Select Committee on European Legislation Second Report


REINFORCED CONVERGENCE PROCEDURES AND A NEW EXCHANGE RATE MECHANISM

2.   We consider that the following raises questions of legal and political importance, and recommend its further consideration on the Floor of the House rather than by European Standing Committee B, together with (17539) COM(96)499 on the introduction of the euro and (17541) COM(96)496 on a stability pact for ensuring budgetary discipline in stage 3 of Economic and Monetary Union:--

H M Treasury

(17540)
--
COM(96)498
Commission Communication on reinforced convergence procedures and a new exchange rate mechanism in stage three of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Legal base: --

  Background

    2.1  In January we reported[4] on an interim Commission report setting out the case for an exchange rate mechanism for non-participating Member States during stage three of EMU.

    2.2  The report had been requested by the European Council in Madrid in December 1995, which had asked the ECOFIN Council together with the Commission and the European Monetary Institute to study, in their respective fields of competence, the range of issues raised by the fact that some Member States would not participate in the euro area at the outset. At the time the Government said it would resist any compulsory membership of such a system. We recommended a debate on the Commission report, which took place in European Standing Committee B on 24 April 1996.

    2.3  The Commission's present paper explains that the new exchange rate arrangement was first discussed by the ECOFIN Council at an informal meeting in April, and that progress reports were submitted to the European Council in Florence in June. We are told by the Commission that the ECOFIN Council reached a broad understanding upon the main elements of a new exchange rate mechanism, based on the existing ERM, at an informal meeting in Dublin in September. The Commission's paper welcomes this understanding and sets out the main elements of the proposed new mechanism.

  The main elements of the proposed new ERM

    2.4  The main elements of the new ERM, as summarised in an Explanatory Memorandum dated 31 October, submitted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr Clarke) are:

        "--The euro will be the anchor currency, with bilateral links with other currencies set up on a 'hub-and-spoke' basis. This contrasts with the current ERM, which uses a parity grid.

        --Parities will be set in a common procedure involving Ministers; the European Central Bank (ECB) or, in the case of non-euro Member States, national central banks (NCBs); and the Commission. Fluctuation margins will be wide, though with flexibility to make closer links if Member States so wish.

        --Intervention support will be available automatically at the margins, though NCBs and the ECB will have the right to suspend intervention if this conflicts with their overriding objectives of price stability.

        --Realignments should be made in a timely manner and by common procedure. Both the ECB and the NCB concerned will have the opportunity to call for realignments."

        It is not envisaged that the new ERM will have a statutory base from the Treaty: it would be achieved by inter-governmental agreement.

  Reinforced convergence procedures

    2.5  The Commission's paper notes that exchange rate stability enjoyed since 1995 reflects the substantial progress in convergence already achieved by Member States. It also discusses, "with a view to ensuring full participation in the euro at the earliest possible date", the need to underpin the convergence efforts of the "pre-ins"[5] in parallel with the obligatory stability programmes proposed for the "ins".

    2.6  The Commission suggests that, given the link between exchange rate stability and convergence, reinforced convergence programmes could have a role in the management of a new ERM, suggesting that progress achieved by a "pre-in" towards convergence objectives might be used as a reference in determining the sustainability of central exchange rates.

    2.7  The Commission also suggests that convergence programmes should follow a common format, and include objectives for inflation, budget deficits and debt, and prospects for the exchange rate and long term interest rates. Economic assumptions underlying the convergence strategy would be made explicit. Medium-term as well as short run information should be included. National convergence programmes, which would be mandatory instead of voluntary as at present, would be updated each year, with information on how to correct any slippage from the previous year's plans. The Commission would have a monitoring role, in accordance with the surveillance procedures set out in Article 103 of the Treaty. Legislation to introduce the proposed reinforced convergence procedures would rely on Article 104(5) of the Treaty as a legal base.

  The Government's view

    2.8  The Chancellor says in his Explanatory Memorandum:

        --"Under the terms of protocol 11 to the EC Treaty, and the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993, the United Kingdom would not be able to participate in the third stage of EMU without a separate decision to do so by Government and Parliament. Furthermore, the European Council in Florence states clearly in its conclusions that while a new exchange rate mechanism will be established to link the euro with the currencies of the outs, membership of the mechanism will remain voluntary. The Government has repeatedly stated that it has no intention of re-entering sterling into an exchange rate mechanism.

        "In the light of these facts, the Government has the following comments on the Commission's Communication.

        "--Policies aimed towards convergence -- low inflation and sound public finances -- are sound in their own right, with or without . . . EMU. The Government will continue to pursue these, regardless of the eventual decision on whether or not to join the single currency.

        --The Commission rightly say that 'experience has shown that exchange rate stability depends more than anything else upon sound macro-economic management.' The Government does not, however, believe that ERM membership is the best way to achieve these sound macro-economic policies. This may work for some Member States. But it is not the best way of achieving exchange rate stability for all. In the UK's case, inflation targets have been very successful in achieving and maintaining low inflation since 1992.

        --It is, however, in every Member State's interest that the new exchange rate mechanism works well. Europe is the UK's biggest market, and accounts for 60 per cent of our exports. It is therefore important to the UK that the details of the new arrangement are sensible, even though we do not plan to join it. The proposals which the Commission summarise preserve flexibility, which is desirable given that the members of the new mechanism will, at least to begin with, not be fully convergent either with each other or with the euro zone.

        --It has been agreed by Ministers and Heads of Government that the basis for establishing the new exchange rate mechanism will be European Council Resolution, like the current EMS -- in other words it will be agreed on an inter-governmental basis. It will not be a Community instrument based on the Treaty.

        --Final details of the new mechanism cannot, however, be agreed before the establishment of the ECB in July 1998.

        --On the question of convergence programmes, the Government already submits these annually to the Council."

    2.9  The Chancellor described the paper as representing the views of the Commission and having no policy consequences.

  Conclusion

    2.10  Whether or not the United Kingdom participates in the single currency, the stability of the euro and the stability of the currencies of the countries of the European Union which are either "pre-ins" or even "outs" (though the Commission does not recognise that term) are of considerable importance to the United Kingdom. The Commission's paper recognises that increased movement towards convergence, in terms of the criteria set out in Article 109j of the Treaty, has brought about greater exchange rate stability. So any proposals which are intended to reinforce the convergence process and maintain exchange rate stability must be of legal and political importance to this country.

    2.11  We note that the Chancellor has said that decisions on the key principles of the new ERM are likely to be reached at the European Council in Dublin on 13-14 December. He does not say so, but we would expect that the proposals relating to reinforced convergence criteria will be discussed at the same time.

    2.12  We think there should be a debate. It would be logical for the debate on this document to take place on the Floor of the House with the draft legislation for the introduction of the euro and for a stability pact, on which we also report today[6].


4.(16707)--; see HC 51-v (1995-96), paragraph 5 (10 January 1996). Back

5.The Commission's term for those countries who have not joined the euro area. Back

6.See paragraph 1 and 3. Back

 

 


© Parliamentary copyright 1996
Prepared 18th November 1996