Select Committee on European Legislation Twelfth Report


SINGLE MONETARY POLICY

3. We consider that the following raises questions of legal and political importance, but make no recommendation for its further consideration at this stage:-

H M TREASURY

(17793)
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Report by the European Monetary Institute (EMI): The single monetary policy in stage three; specification of the operational framework.
Legal base: Article 109f(3) and Article 7 of the Statute of the EMI.

Background

    3.1  This document has been prepared in fulfilment of two obligations. The first stems from Article 109f(3) of the Treaty, which required the European Monetary Institute to specify, by 31 December 1996, the "regulatory, organisational and logistical framework necessary for the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to perform its tasks in the third stage [of EMU]". The second is the requirement in Article 7 of its Statute for the EMI to report annually on the adaptation of monetary policy instruments and the preparation of the procedures necessary for conducting a single monetary policy in stage three.

    3.2  In an Explanatory Memorandum dated 14 January, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr Clarke) told us that the report is for information purposes. Legislation will be necessary in due course, for which the legal base will be Article 106(6) of the Treaty. Although the EMI has proposed a number of draft Regulations in the Annexes to its report, they can be formally proposed only by the Commission or recommended by the European Central Bank (ECB) after its establishment in July 1998.

The contents of the report

    3.3  The report is divided into three chapters:

      --   strategic aspects of the single monetary policy;

      --   implementation of the single monetary policy;

      --   supporting framework for the single monetary policy.

      In his Explanatory Memorandum, the Chancellor summarises the principal elements of the report:

Strategic aspects of the single monetary policy

    3.4  "The framework concerns the monetary policy of the single currency area, which will be the responsibility of the Governing Council of the ECB. The Treaty states that the primary objective of the ESCB will be to maintain price stability. Two possible strategies are described - monetary targeting (targeting measures of money supply) and direct inflation targeting (directly targeting measures of price inflation). The report recognises that while these two strategies can be distinguished theoretically, all NCBs[5] which pursue either strategy today monitor a wide and similar set of variables. The EMI does not consider it possible to determine more specifically now which strategy should be chosen by the Governing Council. The EMI and NCBs are therefore carrying out preparatory work to ensure that the ESCB will have the statistical and analytical infrastructure to pursue either strategy."

Implementation of the single monetary policy

    3.5  "For the implementation of the monetary policy of the single currency area, the ESCB will rely on a set of monetary policy instruments and procedures constituting its operational framework. The normal operational target of the ESCB will be short-term interest rate and this will be set to achieve the strategic objective above.

    3.6  "For this purpose, the EMI has defined the set of monetary policy instruments which will need to be made available to the ESCB. It envisages that the ESCB will mainly use open market operations:

      --   main refinancing operations - weekly repo[6] transactions with a maturity of two weeks, providing liquidity to the banking sector;

      --   longer term refinancing operations - monthly repo transactions with a three-month maturity;

      --   ad hoc fine-tuning operations - to manage the liquidity situation or steer interest rates in the very short term;

      --   structural operations - to affect the structural liquidity position of the banking system relative to the ESCB.

    3.7  "In addition, two standing facilities (a marginal lending facility and a deposit facility) which will provide or absorb overnight liquidity, will set a corridor of upper and lower bounds to short-term interest rates. These facilities will help the general stance of monetary policy in the single currency area.

      "The Treaty provides for the possibility of the ECB using minimum reserve requirements as a monetary policy tool. As the report states, the EMI is engaged in work to keep open this option, although the decision will be for the Governing Council of the ECB. Legislation will be required in this area.

      "The EMI has worked out common eligibility criteria for counterparties[7] and for the assets to be used in operations. A broad range of eligible counterparties is proposed, consistent with the decentralisation of the ESCB's functions. All ESCB credit operations will need to be based on adequate collateral. Eligible collateral will be listed in two categories ('tiers'), both including public and private assets:

      --   tier one will be marketable assets which fulfil uniform single currency area-wide criteria specified by the ECB;

      --   tier two will be additional assets, marketable and non-marketable, which NCBs consider particularly important for their national financial markets and banking systems.

