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7.49 pm
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. David Davis): I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, South (Mr. Marshall) for giving us the opportunity to discuss events in Cyprus once again, and I congratulate him on his eloquent contribution this evening. I hope that the people of Child's Hill ward will forgive my hon. Friend's absence: we are grateful to them for allowing him to be here this evening. I understand that he has also lifted up his bed and walked in order to attend, so we are doubly grateful for his presence.
Many of the subjects mentioned tonight have been covered in previous speeches in the House. I have responded to them, and all my answers given at the Dispatch Box stand. I shall not repeat them tonight. My hon. Friend mentioned the need to make debates and speeches on the same issue exciting. I shall not endeavour to be as exciting as any husband of Elizabeth Taylor--
Mr. John Marshall:
But more successful.
Mr. Davis:
I shall aim at least for greater longevity.
I shall try to be measured in my response, as I believe that that is the most constructive contribution that I can make to both the debate and the Cyprus question in future.
We last debated the subject shortly before my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary visited the island in mid-December. During that debate, I said that, if 1996
could be described as a year of danger, 1997 might be seen as a year of opportunity: time for a serious effort to settle the Cyprus problem. We had some cause for encouragement: both President Clerides and Mr. Denktash told the Foreign Secretary in Cyprus that they, too, viewed 1997 as an important year. Mr. Denktash said publicly that he believed that a settlement could be achieved with give and take on both sides.
For all that, 1997 has not yet brought much cheer to those who want to see a settlement in Cyprus. The first two months have been difficult. I shall devote most of my remarks this evening to developments during that period, and to the conclusion that I believe that we should draw from them: this is a time neither for bright optimism nor for deep gloom but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Dr. Twinn) said, for action.
In the first week of this year, the Government of Cyprus announced their plan to buy a Russian surface-to-air missile system, to which several hon. Members have referred. The quick reaction from the Turkish side was both threatening and bellicose. Neither move has helped to promote a climate congenial to progress on a settlement. Rather than intensifying it, the result has been to divert energy and attention from the serious efforts needed to achieve a settlement. It has no doubt also given great encouragement to those in both communities who want to derail those efforts.
There has been much talk about the defensive nature of weapons and the right of states to defend themselves. I do not question that right. However, I do seriously question whether this missile purchase was the right decision at this time of some opportunity in Cyprus--especially when the United Nations Security Council has again underlined its concern about the excessive levels of military forces and armaments in Cyprus.
After that unpromising start to 1997, can things get better? I believe they can, but only with readiness on both sides to stop looking for excuses and start looking for solutions. I do not think that anyone doubts the determination that the United Nations, the United Kingdom, the United States--to which my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton referred--the European Union and others have shown in recent months in a methodical and concerted effort in support of a settlement. They have worked to build a basis of understanding on which the leaders of the two communities can engage. However, it is that engagement that will count in the end: no matter how committed our supporting efforts and encouragement, only the parties themselves can make the decisions that will underpin a comprehensive political settlement.
For that reason, I hope that, in the crucial months ahead, both leaders will engage seriously and positively with the United Nations Secretary-General's special representative and all those who visit Cyprus to support his mission. I hope that both leaders will focus with determination on how to move quickly to face-to-face negotiations, and beyond that to the goal of a comprehensive agreement.
What are the prospects of success? I mentioned the visit to Cyprus in December by my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary. He had detailed talks with both leaders, and set out in his press conference afterwards a list of 10 points that he believed constituted the best basis for making progress. The points draw on
positions established over many years of efforts to achieve a settlement, and I believe that they reflect a significant degree of common ground in setting out the general shape of an acceptable settlement.
However, neither side yet has a clear route map of how it will move towards that settlement. The international community--the United Nations, supported by the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union and others--has a crucial role to play in helping to draw that map. However, in the end, it will be up to the Cypriots whether they wish to use it. Should they choose to do so, we are under no illusions: difficult choices and compromises lie ahead for both sides in a number of areas. For example, how will a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation look in practice? How should political equality be expressed in the new constitution? How will the powers of the two zones be defined? What powers should the presidency be given? What arrangements should be made for those who became refugees in 1974? Fundamentally, what security arrangements will there be to underpin a settlement?
We can put the questions, and we may even suggest some answers, but the Cypriots are the only people who can provide those answers. Security is a case in point. In his 10 points, my right hon. and learned Friend said:
By way of conclusion, I mention once again the European dimension. I make no apologies for retreading ground that we have covered in previous debates. It is important that the issues are clearly understood. The European Union factor is a comparatively new and positive development. It offers a real opportunity, but how can that opportunity best be taken?
Few disagree that the best solution is for a political settlement to precede the accession negotiations. In those circumstances, negotiations would be joined by the Government of a bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal Cyprus. The date for negotiations to start has been agreed by the European Union, and that commitment will be honoured. However, we remain convinced that the negotiating process will be much easier and the path to accession much smoother if, by then, a settlement is assured or in sight.
Again, let me make it absolutely clear--in direct response to the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, South--that nobody, I repeat nobody, outside the European Union can, whatever the circumstances, veto Cyprus's accession to the Union. It is not impossible for a divided Cyprus to enter the European Union, but no one should assume that negotiations by a divided Cyprus would be simple or straightforward.
In that context, I want to spend a few minutes on the question that arose at last week's General Affairs Council in Brussels about the participation of the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus's accession negotiations. We were, of course, disappointed that it proved impossible to reach agreement among all member states on the question, and that, as a result, the structured dialogue meeting with Cyprus that was scheduled for 25 February had to be cancelled. It was a particular pity, because we felt that it was rather straightforward and uncontentious simply to express the hope that a situation would be achieved in which all Cypriots could participate in the negotiation process.
Clearly, a settlement before the negotiations started would achieve such an aim. It is a separate question--and one that we cannot judge now--what other circumstances might permit Turkish Cypriot participation in the accession negotiations. We wanted the GAC message to encourage the Turkish Cypriot community to see EU accession as an opportunity. What we seek to achieve is what the March 1995 Council envisaged: that accession should benefit all communities in Cyprus, as I have heard reflected in this debate.
The events of last summer and the developments in the past few weeks reminded us how easily steps backwards can be taken. The arguments for steps forward should be all the more compelling. That is why the Government will persevere and persevere in their efforts in support of a settlement.
Question put and agreed to.
"the security of each of the two communities and of the settlement as a whole will be achieved by means of international guarantees and by such measures of international collective security as may be agreed by the parties."
As ever in Cyprus, the statement has been construed in some quarters as calling for the dilution of the 1960 treaty of guarantee; in others, it has been described as unqualified support for it. The statement actually reflects the simple fact that a settlement will need to be based on security arrangements with which both sides can be comfortable. Beyond that, it reflects implicitly that the present situation provides no real, lasting security. At best, it provides a short-term and inadequate comfort blanket, wherein each community's security is obtained at the cost of the insecurity of the other community.
3 Mar 1997 : Column 691Adjourned accordingly at one minute past Eight o'clock.
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