Select Committee on European Legislation Seventh Report


THIRD COUNTRY FISHERY AGREEMENTS

9.   We consider that the following raises questions of political importance. We make no recommendation for its further consideration, but suggest that it would be relevant to the debate which we are recommending on (17704)--, on total allowable catches and quotas 1997:--

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

(17629) 11171/96 COM(96)488	Communication from the Commission on fisheries agreements -- current situation and perspectives.
Legal base:	--

Background
9.1  Earlier in the year we considered proposals for fisheries agreements with a number of countries[15], and recommended that they be debated by European Standing Committee A, together with the multi-annual guidance programme (MAGP IV)[16]. The reasons for our concern was the total cost of the third country agreements, which now amounts to more than 256 million ECU (£207.9 million)[17] annually, and is around one third of the total cost of the Common Fisheries Policy. We consider that the rationale behind the fisheries agreements needs to be fundamentally reviewed. We are therefore glad to see the present Commission Communication to the Council on the current situation and perspectives.

  The Commission communication

9.2  As the Communication explains, the current pattern of fisheries agreements has developed in an ad hoc way. This is because individual Member States had special fishing agreements with neighbouring third countries. The extension of sovereignty over fishing to 200 miles had a direct effect on traditional fishing grounds, and in 1977 the Community decided that fishing by third country vessels in the 200 mile Community zone must be subject to agreements between the Community and the partner countries concerned. Agreements would also cover the maintenance of existing fishing rights and the obtaining of new rights for Community fishermen in third country waters. These agreements, initially confined to the North Sea, have been extended to other waters and at present the Community has 26 agreements: 15 with countries, in Africa and the Indian Ocean, 10 with North Atlantic countries including 5 in the Baltic Sea, and Argentina. The financial cost to the Community has increased from 6 million ECU in 1981 to 280 million ECU in 1996; fishing possibilities have not increased pro rata.
9.3  There is no single "agreement type". The agreements cover:
--  reciprocal arrangements: the swapping of equivalent opportunities between Community vessels from Norway, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland and the Baltic Republics;
--  agreements on access to surplus stocks in the United States and Canada;
--  agreements on access to resources for Community vessels in exchange for financial compensation in Africa, the Indian Ocean and Morocco; and
--  agreements on access to resources under licence and joint venture arrangements in return for financial compensation and market access.
These agreements have been supplemented with "second generation agreements"; that with Argentina is the first involving joint enterprises and joint ventures.
9.4  The report does not assess the cost of the agreements in relation to the amount of fish caught, although it does emphasis employment opportunities, both on Community vessels and processing the catch when it is brought back to the Community.
9.5  The Commission acknowledges the increasing cost of the present agreements, and the budgetary constraints imposed in respect of new agreements and the renewal of existing agreements. It points out that
"the financial reality is that certain agreements should now be allowed to lapse in the interests of concentrating the Community's financial resources on improving those agreements considered to be most attractive to Community ship owners",
and indicates that the level of utilisation of the agreements should be a relevant indicator. Certain agreements are systematically under-used to a very large extent and are of limited interest to Community fishermen.
9.6  The Communication suggests four possible options:
(a)    speed up a reduction of the Community fleet operating in non-Community waters. This option is not favoured because of the cost of compensating the fleet and the greater dependence on imports for supplies of fisheries products;
(b)    renounce those agreements that are least attractive to the Community as a whole. While recognising the need for such a policy; the Commission is equivocal, calling in aid non-quantifiable factors such as the nature of relationships between the Community and the third countries concerned;
(c)    concentrate financial resources on the most attractive agreements. This option would redistribute existing budgetary resources by concentrating them on current or future agreements which offer the maximum potential. (Potential is not spelt out but would, we assume, include the amount of fish caught and the employment opportunities provided for Community fishermen); or
(d)    modify the current allocation of costs of the fisheries agreements. This would introduce an interesting development whereby vessel owners and/or Member States assumed a greater share of the current cost of the fisheries agreement. The Commission Communication comes to no conclusion on which of the four options, or which mixture of them, would be the most appropriate.

  The Government's view

9.7  In his Explanatory Memorandum of 3 December, the Minister of State at the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr Baldry) states:
"The Communication does not contain any formal proposals. However, it does provide a welcome opportunity to take stock of the operation of such agreements to date in the light of rising costs. It contributes to the debate on how to ensure that fisheries agreements represent value for money. The Government agrees with the Commission's conclusion that the agreements involving reciprocal exchange of quotas should be maintained. It believes that the agreements involving financial contributions should be considered individually but as a general principle that there should be a shift of emphasis towards those offering the best value for money."

  Conclusion

9.8  We welcome the Commission's Communication as a first attempt to address the problem of the escalating costs of third country fisheries agreements. As the Communication makes clear, not all of the agreements represent value for money, as they have been entered into for a wide variety of reasons, such as those of foreign policy or bilateral loyalties between certain Member States and third countries. No assessment has been made of exactly what the benefit is to the Community (in terms of employment and extent of fishery vessel use) in relation to cost. Nor does the Communication address the central issue of the efficiency of the Community fleet and whether third country agreements are a palliative for problems in the EU or an encouragement for modernisation of the EU fleet. We ask the Government to seek further information from the Commission on these aspects; a clear rationale must be developed to justify the expenditure of one-third of the Common Fisheries Policy Budget.
9.9  Before the Summer Adjournment we recommended specific third country fisheries agreements for debate. This debate took place in European Standing Committee A on 23 July. We do not therefore recommend a further debate on this document, but we consider that it is relevant to the debate we are recommending elsewhere in this Report on total allowable catches and quotas for 1997.

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15.(16995) 4218/96; see HC 51-xiii (1995-96), paragraph 10 (13 March 1996); (17306) 9773/96; see HC 51-xxv (1995-96), paragraph 4 (10 July 1996) and in the same Report (17307) 8954/96 and (17309) 9359/96, which dealt with agreements with Mauritania, Angola and Sao Tom. Back

16.(17255) 7833/96; see HC 51-xxv (1995-96), paragraph 1 (10 July 1996). Back

17.July 1996 conversion rate £1 = 1.2316 ECU. Back

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Prepared 19th December 1996