      "The lists will allow for a wide range of assets, desirable for a smooth settlement of monetary policy operations, and will be available to the public.

    3.8  "The ESCB will also have the capacity to conduct foreign exchange intervention, either in relation to non-EU currencies, or other EU currencies in the context of a revised exchange rate mechanism (ERM). Further information about exchange rate co-operation between the single currency area and other EU Member States is contained in an annex[8]. The EMI believes that intervention in a revised ERM should not be used alone but only as a supportive instrument in conjunction with other policy measures. Preparatory work is being undertaken to allow the ESCB to use either a centralised or decentralised set-up for foreign exchange policy. The choice of counterparties will follow a uniform approach, based on prudence and efficiency."

Supporting framework for the single monetary policy

    3.9  "The ECB will need to collect statistics with the assistance of the NCBs to operate the monetary policy of the single currency area. The report states that the statistical requirements will resemble the national statistics currently available, although there will be a need for some harmonisation and for consolidation of cross-border flows. Legislation will be required in the field of the collection of statistics."

    3.10  "The EMI and NCBs are developing an interbank funds transfer system (TARGET - trans-European real-time automated gross settlement express transfer). It is intended to process cross-border payments in euro. TARGET will be composed of one real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system in every EU Member State, plus an interlinking mechanism. All Member States will be able to access TARGET. Only NCBs (as settlement agents of the RTGS) will access the interlinking mechanism. Additional information on TARGET is contained in an annex to the main report. The report notes three outstanding points relating to TARGET:

      --   the provision of intra-day liquidity (in case a commercial bank's cumulative payments may exceed its receipts at any particular point during the day), including the terms of access to intra-day liquidity for NCBs in member states not participating in the single currency area;

      --   pricing, with efforts being made to ensure that costs are properly allocated and to respect principles of free competition;

      --   operating hours.

    3.11  "NCBs will be able to choose the most appropriate securities settlement systems to be used for monetary policy operations on the basis of existing infrastructures. Linkages to allow cross-border use of eligible assets are being developed."

The Government's views

    3.12  The Chancellor reminds us that the United Kingdom is not required to participate in the third stage of EMU. He says that nothing in the operations framework for monetary policy within the single currency area affects this and that participation in discussions on EMU has no implications for future UK participation. He continues:

    3.13  "The Government is committed to full involvement in practical negotiations on the detailed arrangements for EMU, given the implications for the United Kingdom whether or not it participates in the single currency, particularly for the financial sector. The Governor of the Bank of England is a member of the Council of the EMI.

    3.14  "The Government is committed to low inflation and welcomes the consideration given in the EMI to how this may best be achieved. It notes that the report recognises that, in practice, NCBs within the EU (including the Bank of England) monitor a range of monetary and financial indicators to assist the operation of monetary policy, and that the ESCB is likely to continue this practice. The Government believes that the present arrangements in operation in the United Kingdom would continue to be suitable to deliver low inflation in line with the Government's target if the United Kingdom were to decide not to participate in the single currency.

    3.15  "The proposed use of short-term interest rates as the general operational target for the ESCB matches the use of short-term interest rates in the United Kingdom today. The proposed reliance on open market operations by the ESCB also mirrors current practices in the United Kingdom. The Government welcomes the recognition within the EMI of the benefits of having a wide range of eligible counterparties and assets. The Government believes that reserve requirements have significant disadvantages. In particular, they effectively impose a tax on business through institutions subject to their requirements. The Bank of England has consistently argued in the EMI against the future actual use of reserve requirements, and would do so in the ECB if the United Kingdom were to participate in the single currency.

