Select Committee on European Legislation Seventeenth Report


AGRICULTURAL EXPENDITURES: CLEARANCE OF ACCOUNTS

16. We consider that the following raises questions of political importance. We make no recommendation for its further consideration, but suggest it would be relevant to a debate covering the Common Agricultural Policy price proposals for 1997-98:-

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
(17907) 5617/97
ECA 1/97
Special Report No. 1/97 on the Commission Decision of 10 April 1996 and 20 November 1996 on the clearance of accounts 1992 and certain expenditure for 1993.

Legal base: Article 188c (4), second sub-paragraph.

Background

    16.1  The procedure for the clearance of accounts requires the Commission to audit Member States' accounts and make financial corrections before clearing them. Such corrections are known as disallowance and relate to irregularities or control weaknesses. Member States pay to the Community the sums disallowed . Following clearance by the Commission, the Commission's own accounts are required to be discharged by the European Parliament. In cases where a Member State objects to the disallowance, the matter is referred to the Conciliation Body (an independent review body) and, following its ruling, disallowances can be amended or confirmed. The process is a lengthy one and the April 1996 clearance Decision excluded a number of cases still before the Conciliation Body, requiring a supplementary Decision in December 1996 which disallowed a further 70 million ECU (£57 million)[38].

The report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA)

    16.2  The report of the ECA concentrates on the effectiveness of the Commission's clearance mechanisms. It does not go into individual accounts but looks at the need to improve, and make more transparent, the way in which the Commission operates.

    16.3  It considers the staff resources available, and points out that a maximum of 40 staff were available to comment on more than 30,000 million ECU of expenditure incurred in 12 Member States. The report says that the work programme submitted to the EAGGF Committee stated that the number of staff available was insufficient to ensure coverage of all significant measures, but there was no redeployment of staff to cover deficiencies. In its resolution on the discharge of EAGGF expenditure for 1991, the European Parliament agreed that there was a need for more staff and called for the redeployment of 15 extra staff. It said that, if redeployment was not possible, the Commission should come forward to the budgetary authority with an appropriate proposal. This has not happened.

    16.4  The report considers whether the limited staff available were deployed on the appropriate areas, and makes certain criticisms. It says that, in a high risk area such as export refunds, the audits for the six Member States with the highest level of refunds did not cover supporting documentation in the paying agency. The audit in the oils and fats sector for Italy concentrated on olive oil and sunflower even though more money was spend on soya. In Germany and the United Kingdom, the audit of the oils and fats measure did not cover peas, beans and rape-seed but only the relatively less expensive dried fodder régime. The report is particularly concerned with need for proper audit in the milk sector, commenting that resources were engaged in the follow-up of the consequences of the Council Decision on disallowance in Italy, Spain and Greece following their failure to observe the requirements on milk quotas. No programme identifying audit priorities for the 1992 expenditure was prepared.

    16.5  The ECA says the work programme was therefore carried out on a somewhat ad hoc basis, and that arbitrary decisions were taken on redeployment of resources. The report says that during the first mission to Ireland it was impossible to carry out a satisfactory examination of beef export refund files because of the disarray in the supporting documents. A second mission a year later encountered the same problem, but nevertheless Ireland received more favourable treatment when clearing the accounts than other countries whose records were in better order. Assurances of improvement appear to have been accepted without full examination. The report also comments on the lack of follow-up of deficiencies identified in the 1991 clearance of accounts, particularly in relation to olive oil in Greece.

    16.6  Commenting on working methods, the report draws attention to the significant delay between a mission being carried out and the report to the Member State concerned, leading to errors and omissions.

    16.7  The conciliation procedure was available to Member States for the first time for the clearance of accounts for the year 1992. It is available when the Commission suggests disallowance exceeding 0.5 million ECU, or more than 25% of a Member State's total annual expenditure for the particular budget line. 34 cases were submitted, of which 6 were withdrawn before consideration. The report tabulates the results of the 28 cases actually considered. Inevitably, the conciliation procedure has caused additional delay; three cases are still outstanding and will need to be dealt with as part of the 1993 clearance Decision.

    16.8  The Commission uses three general types of correction, flat rate, ad hoc and routine accounting corrections. On flat rate corrections, the Commission has established an internal grid leading to flat rate corrections of 2%, 5% or 10%, depending on the seriousness of the problem, and can take into account the effectiveness of remedial action. Higher rates can be applied in exceptional circumstances. The ECA that considers the flat rate corrections are applied inconsistently, and give the benefit of the doubt to countries' assurances of improvements even when these have not been tested. A disallowance can be rescinded even when remedial action has been taken long after the year under examination. This appears contrary to the conclusions of the European Parliament, which deplored the practice of assessing the rates of financial corrections on the basis of non-objective evidence. Such problems arose in:

        a)  olive oil production aid to Greece;

        b)  cotton production aid to Greece;

        c)  beef public storage in Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom;

        d)  withdrawal of peaches in Greece and the grubbing up of vines in Greece, where weaknesses still persist even though no correction was proposed for 1992 or 1993.

    16.9  The report also draws attention to the overruling of the Commission's Financial Controller in relation to a disallowance of expenditure in Ireland on storing intervention beef.

    16.10  In its response, the Commission points to the shortage of resources and supports the use of flat rate corrections. It also accepts the need for better liaison between the EAGGF and the Financial Controller.

The Government's view

    16.11  In his Explanatory Memorandum of 4 March, the Minister of State at the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr Baldry) welcomes the report and says:

        "On the detailed points, it is unsatisfactory for 1992 accounts still to be undischarged in 1997. Although the system was changed at the start of the 1996 year, and now aims for clearance in seven months, the fact remains that accounts for previous years are still uncleared. The Government welcomes the action now in hand to redeploy resources to strengthen the EAGGF and also the introduction of the Conciliation procedure (the 1992 accounts are the first for which it was available). As the ECA says, it can cause further delays, but it also provides a further incentive for the Commission to work properly, and it provides a forum to try and resolve disputes between the Commission and Member States objectively. These issues can be looked at further when the new arrangements are reviewed after three years.

        "The Government will continue to press for improved financial procedures within the Community. The UK has a generally good record on disallowance, but like all other Member States, the UK has encountered problems and is constantly striving to improve and to use financial control resources as effectively as possible."

Conclusion

    16.12  The report of the European Court of Auditors concentrates on areas where funds cannot be properly accounted for. It draws attention to underlying weaknesses in the way in which the Commission draws up and carries out its audit and also to the apparently arbitrary nature of its disallowance and reinstatements. It is obviously unsatisfactory, as the Minister says, that these accounts have not been cleared after five years. The new system of conciliation has clearly encountered teething problems, causing further delays. We hope that the Commission will seek adequate resources to do the necessary checking so that ad hoc and arbitrary decisions can be avoided.

    16.13  We consider the report raises questions of political importance which would be best addressed in the context of a debate on the Floor of the House on the annual CAP Price Fixing.

38  At £1 = 1.2313 ECU. Back


 
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