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Mr. Bennett: If someone's reputation is at stake and rests on the question of what is harassment and what is reasonable, there is a much greater safeguard in being able to put a case for the defence to a jury rather than to magistrates, many of whom, perhaps as a result of their jobs, become somewhat case-hardened. However, I realise that the Committee wants to make progress, and on that basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Kirkhope: I beg to move amendment No. 42, in page 2, leave out lines 1 and 2 and insert--


'(3) In section 24(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (arrestable offences), after paragraph (m) there is inserted--
"(n) an offence under section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (harassment)."'.

The amendment replaces the power of arrest provision in the Bill with somewhat stronger provisions which accrue to offences that are arrestable under the provisions of section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

I am persuaded that the additional powers are needed for the police to deal effectively with stalkers. The power under section 18 of the 1984 Act for the police to search for evidence is particularly relevant and necessary if the menace of stalking is to be tackled effectively.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Civil remedy

Mrs. Maddock: I beg to move amendment No. 33, in page 2, line 6, after 'claim', insert 'for an actual breach.'

The purpose of the amendment is to make explicit what we believe is the Government's intention anyway--that damages are not awardable where there has been only an apprehended breach but no actual breach of section 1. I seek reassurance from the Government.

Mr. Streeter: I am afraid that I am unable to give the hon. Lady the assurance she seeks, because, if the

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amendment were accepted, it might be thought that damages claims should be limited to cases in which harassment had actually occurred. On the face of it, it is not easy to see how it could be claimed that damages should be awarded for something that has not--or at least not yet--happened. Part of our problem is that we are trying to legislate for a wide range of behaviour. It is conceivable, for example, that even the anticipation of harassment could, in particularly vulnerable people, cause anxiety or loss. A situation may build up over a period of time and be about to reach boiling point.

The Government would prefer to leave it to the courts to decide in the individual case whether the award of damages was appropriate. The courts are very good at considering specific circumstances and tailoring the order to meet a particular set of facts. The courts' existing powers enable that to happen effectively. Before the court awards damages, it must first be persuaded that the victim has--under this legislation--suffered anxiety or loss. The court will not award damages unless it is persuaded on the evidence that that has happened. A defendant who feels that the court's judgment in that regard is wrong may, of course, appeal against the judgment.

Although the Government recognise the point that the hon. Member for Christchurch (Mrs. Maddock) is trying to make in the amendment, we think that the courts' existing powers cover the point adequately and that the amendment is therefore unnecessary.

Mrs. Maddock: In view of the Minister's comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

9 pm

Mr. George Howarth: I beg to move amendment No. 13, in page 2, line 8, at end insert--


'(2A) In proceedings under this section a court may, if it appears just and appropriate to do so, order that the person who has been found to have pursued the course of conduct amounting to harassment, to attend a course of counselling with a named person or organisation for the purpose of persuading him not to harass the victim or any other person in the future.'.

The Chairman: With this, it will be convenient to discuss also the following amendments: No. 15, in clause 5, page 3, line 21, at end insert--


'(2A) The order may, for the purpose of persuading the defendant not to pursue a course of conduct likely to cause harassment to the victim of the offence or any other person in the future, provide that the defendant attend a course of counselling with a named person or organisation.'.

No. 16, in clause 5, page 3, line 26, after 'defendant', insert


'fails to do anything which he has been ordered to do or'.

No. 24, in clause 8, clause 8, page 4, line 36, at end insert--


'(c) grant an order, if it appears just and appropriate to do so, requiring the defender to attend a course of counselling with a named person or organisation for the purpose of persuading him not to harass the pursuer or any other person in the future'.

No. 26, in clause 11, clause 11, page 6, line 41, at end insert--


'(6A) A non-harassment order may, for the purpose of persuading the defendant not to pursue a course of conduct likely to cause harassment to the victim of the offence or any other person in the future, provide that the offender attend a course of counselling with a named person or organisation'.

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No. 19, in clause 14, clause 14, page 7, line 13, at beginning insert


'Subject to subsection (2A) below,'.

No. 20, in clause 14, page 7, line 15, at beginning insert


'Subject to subsection (2A) below,'.

No. 21, in clause 14, page 7, line 16, at end insert--


'(2A) The Secretary of State or, as the case may be, the Lord Chancellor, may provide that section 3(2A) or section 5(2A) shall come into force in different areas of England and Wales in different ways.'.

Mr. Howarth: Amendment No. 13 and those associated with it cover the issue of counselling for those who are convicted of stalking or harassment in one form or another.

I should make it clear what the Opposition mean by counselling. We mean not some pleasant chat over a cup of tea between the perpetrator and some qualified counsellor, but the sort of counselling that forces offenders to face up to their offending behaviour, the effects that it has had and what its consequences can be. I will cite some examples of what I mean by that later.

The amendments are basically permissive; they give the courts the option to rule as part of an order or sentence that some form of counselling will take place. At present, the civil courts have no such power and the amendments provide a constructive remedy, especially in "sad cases" where a criminal conviction may be inappropriate.

The Government's definition of harassment, as set out in clause 1, says that what the defendant


It is therefore clear that the defendant, even once convicted, may genuinely believe that his or her behaviour was quite reasonable.

Amazing though that may seem to reasonable people such as hon. Members, there are circumstances in which people simply do not realise that what they have done is wrong. That attitude is typical of those who commit offences that are directed toward another person--a good example being a rapist, who will cite the fact that the victim was "provocatively dressed" or that the victim said no, but really meant yes. Even more bizarre to many of us, but which happens, is the child abuser who argues that they were led on by the child.

