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Mr. Martin O'Neill (Clackmannan): Although it is some time since I have spoken in a defence debate, sitting on these Benches the years seem to melt away, and very little has changed.
Mr. Menzies Campbell: The arguments have not changed.
Mr. O'Neill: As the hon. and learned Gentleman says, the arguments have not changed. One thing that has changed, though, is that The Daily Telegraph is prepared to allow my right hon. Friend the leader of the Labour party space in its columns to write what it said was
6 Feb 1997 : Column 1187
It is irresponsible to try to create artificial divides on an issue such as defence. While the Minister of State for the Armed Forces was making a mess of agricultural policy in his former post, some of us were trying to work with the Government and other parties in the House and in Europe in insisting that the Eurofighter was an essential part of the defence--in those days--of western Europe and that it was important to have a proper capability in Europe. It is irresponsible to try to undermine the bipartisan unity that was achieved when people in Germany and Italy are ready to seize on any sign of weakness on the British side.
It is significant that the editorial in The Daily Telegraph that accompanied my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition's article made the point that the article made little reference to the Eurofighter; it is important that it also referred to the need for a reconsideration of our defence priorities. When there is a clear understanding, as there is today, that a Labour Government will order 232 Eurofighters, as the Government are intending to do, it is irresponsible to suggest that a party expecting to come to power--we may not, but if we do--is not entitled, as any incoming Government would be, to reconsider its priorities.
The Conservatives had such a review in "Options for Change", when the right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King) was Secretary of State for Defence. He looked at the threats, the capabilities and the roles that we had to fulfil as a country. Labour Members did not agree with his methodology. Indeed, that is perhaps one of the reasons why the Labour party persists in arguing that there should be a defence review. It would be irresponsible of any party that says that it is necessary to have a review not to take account in that review of capabilities. The capabilities will include 232 Eurofighter aircraft because Labour Members are committed to that. We have been committed to it from the outset because we recognise that it is wrong to put our men into the air in aircraft that are out of date and not the best creation to which British manufacturing can make a major contribution.
Mr. Bill Walker:
Let me make it quite clear that I do not doubt the hon. Gentleman's integrity. I remember when he was a member of the shadow defence team. Why did the yardstick that he is describing not apply to the TSR2? He will understand why Conservative Members are apprehensive.
Mr. O'Neill:
The TSR2 was a source of disappointment to many in the services--probably when the hon. Gentleman was serving in them. I do not think that what happened then is in any way similar to the Eurofighter or that the instances are in any way parallel. [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman has asked me a question. He may not like my answer, but I shall give it to him. I do not think that the example of the TSR2 is necessarily comparable.
Mr. O'Neill:
I want to make progress. My comments so far are not the purpose of my speech. I do not think that we need to talk about the matter in quite such a vein
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Lady Olga Maitland:
I am left in complete confusion. I would be grateful if the hon. Gentleman would clarify his remarks, since the matter has not been clarified by his colleagues. Is he or is he not advocating that the Eurofighter will be in the strategic defence review? Does he support the ordering of 232 such aircraft, or is that order now open to being cut?
Mr. O'Neill:
I have not participated in a defence debate with the hon. Lady before, although I recall that when I was doing the work in which my hon. Friends on the Front Bench are engaged, she was pushing prams for peace, or something like that. Perhaps she just has difficulty understanding things. I shall explain again very simply. With the exception of the point about the TSR2, the hon. Member for North Tayside (Mr. Walker), with whom I have crossed swords on many occasions, would have made it clear if he had not understood.
My understanding is straightforward. The Labour party is committed to sustaining the order for 232 Eurofighters, a defence review and the fact that any kind of defence review must take account of what we have, what we are to have, our capabilities and how we deploy it against the threats.
I recognise that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam (Lady Olga Maitland) does not know any more about defence and strategic thinking than would cover the back of a postage stamp, so think that we should make progress. The point that I was making is that it is important that we do not send our airmen into the air in aircraft that are not properly tested and equipped.
