individuals. Even in neighbour disputes, with families involved, and in racial harassment, it should be possible to identify the one individual, or the various individuals in the group, who are causing the problems.
I do not know of any instances in which courts convict people in groups. Even if half a dozen people are engaged in a robbery, murder or other crime, they must be served with a summons, charged and sentenced individually; and often they get different sentences. In those circumstances, the language in the Bill is adequate to catch the bulk of
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Mr. Bennett:
That answer is helpful, but does not fulfil the promise that was made on Second Reading. As I understand it, if a family is causing trouble to the next-door neighbours, it is not sufficient to serve the head of the household with an order; each individual has to be named.
Mr. Maclean:
I can see no difficulty in that whatever. It would be justice, because if a family generally is causing trouble, one member of that family may not be involved. It would not be acceptable in British law--and certainly not in the European Court of Human Rights--to tarnish or convict a whole family, when individuals in it are innocent of the charge. If one did that, why stop at this law? To take the idea to extremes, why not convict whole families of murder, robbery or drug dealing when one member or a few members of it are involved?
Mr. Streeter:
We could put that in the manifesto.
Mr. Maclean:
My hon. Friend is tempting me into a commitment. If I had the prison places, I might consider it.
Seriously, though, what the hon. Gentleman is suggesting is not necessary; the provisions in the Bill catch the activity to which he refers. If we want to deal with half a dozen people in a family who are causing trouble, we have to get the individuals by name; we have to do that in any case to get any conviction under any rule of law of which I am aware.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Bennett:
I beg to move amendment No. 2, in page 1, line 24, leave out 'summary'.
The Chairman:
With this, it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 3, in page 1, line 25, after 'conviction', insert 'on indictment'.
Mr. Bennett:
I realise that the Government want to differentiate between clauses 1 and 2 and clauses 3 and 4, but would not the decision on what is harassment and what is reasonable be far better taken by a jury than merely by magistrates?
Mr. Kirkhope:
I am somewhat puzzled by the amendments. The effect would be to require the person charged with the offence of harassment to be tried in the Crown court rather than the magistrates court. I am puzzled because the amendment does not propose any corresponding increase in penalty. The penalty set out in the Bill--a six-month sentence of imprisonment or a level 5 fine, or both--is the maximum penalty available for any offence tried in the magistrates court. It would be an
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"that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable."
That would apply to whole categories of people, such as journalists, politicians, doorstep sellers and people who canvass on religious matters. It would certainly cover, in the legitimate course of conduct, the activities of private investigators and security guards. It comes down to whether someone's activity is reasonable.
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