All of us know, because we are reasonable and coherent people, that such statements are neither sufficient excuses nor reasonable explanations for such behaviour. The truth, with which the Prison Service has had to come to terms, is that people often delude themselves into believing that an incident was not their fault. The point of programmes which are already very successful in some prisons is that they remove any reason for people to continue with the self-delusion that they were in some way not responsible for the actions that they perpetrated. By introducing the concept of counselling into the Bill, we hope that those who have committed an offence will have to address the root causes of the problems that they have created by the nature of their behaviour. That, simply, is what we seek to do.

Of course, there will also be stalkers who are well aware of the impact of their behaviour on victims. They, too, should be forced to confront their offending behaviour. Merely placing restrictive orders on them may or may not be sufficient to remedy the problem.

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If the Minister can give me assurances that our concerns can be taken into account, and that remedies along the lines that I have described will be available, we may reconsider our position. None the less, at this stage I want to register the fact that we regard this matter as vital, and that I shall probably wish to press it to a Division.

There are many examples of stalkers convicted of offences such as breaches of the peace, or making nuisance telephone calls, who learn to restrict their behaviour and keep just within the law. That is a worrying phenomenon, and the Bill as presently constructed may allow such people to slip through the net.

The most effective way to stop harassment is to remove the root cause. A stalker who has been forced to address his own offending behaviour and no longer wishes to harass the victim is far less of a threat than one whose only motive in not committing further offences is the fear of legal retribution, important though that is. We owe it to the victims of harassment to ensure that stalkers are forced to confront their behaviour, and that an order imposed by the court can make them undertake such activity.

There are many examples. I shall not labour them, because all the cases have been mentioned in earlier debates, but they all help to make the case. Vanessa Kennedy, a resident of Lewisham, was subjected to an eight-year ordeal that she describes as psychological torture. She lives in fear of a man who has forced her to change her identity, has destroyed her family and driven her to move house. Vanessa Kennedy has attempted suicide four times, and claims that the perpetrator, Laurence Hammond, threatened to cut her into pieces and make her pay for rejecting him. He would describe in detail how he would torture her and other women, and the images still live in her nightmares. That man has never been forced to address the impact of his offending. Clearly, if the Bill allowed such things to continue without redress, it would not be adequate.

Secondly, I cite the case of Dennis Chambers, which has already been mentioned. The case came to trial earlier this year, and the defendant was acquitted when a jury was not convinced that he had caused "serious or really serious" psychological harm to Margaret Bent. The court was told that he had waited outside her home with a machete on two occasions, and had barricaded her into her office. Chambers admitted to the police that he had registered his car in Miss Bent's name and ensured that she received a string of parking tickets, followed by summonses and visits by bailiffs threatening to seize her property if fines went unpaid. He also admitted kicking her office door open, but denied that that amounted to affray. He said that it was


The drip, drip, drip effect of those incidents was not sufficient to achieve a criminal conviction, so there have been no consequences for that man. He has not been forced to face up to his offending behaviour.

The Government may say that proposals to force stalkers to confront their offending behaviour are uncosted

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and may prove expensive. However, the section of the explanatory and financial memorandum headed "Financial Effects of the Bill", says:


    "It is anticipated that approximately 200 extra criminal cases a year will arise".

We do not propose that every one, even of that small number of people, would be compelled to have counselling, so very few cases would be involved.

Amendment No. 21 would provide for counselling to be piloted, so any cost implications could be closely monitored, and would be extremely limited in scope. Moreover, the purpose of counselling would be to prevent further offending, and could therefore reduce future legal costs.

Amendment No. 15 provides the criminal court with the power to order offenders to undergo counselling on conviction. Although magistrates courts can theoretically issue similar orders already, it does us no harm to reiterate the point. The clause also reflects the wording of amendment No. 13. There are examples of cases that highlight the benefit of making stalkers address their offending behaviour, such as the case of Anthony Burstow, who, in March 1996, was jailed for three years for inflicting psychological grievous bodily harm following a three-year hate campaign against a former colleague, Tracey Sant.

The harassment began when Miss Sant decided to end their friendship, but Mr. Burstow refused to accept that. His activities included sending her a soiled sanitary towel, stealing her underwear from a washing line, pouring solvent over her car and writing her sinister notes. This was the first case in which a stalker was convicted of grievous bodily harm, but it took five days of tortuous legal wrangling before the court was able to reach a decision.

A similar example is Perry Southall of east London, who was subjected to an eight-month campaign--involving more than 200 separate incidents--by convicted rapist Clarence Morris, until his conviction in September of this year. Morris was finally convicted of two assault charges after a case in which his barrister, David Stanton, said:


I think that we would all take issue with that statement. In response to that case, the Home Secretary promised that the proposed Bill


    "would have the effect of providing proper safeguards against stalking."

It is difficult to envisage how those proper safeguards against further stalking can be provided without making some effort to prevent the root causes of the offence.

I will not detain the Committee with a description of the remaining amendments, which are consequential and follow the same line of argument. Although the Bill starts to provide some remedies, unless and until the unacceptable attitudes that people use to justify some appalling behaviour--mainly towards women--are confronted, and until the offenders are counselled and

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forced to confront their offending behaviour and the faults in their approach to other people, the root causes of some of the problems will not be adequately dealt with. This is an important issue and an important principle, and it is one that I hope the Committee will accept if it comes to a vote. We must make sure that the root causes of offensive behaviour are tackled properly by making provision within the Bill for counselling to take place on a statutory basis.


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