I want to speak primarily about the Chinook helicopter crash in June 1994 on the Mull of Kintyre. On board were 25 of the most senior members of the British intelligence community and a four-man aircrew, all of whom were from the RAF's special forces. The crash was recently the subject of a "Cutting Edge" documentary, which raised a number of questions, some of which have already been raised in another place by Lord Chalfont and others. I think that the families of two of the airmen--and, I would imagine, the families of the pilots and the two other crew members, as well as the other 25 people--would like to try to clear up the matter.
I raise the issue because there seems to be a contradiction. An inquiry was carried out, during which the president of the board of inquiry judged that he was not ready to criticise the pilots for human failings. That view was overturned, yet it was also contrary to the opinion expressed by Sir Stephen Young, the sheriff in charge of the fatal accident inquiry. A fatal accident inquiry is a feature of Scots law. It is not carried out in the English legal system, where such a matter would be the subject of a coroner's court.
The inquiry was rigorous. It was suggested at the beginning that Sir Stephen, as a civilian and, therefore, a layman in such matters, might not understand the intricacies of the technical matters involved, but it is fair to say that, by the end of the inquiry, no one who reported it or was present was in any doubt about the sheriff's mastery of his subject.
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When Sir Stephen completed his findings, he made it clear that as far as he was concerned there was no proof that the pilots were to blame. That raises a question in the minds of the public, and especially in the minds of the families.
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
If I may say so, the hon. Gentleman is giving a lucid explanation of the role of the fatal accident inquiry in Scots law, particularly of the role of the sheriff, Sir Stephen Young. Is he aware--I think he will be--that in a fatal accident inquiry all interested parties are entitled to be represented, so the evidence upon which the sheriff draws his conclusion has been open to cross-examination by every party, every department and every institution with an interest in the outcome of the inquiry?
Mr. O'Neill:
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. I should happily step back from his expertise in such matters and give him the Floor, because he is a distinguished member of the Scottish Bar. What I have to say about the evidence will become more apparent in a minute or two.
First, I shall set the scene. The Chinooks had been in service for several years, Boeing had just refitted them to make them into mark 2s, and they were being brought into commission at the time. I have heard on authority from the families that, in telephone conversations with the pilots, the crew were not happy about the flightworthiness of the craft that they were to handle.
The crew had access to manuals containing flight limitation documents. Normally, such documents outline scenarios in which the craft in question could be in trouble, but in this instance the Chinook manual stated only that such details were to be issued. We must ask why the pilots were flying aircraft without that potentially crucial information. How could they be considered grossly incompetent when they had no access to the information?
As I understand it, test pilots had grounded the craft on numerous occasions in the days before the crash, which included the very day before the crash. Five days beforehand, the same aircraft had demonstrated control system problems, including "undemanded engine shutdown" and "spurious engine fail captions".
Given the documented evidence of several serious technical problems with the mark 2, can the RAF really be so sure that there were no problems during the flight in question? I gave the Minister notice of some of the points that I intended to raise, so I hope that he will be able to respond to my questions.
The RAF still ordered the craft to be used, albeit with certain restrictions, such as height restrictions. Flight Lieutenant Tapper had asked for a mark 1 aircraft to be placed on standby because he was worried, and not certain that the craft could do the job. The RAF refused to make such a craft available.
As hon. Members will be aware, this type of aircraft does not carry a black box recorder. The Chinook carried only the TANS navigation equipment--provided by Racal, I believe. The manufacturers do not regard it as equipment that can be used as reliable evidence in such cases, but it appears that, in the absence of anything else, the RAF based at least some of the inquiry's conclusions on the TANS evidence. We need to know whether the
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There would be two other crew members on such flights--the loadmasters, whose job it is to monitor the flight and advise if necessary. Those two were also part of the RAF special forces. One would have imagined that they would see a mountain coming up in plenty of time to warn the pilots, but the RAF concluded that they would not have been aware of the situation and that no blame could be placed on them. The television programme implied that the RAF considered them quite unimportant; I do not know whether the loadmasters would have agreed.