    3.16  "The Government has stated that it has no intention to participate in the proposed revised ERM for countries not adopting the single currency. Like the existing ERM, the revised mechanism will be voluntary and based on intergovernmental agreement (also involving the ESCB). These characteristics of the revised ERM have been recognised in successive European Council conclusions.

    3.17  "The Government recognises the need for the ESCB to have statistics to enable it to conduct monetary policy within the single currency area. However, the Government and the Bank of England will seek to ensure that the statistical burdens on businesses will be minimised. In this context, the Government welcomes the statement in the report that the statistical requirements for the single currency area resemble the national statistics currently available.

    3.18  "On TARGET, the Government welcomes the repeated recognition by the EMI that all Member States' NCBs will have access to TARGET. The Government notes that decisions on the terms of access by non-participating Member States' NCBs to intra-day liquidity in TARGET remain to be taken. It believes that equal terms of access for all EU Member States' NCBs would make TARGET more attractive and reduce systemic risk within the financial system of the EU as a whole. The Government also notes that other alternative euro settlement and payment systems will operate alongside TARGET and that such arrangements are used for cross-border payments today.

    3.19  "The report of the EMI is for information purposes. No compliance cost assessment has therefore been undertaken. Assessments of the compliance cost of future Community legislation which will be needed to establish the framework for the operation of the single monetary policy will be conducted if required at the appropriate time. The bulk of the transitional costs involved in the introduction of the single currency will fall on businesses, public authorities and individuals in participating Member States only. The Government will therefore take an assessment of these costs into account when it decides whether or not the United Kingdom should participate."

    3.20  In a letter dated 14 January, the Chancellor informed us that copies of the EMI report are being circulated by the Bank of England to organisations in the UK financial sector for information, to assist preparations for EMU which will be required whether the UK adopts the single currency or not. We note that the Bank says in its covering memorandum:

        "We welcome the substance of the report which in our view provides a practical framework for the ECB's future monetary policy operations."

Conclusions

    3.21  The creation of the operating framework for the European Central Bank is, we understand, considered by the President of the European Monetary Institute (Mr Lamfalussy) as one of the most important tasks falling to the EMI under the Treaty[9]. Since the ECB will need to make decisions on some issues where this report leaves options, and the Bank itself will not be set up until after 1 July 1998, the report does not provide a definitive framework for future monetary policy, but it is a major step in that direction. It clearly raises matters of political importance, whether or not the United Kingdom opts to participate in the single currency.

    3.22  The report also contains draft legislative proposals which, if the United Kingdom joins the single currency area, will have unprecedented implications. These proposals clearly raise matters of legal importance.

    3.23  Our initial reaction to this report was that it would be an appropriate subject for a short investigation by a Departmental Select Committee. However, our colleagues on the Treasury Select Committee have told us that they have concluded that they will not have an opportunity to consider the report properly in this Parliament. This we understand.

    3.24  Despite the importance of the proposals contained in this report, we are reluctant to recommend a debate before the various financial institutions in the United Kingdom have had opportunity to consider the report and to react to it. At this stage, there are also no legislative proposals on which Ministers may be required to make decisions.

    3.25  Our conclusion is that we should not recommend a debate at this stage. We shall ask the Bank of England to let us know the reaction to the paper from the organisations which it has consulted, and we shall report again when we have the Bank's reply.

5  National Central Banks.  Back

6  A sale and repurchase agreement for securities. Back

7  A counterparty here means the opposite party in a transaction with the Central Bank. Back

8  The views of the EMI regarding exchange rate co-operation between the single currency area and other Member States were set out in letters of 31 October 1996 from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Chairman of the House of Commons Select Committee on European Legislation and the Chairman of the House of Lords Select Committee in the European Communities. We reported on them in our Third Report of the current Session under reference (17540) 10893/96; see HC 36-iii (1996-97), paragraph 1 (13 November 1996). Back

9  Reported in an article in the Financial Times: 13 January 1997. Back


 


© Parliamentary copyright 1997
Prepared 17 February 1997