PUBLIC SERVICE COMMITTEE
1995-97
Report by Mr Giles
Radice, Chairman of the Committee
Scrutiny of Agencies
and other non-departmental bodies
1. The Committee delivered
its views on the scrutiny of agencies in its Report on Ministerial
Accountability and Responsibility (Second Report of Session 1995-96,
HC, 1995-96, 313). The Committee argued that where a Department
has established a number of agencies, it has exposed a much greater
area of its activities than before to much more detailed scrutiny.
A number of those giving evidence and talking to the Committee
were disappointed by what they saw as the failure of committees
to take up this opportunity to get more closely involved in the
work of Government. The Committee supported (paras 122 and 123)
calls for select committees to become more involved in the process
of setting up Executive Agencies, by considering Agencies' Framework
Documents.
2. The Committee also recognised
the difficulties of properly scrutinising the work of agencies
and quoted the point made by the Chairman of the Environment Committee
on the difficulty of monitoring in depth the full range of responsibilities
of the Department of the Environment and its agencies. The Public
Service Committee itself has within its remit a growing number
of agencies and may well find it difficult to monitor all of them
with any regularity. The Committee drew attention to the benefits
that might be drawn from better staffing, which might enable Committees
to make better use of the time they have at their disposal by
directing their attention more quickly and effectively to areas
of interest and concern.
3. Some of the same points
could no doubt be applied to non-departmental public bodies as
well, although the issue of their accountability to Parliament
is a somewhat different one.
Resources: constraints caused
by lack of staff and Members' time and use made by committees
of specialist advisers
4. The Committee delivered
its views on this in its Report. It is often argued that Members
only have a limited amount of time to spend on select committee
work and that this means that information produced by staff may
not be used effectively - or else that committees will be driven
by the work of their staff, rather than the concerns of their
Members. The Committee felt, however, that there is now an enormous
amount of information available about the work of Departments;
it is difficult for Members, with the limited amount of time
at their disposal, always themselves to pick out what is significant
and what is not. A small increase in the resources available
to committees could help them to do this. We accepted, however,
that there will be a corresponding need for Members to find ways
of making the most effective use of the information they gain.
5. The Committee did not
specify in what way extra resources should be used. There would
seem to be three main options (apart from the question of the
relationship with the NAO, which is considered separately below):
- Greater use of specialist
advisers. Because specialist advisers are normally appointed
for a particular inquiry, it is unlikely that they could provide
the sort of sustained service in informing the committee about
issues of importance, and filtering information for them. Too
great a use of specialist advisers does carry the danger of a
committee becoming `adviser-driven': well-established advisers
with a considerable reputation may have a disproportionate influence
on a committee. Committees may benefit, however, from advisers
on particularly technical or complex matters. Because it is often
difficult to find those with sufficient expertise on these matters
at the pay rates currently offered for specialist advisers, it
may be worth reviewing these.
- Greater use of specialist
assistants. Specialist assistants do provide the sort of sustained
service and broad degree of expertise in a particular set of issues
that would probably be most valuable to committees. This is,
however, one of the most expensive options. It might be worth
considering whether it would be helpful both to committees and
to the Library to exchange specialist staff between them occasionally.
- Greater use of commissioned
research. I understand that it is currently possible to commission
research, but the budget for it is too small to fund more than
about one or two projects a year. An expansion of this budget
would give committees the ability themselves to make an impact
on the terms in which policy is discussed, rather than (as they
tend to do), to pick up a discussion whose terms are set by others.
There would be problems: it is difficult to design well-conceived
research projects; and there would be a danger that, were the
budget expanded, ill-considered research projects would too easily
be approved. This might be avoided if committees were to establish
closer links with research institutes which could advise on how
a project might be put together. It might also be necessary to
ensure that the funds for such work were cash-limited, to prevent
too much research being entered into lightly or wastefully.
6. I would hope that the
Committee might think of all of these methods of increasing the
research power available to committees and not see them as alternatives.
Relations with the PAC and
NAO
7. The Committee has delivered
its views on this matter in its Report. The Committee examined
the history of the relationship between committees and the NAO
(paras 134-140) in some detail and said that the limited arrangements
that would enable committees apart from the PAC to draw on the
work of the NAO, set up following a Procedure Committee report
in 1990, had had little effect. While the Committee noted that
there would be problems in using the NAO's expertise in `economy,
efficiency and effectiveness' in inquiries that are mainly concerned
with policy - from consideration of which the NAO is barred -
it felt that there is scope for increasing contact and cooperation
between select committees and the NAO, and it recommended that
this be considered by the Liaison Committee. It made a number
of specific proposals: that the PAC should consult select committees
at regular intervals about the NAO's programme of inquiries; that
committees should be able to request memoranda from NAO concerning
economy and efficiency issues within the Departments they scrutinise;
and that the NAO hold regular briefings for select committees
on administrative and value for money issues within Departments.