New or, rather, refitted aircraft were being brought into service, perhaps in too great a hurry. Perhaps there was an over-anxiety to use what was considered the best possible kit--the best possible equipment available for one of the most important group of passengers that the RAF was ever likely to carry.
We all know that the people in the Chinook were at the very heart of security and intelligence operations in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the immediate reaction to the crash was to ask whether the aircraft had been the subject of hostile action, because so many vital cogs in the Northern Ireland security machine were in one place at one time.
We are entitled to ask why so many vital personnel were concentrated in one aircraft. Given that there was no mark 1 there, as had been requested, was the aircraft in question the only one available? That raises questions about the way in which the business was handled. Certainly there are questions that were raised by the board of inquiry, but were not really resolved.
The board of inquiry report discussed possible technical failures. Paragraph 35d says:
Despite the fact that it is suggested that the aircraft was serviceable at the time of the crash, the investigator from the air accidents investigation branch says on page 1 of his report:
I imagine that no expense or effort was spared. Such was the importance and significance of the inquiry--because of the number of people involved and their significance in security terms--it was vital that the truth be reached. As far as the truth could be reached, the sheriff said that these men could not be culpable. That view was held by the board of inquiry, but when the report went to the final stage of consideration, it was overturned. The families are entitled to know the circumstances in which the report was overturned and why greater weight was placed on the internal report than on the proceedings of a Scottish court.
Two young men had great careers in front of them, and their families now have only the memory of what they achieved in their lives. They also have the distressing and worrying thought that their names may never be cleared because a court of inquiry said one thing while the board of inquiry said something else. Richard Cook and Jonathan Tapper deserve better than they have had, and they probably deserved better equipment than they had to fly. No criticism is made of their professionalism, as they raised questions and echoed the doubts shared by an awful lot of their comrades.
This House is entitled to answers to at least some of these questions. I understand that--for a variety of reasons--we will never get to the bottom of the matter. We know that, because of its security significance, people were going over the ground with a fine-toothed comb for 48 hours after the crash. We know that the accident investigators were not allowed in for 48 hours. That is understandable, but again it raises questions about the nature of the certainty that the Ministry of Defence now seems to have. My understanding is that people are not accused of gross negligence if there is a scintilla of doubt. As far as I can see, there was at least a scintilla of doubt in the mind of the sheriff, and more than a scintilla of doubt in the minds of the individuals involved in the preliminary treatment of the inquiry.
This is one of the few opportunities that we get in the House--short of an Adjournment debate--to raise a matter like this. I do so because I happen to be friendly with the father of one of the young men involved. I have no constituency interest in the crash, which did not occur in my part of Scotland. But for the peace of mind of the families, for the young men's comrades, and for the people who continue to fly these aircraft, we are entitled to know if there were lessons to be learnt and, if so, whether they have been put into practice.
"Nevertheless, an unforeseen technical malfunction of the type being experienced by the Chinook HC2, which would not necessarily have left any physical evidence, remained a possibility, and could not be discounted."
Paragraph 48 discusses the final few seconds of the flight, and there we read such phrases as "most likely track", "estimated final track", and
"It could not be proven that the aircraft flew in a straight line . . . to the point of impact".
Other points could be raised. Indeed, in paragraph 61 of his summary, the president of the board stated:
"The Board based its findings on logical argument derived from the limited evidence . . . There were many potential causes of the accident and . . . the Board was unable to determine a definite cause . . . the Board could not avoid a degree of speculation".
That was the board's decision, but it was subsequently overturned when the matter went further up the chain of command.
"The pre-impact serviceability of the aircraft could not be positively verified".
On subsequent pages the report says:
"the possibility of control system jam could not be positively dismissed . . . most of the attachment inserts on both flight control system pallets had detached . . . with little evidence to eliminate the possibility of pre-impact detachment".
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Those are matters that appear in the written evidence. The hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East has already pointed out that, in the public court hearings, a range of issues were the subject of consideration--indeed, of the kind of nit-picking detailed consideration that is a feature of such inquiries, in which counsel on both sides wish to ensure that their cases are heard to the fullest extent.
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