| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
Mr. Michael: The Minister had a difficult row to hoe in responding to the debate, but he should not have misrepresented our position on the Bill. We have made it clear that we want consistency and progression of sentencing in our courts so that appropriate sentences are given, particularly to repeat offenders. We have explained the best methods to achieve that, especially in Monday's speech by the shadow Home Secretary.
New clause 14 is a diversion from the serious debates in which we have been seeking to make the Bill more effective and improve its consistency. We will return to some of those important issues when this new clause has been dealt with. The Minister rightly referred to it as whistling in the wind. We oppose it and will vote against it, if it is put to a vote.
Mr. Marlow:
By leave of the House, I have the greatest respect for my right hon. Friend the Minister, particularly for the massive and good work that he is doing in his current job. Although his arguments might convince a minority in this House, beyond the Home Office insiders and professionals, he would not begin to have an audience outside it. He said that the prospect of
15 Jan 1997 : Column 371
My right hon. Friend the Minister made several arguments. First, the European convention on human rights is not supported by and is not an acceptable argument to Conservative Members. It has to go. We have a Government in our own country and we have to decide in our own Parliament. We ran the affairs of a third of the world until 30 or 40 years ago. Surely we are allowed to govern ourselves now. Cannot we make our own decisions? We are a mature democracy.
Secondly, the Minister said that it would be months before sentences were carried out. That is not an argument against corporal punishment but against the judicial system. Vandals and hooligans should be in court on Tuesday and punished on Wednesday; if they do it again on Thursday, they should be back on Friday.
My right hon. Friend knows in his heart and in his bones that there is a massive problem out there. He is doing what he can, but the new clause is a weapon that we could use. If he is uncertain whether it will be successful, we could use it for a trial period and suck it and see.
My right hon. Friend has listened to the arguments and we have had a good debate. It is my intention--the large number of my colleagues in the House reveals that it is also their intention--to give the subject an airing. It is time that we started to fight back and moved to defend the people who are suffering. We are all right; we have a privileged life style, but many of our constituents are suffering and we are not doing enough to help them.
I see no purpose in pushing the new clause to a vote, but this is the beginning and its time will come.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr. Llwyd:
I beg to move amendment No. 6, in page 1, line 17, leave out from 'that' to end of line 18 and insert
Madam Speaker:
With this, it will be convenient to discuss also the following amendments: No. 1, in page 1, line 18, at end insert
No. 32, in page 1, line 23, at end insert--
No. 7, in clause 2, page 2, line 42, leave out from 'that' to end of line 43 and insert
15 Jan 1997 : Column 372
No. 33, in page 3, line 6, at end insert--
No. 8, in clause 3, page 3, line 31, leave out from 'that' to end of line 32 and insert
No. 34, in page 3, line 40, at end insert--
No. 35, in schedule 4, page 60, leave out lines 2 to 10.
Mr. Llwyd:
I wish to speak to amendments Nos. 7 and 8 and the lead amendment, amendment No. 6, which are principally the same. I am privileged to have had the support of the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile), who is an experienced criminal Queen's Counsel, and the support of the right hon. Member for Fareham (Sir P. Lloyd), who has been a Home Office Minister with direct responsibility for prisons. That is an example of cross-party co-operation on one of the most important sections of the Bill.
The amendments widen the circumstances in which the courts may pass sentences--other than automatic life sentences under clause 1 and the minimum sentences of seven and three years under clauses 2 and 3 respectively. Courts would not have to find "exceptional circumstances" in order to depart from the mandatory or minimum sentence, but would be able to pass another sentence if it would be in the interests of justice to do so. The effect would be to provide for presumptive sentences rather than automatic or mandatory sentences in the circumstances covered by the clauses. The amendments propose a formulation similar to that proposed by Lord Bingham, the Lord Chief Justice, in a recent interview on the Frost programme in November 1996.
Clause 1 requires courts to impose automatic life sentences on those who are twice convicted of certain serious violent or sexual offences. Of course, I have no truck with those criminals, but requiring courts to pass automatic life sentences on all serious repeat offenders in all but exceptional circumstances would be unjust. Judges already have the discretionary power to pass life sentences for serious violent and sexual offences when the gravity of the crime or the dangerousness of the offender justifies it.
To require courts to pass life sentences in cases which they consider deserve fixed sentences seems to contravene the fundamental principles of justice. Unlike a mandatory life sentence, fixed sentences reflect an individual assessment of the case and of the offender's just deserts. The provision to allow departures from the mandatory sentence only in exceptional circumstances will do little to mitigate that injustice. In Committee, the Minister was unable to refer to any example of an exceptional
15 Jan 1997 : Column 373
The circumstances of offences within the categories vary greatly. The White Paper, "Protecting the Public," published in 1996, observed that of the 3,121 people convicted of such offences in 1994, 65 per cent. received custodial sentences. That means that 35 per cent. of the cases were regarded by the courts as not meriting custody when the full circumstances of the offence and the offender were taken into account. Yet the Bill proposes that such offences would trigger an automatic life sentence.
The White Paper further, and rightly, acknowledged that
'it would be in the interests of justice to impose another sentence'.
'or, where the offence is an offence under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the court is of the opinion that it would be in the interests of justice to impose another sentence'.
'(4A) Where a person is convicted of an offence the sentence for which would otherwise fall to be imposed under section 1(2) above and the conditions mentioned in section 37(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 are satisfied, the court may if it sees fit conclude that the satisfaction of those conditions constitutes exceptional circumstances which justify its not imposing a life sentence.'.
'it would be in the interests of justice to impose another sentence'.
'(4A) Where a person is convicted of an offence the sentence for which would otherwise fall to be imposed under section 2(2) above and the conditions mentioned in section 37(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 are satisfied, the court may if it sees fit conclude that the satisfaction of those conditions constitutes exceptional circumstances which justify its not imposing a custodial sentence for a term of at least seven years.'.
'it would be in the interests of justice to impose another sentence'.
'(4A) Where a person is convicted of an offence the sentence for which would otherwise fall to be imposed under section 3(2) above and the conditions mentioned in section 37(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 are satisfied, the court may if it sees fit conclude that the satisfaction of those conditions constitutes exceptional circumstances which justify its not imposing a custodial sentence for a term of at least three years.'.
6.45 pm
"long sentences are frequently imposed on offenders convicted of violent and sex offences".
However, it argued that the proposal would increase public safety for two reasons. First, it stated that determinate sentences mean that
"the offender must be released once that sentence has been served, even if there is every reason to believe that he or she will commit further serious offences".
When life sentences are passed, however,
"before potentially dangerous offenders are released an assessment must be made to see whether they still pose a risk".
Secondly, it stated that an offender released from a life sentence
"will remain on licence and subject to recall for the rest of his or her life".
However, the courts can already pass life sentences on such offenders if they consider that the seriousness of the offence or the dangerousness of the offender justifies it.
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |