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Mr. Chris Davies: I do not believe that any hon. Member can wish to do other than end benefit fraud. Money should, of course, reach those who are most in need, and not be siphoned off by people who are out for private gain, and defraud taxpayers and other claimants for their personal advantage. People should not, however, be able to take advantage of the bureaucratic obstacles that may exist now in order to play one Department off against another. We support the widening of powers to ensure that data can be cross-referenced to enable crooks and fraudsters to be caught out.

As long as the powers in the Bill are used as they are intended to be used, there will be no problem. The question is, how do we ensure that that happens? How do we prevent civil servants with access to information from going on fishing expeditions to find out--for reasons of curiosity, devilment or desire for personal gain--the private details of other citizens? The details may be those of a personal acquaintance: a neighbour, perhaps, or an ex-wife's new partner.

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One thing is certain. The House cannot rely on the good behaviour of every civil servant; that is expecting too much of human nature. As sure as eggs is eggs, there will be cases of abuse.

I listened with interest to the comments of the hon. Member for South Dorset (Mr. Bruce). He spoke of the specific information that would be available, giving us to believe that it would be possible to gain access only to that information; but a National Audit Commission report published in March 1995 noted 655 reported incidents of computer hacking among civil servants--staff who were exceeding their authority by using passwords to obtain information about members of the public which they intended to disclose, or did disclose, to outsiders. That happened two years ago.

Mr. Bruce: It is interesting that the hon. Gentleman should raise the subject of computer hacking. Does he accept that someone who opens a filing cabinet and examines a piece of information in that cabinet can get away with it very easily, but that someone who hacks into a computer leaves an audit trail? Many people say that a computer is less secure than a filing cabinet, but I would contend that it is much more secure.

Mr. Davies: The hon. Gentleman misses the point. He may be correct in saying that it is possible for computer hacking to be detected--if, that is, someone is aware that it is taking place, and bothers to go and check. There is clearly a huge difference between access to one filing cabinet in one Department and the ability to touch a computer keyboard and gain access to a full range of Government information on the screen. The technology that is now at our disposal, and the sheer amount of information on private citizens that is stored in Government offices, create an opportunity for the fostering of Orwellian conditions.

As Liberty has pointed out in the past few days, there is a danger that human rights may be violated if the Bill is passed in its present form. The House must remember that it has an obligation not only to protect taxpayers from fraud, but to protect and safeguard the liberties of all individuals, along with their privacy. It must give them the right to ensure that that privacy is not invaded without specific and lawful reason.

5.15 pm

In an intervention, the Minister said that powers would shortly be introduced to ensure that access to information was properly controlled, but I, for one, do not feel happy about supporting proposals now on the assumption--only the assumption--that safeguards will be introduced later. In the past few weeks, the official Opposition's approach to the Police Bill has demonstrated all too clearly that they do not share the approach of Liberal Democrats and, I believe, Liberty to the defence of civil liberties. That does not make us feel confident that the safeguards mentioned by the Minister are likely to be introduced if the official Opposition become a Government later this year.

None the less, I support the proposals for a code of practice, which go some way towards meeting my concerns. I ask hon. Members to remember that we have a duty to set standards that are, in this respect, at least as tough as those applying in other democracies, and that we should not forsake that duty.

Mr. Alan Howarth: In contemplating the Bill, we face a dilemma. We are all committed to introducing measures

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and powers to prevent and expose fraud, but, equally, we should all be committed to safeguarding civil rights, and, in particular, the right to privacy that is enshrined in article 8 of the European convention on human rights. We must strike a balance. That involves a difficult judgment, but I believe that the introduction of the code of practice proposed in new clause 2 would help us to strike the right balance. At present, such a balance is grievously lacking.

Last week, I asked the Secretary of State a question about this matter, and his response was not discouraging. I hope that the Minister will be able to tell us today that it is indeed the Government's intention to introduce a code of practice--but we must wait and see what he says.

In the meantime, hon. Members are doubtless aware of the legal opinion with which Liberty was provided by Mr. Richard Drabble QC and Dinah Rose, who clearly consider that the Bill fails to constrain powers within the exceptions that are set out in the second paragraph of article 8 of the European convention--the exceptional circumstances in which intrusion into privacy can be justified. They doubt whether the powers that would be exercised under the Bill could be regarded as being in accordance with the law; in the sense that the Bill creates such large discretion, and omits so comprehensively to provide safeguards, that it would not be possible for the citizen to regulate his conduct with sufficient precision--to use the terminology of legal opinion. They question whether the Bill, and the actions that could be taken under it, would be proportionate.

Of course there is a pressing social need to address the problem of fraud, but it remains at the very least highly doubtful that such far-ranging powers should be taken and exercised by the Government and their agencies, invading the privacy of the individual citizen through data matching. The opinion's authors deplore the absence of an effective remedy, to which the citizen should be entitled under article 13 of the convention when there is abuse of his privacy. They say that, before someone's personal records are divulged to others, there should at least be grounds for suspicion or, at any rate, inaccuracies and inconsistencies should already have been demonstrated. Of course, the Government will contend that, until they have the data matching powers, it will not be possible to demonstrate the inaccuracies and the inconsistencies, as is necessary in the effort to deal with fraud, so we are clearly faced with a conundrum.

What the House cannot be in doubt about is that the Bill provides for a large extension of state powers. It amends section 122 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 so that the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise and other Departments may pass on information to the Secretary of State. He may pass on information to local authorities and their contractors, who may pass it on to each other--not to mention access to the Royal Mail's database for redirection of mail. We are therefore talking of a vast increase in the scope for data matching and of the use of extended powers not just for purposes of prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of fraud, but to enable greater accuracy to be achieved in records.

Then there is the catch-all phrase:

"any other matter relating to social security".

The Department of Social Security already has powers to obtain information from other Departments when it investigates fraud, but, if the Bill is passed in its present

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form, the Department will have powers to embark on wholesale trawling of increasingly large databases. As my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Mrs. Campbell) said, that must at least be contrary to the 1981 European convention on data processing, which stipulates that data compiled for one purpose should not be used for another.

Safeguards need to be introduced. We need legislation to incorporate the new European data protection directive. We also need privacy legislation. We should incorporate the European convention on human rights into our domestic law and, following satisfactory public debate, introduce a Bill of Rights in Britain.

In response to my intervention, the Minister said that the Bill was not needed to legitimise existing data matching, but I understand that, since April 1995, the Department has cross-checked certain benefit payments, looking for inconsistencies and multiple claims. The London fraud initiative is already under way. Existing legal powers must be being stretched to their ultimate, if not being overstepped. We should be careful and sensitive about civil liberties. The Police Bill has been mentioned, and I think that we are all conscious of this issue's delicacy.

There was a story in the press recently--I think last Sunday--about benefit spies joining police road checks. It said that fraud investigators and the Benefits Agency were interrogating people who were stopped by police in routine roadside checks and that, last year, up to 10,000 vehicles were checked. Benefits Agency staff were alongside the police as they did that.

Liberty reports that some people who were questioned were not told of their right to stay silent. That must worry us all. There is always the temptation for big government and officialdom to step beyond where they should go in the exercise of their powers, using excessive zeal, and jeopardising civil liberties. That is why it is particularly important for the code of practice to be incorporated into the Bill.

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