8. I would stress, particularly,
the value of the National Audit Office holding regular briefings
for select committees on administrative and Value for Money issues
within Departments. I would hope that the NAO might see this
as an opportunity to direct the attention of committees to areas
which they thought might be in need of improvement but which they
did not think necessarily worthy of a full NAO report - and, indeed,
to discuss with the committee broader issues of public management.
The concept of Parliamentary
Commissions
9. The Committee has delivered
its views on this matter in its Report. The Committee welcomed
the proposal of the Trade and Industry Committee and suggested
that the Tribunals of Inquiry Act of 1921 already contained a
procedure for the House to instigate inquiries, which might be
adapted for the idea.
Difficulties in obtaining
evidence from Government Departments and summoning of named officials
10. The Committee has delivered
its views on this matter in its Report. It says that there should
be a presumption that Ministers accept requests by committees
that individual named civil servants give evidence to them. The
Government in its response has agreed that `where a select committee
has indicated that it wishes to hear evidence from named civil
servants, Ministers should normally accept such a request', subject
to two qualifications. The first of these is that they appear
before committees on behalf of their Ministers and under their
directions. Therefore, it remains the right of a Minister to
suggest an alternative civil servant to that named by the committee
and, although the committee is under no obligation to accept the
proposal, it is open to the Minister to appear personally before
the committee if there is no agreement about which official should
most appropriately give evidence. The second is that it is not
the task of select committees to act as disciplinary tribunals:
where a committee asks to hear evidence from named officials,
if this is likely to expose the individuals concerned to questioning
about their personal responsibility or the allocation of blame
between them and others, the Minister may suggest that a senior
official gives evidence on their behalf. Where a committee needs
information about individual civil servants who are the subject
of disciplinary proceedings, the Government undertakes to provide
them in closed session and on an understanding of confidentiality.
They say that evidence on such matters will be given on the basis
that:
- The Government will not
give information about departmental disciplinary proceedings until
the hearings are complete;
- When hearings have been
completed, the Government will inform the committee of their outcome
in a form which protects the identity of the individual or individuals
concerned except insofar as this is already public knowledge;
- where more detail is needed
to enable the committee to discharge its responsibilities, such
detail will be given but on the basis of a clear understanding
as to confidentiality;
- the Government will thereafter
give an account to the committee of the measures taken to put
right what went wrong and to prevent a repeat of any failures
which have arisen from weaknesses in departmental arrangements.
11. The Committee would
wish to draw these guidelines to the attention of the Liaison
Committee.
Ordering the attendance of
Members
12. The Committee did not
specifically consider this matter in its Report. The Committee
has had no difficulties with ordering the attendance of Members,
nor would it expect to do so. It may be that this is a matter
that may be usefully dealt with if the concept of Parliamentary
Commissions were to be proceeded with.
The "crown jewels"
procedure
13. The Committee has not
sought to invoke the "crown jewels" procedure. The
Committee does not deal with intelligence or military matters
and therefore the "crown jewels" procedure is unlikely
to be relevant to our own work.
14. The Committee did, however,
support the proposal of the Trade and Industry Committee that
the procedure be employed more widely to allow select committees
access to intelligence material for inquiries to which it is directly
relevant.
15. This case, too, may
be a matter that could be usefully dealt with if the concept of
Parliamentary Commissions were to be proceeded with.
Any other issues or difficulties
16. There are no particular
other matters which the Committee would wish to bring to the attention
of the Liaison Committee, although, like other committees, it
would welcome a clarification of the rules concerning declaration
of interests as they apply in select committees.
Suggestions for the future
17. The Committee would
strongly support the idea of holding prelegislation inquiries.
The Committee discussed in its Report the proposals of the Hansard
Society Commission on the Legislative Process, which suggested
that select committees might helpfully examine Green and White
Papers and other published consultative documents relating to
proposed legislation and make reports which would assist the preparatory
work on the legislation and inform Parliamentary debate.
18. Because few Statutory
Instruments or European documents are the responsibility of the
Office of Public Service, the Committee has little comment to
make on how committees might deal with them. We might add, however,
that we do regularly see the Commissioner for Public Appointments
and discuss with him the rules governing senior appointments.
