Select Committee on Trade and Industry First Report



Price Controls

  34. One objective of regulation was to establish mechanisms to prevent the utilities from exploiting their dominant market power given that they face, initially at least little, or no effective competition, while at the same time providing incentives to improve efficiency. The aim was to achieve a balance, ensuring that the utilities were able to carry out their functions effectively and profitably, and protecting the interests of consumers in terms of prices and quality. To achieve this, the Government chose to impose price controls, rather than methods such as an annual rate of return requirement which would control profits, and adopted a formula based on the RPI-X principle.[48] Although not obliged by law to continue with this form of regulation, all utility regulators in the UK have so far decided to do so. The two energy regulators told us that they believe that it protects consumers from the abuse of monopoly power and benefits consumers through greater efficiencies, while encouraging companies further to increase efficiency.[49]

  35. The RPI-X price cap operates by restricting the annual price changes to the rate of change of RPI minus or plus a fixed factor X. In addition there may also be controls on total allowed revenue. The X is intended to represent an efficiency factor, and is based on the cost structure of the company. However, there are also provisions for the pass through of certain costs deemed to be outside the control of the company, for example, environmental levies. Hence, consumer end prices do not necessarily rise or fall in line with RPI-X. There are also provisions for including forecasts in relation to raising capital expenditure for the purposes of improving quality standards. Table I below shows the different price controls set and proposed for gas and electricity supply, distribution and transmission charges since privatisation. In the gas sector, British Gas prices to consumers who use under 2,500 therms a year (the monopoly element in gas supply), are currently capped by an X factor of 4; in the gas transportation and storage sector, the maximum average price which TransCo is allowed to charge users of its facilities is capped by RPI-5.[50] In the electricity sector, the price control formula applied to transmission is currently RPI-3 (OFFER has agreed [hence changes] to cut transmission prices by 20% in 1997 and set X at 4 from 1998 to 2001; distribution charges have been cut by 13% in 1996-1997 and X will be set at RPI-3 from 1997 until 2000).[51]

Table I: Main Price Caps for Gas and Electricity since Privatisation
British Gas Trading (supply)
December 1986-March 1992 RPI-2+Y
April 1992-March 1997 RPI-5+GPI-Z+E
Redetermined January 1994 RPI-4+GPI-Z+E
Where GPI=Gas Price Index; Z=1% pa; E=Energy Efficiency schemes; Y=Gas purchase costs)
April 1997-March 2000 RPI-4+Y
BG plc (TransCo)
October 1994-March 1997 RPI-5
(Where the average price per therm in the base year, 1993-94, is 14.16p.)
April 1997-March 2002 (proposed) RPI-20 (1997)*
Equates to -6.5% p.a. for full five years RPI-2.5 (1998-2002)*
Electricity Supply
April 1990-March 1994 (England and Wales) RPI-0+Y
April 1994-March 1998 (England and Wales) RPI-2+Y
April 1990-March 1995 (Scotland) RPI-0+Y (Hydro)

RPI-0.3+Y (ScottishPower)

April 1995-March 1998 (Scotland) RPI-2+Y
April 1992-March 1997 (Northern Ireland) RPI+0+Y
April 1997-March 2001 (proposed) RPI-43.9+Y (1997)*
RPI-1.5+Y (1998-2001)*
(Y covers pass through of distribution, transmission and generation costs.

Note: the temporary cap on generation prices in England and Wales ended in 1996.)

Distribution (England and Wales)
April 1990-March 1995 RPI+0.0 to +2.5 (av.+1.3)
April 1995-March 1996† RPI-11; -14 or -17 (av. -14)
April 1996-March 1997† RPI-10; -11 or -14 (av. -11.5)
April 1997-March 2000† RPI-3
(†Equivalent to an average reduction in X from +1.3% p.a. to -9.5% p.a. for the full five years. The caps were redetermined from April 1996 from RPI-2.)
Distribution (Scotland)
April 1990-March 1995 RPI-0.3 (Hydro)

RPI-0.5 (ScottishPower)

April 1995-March 2000 RPI-1 (Hydro)

RPI-2 (ScottishPower)

Transmission
April 1990-March 1993 (NGC) RPI-0
April 1993-March 1997 (NGC) RPI-3
April 1997-March 2001 (NGC) RPI-20 (1997)

RPI-4 (1998-2001)

April 1990-March 1994 (Scotland) RPI-0.5 (Hydro)

RPI-1 (ScottishPower)

April 1994-March 1999 (Scotland) RPI-1.5 (Hydro)

RPI-1 (ScottishPower)

Northern Ireland Electricity (transmission and distribution)
April 1992-March 1997
Fixed component (75%) RPI+3.5
Variable component (25%) RPI+1.0
April 1997-March 2002 (proposed) RPI-30 (1997)*

RPI-2 (1998-2002)*

Source:  Centre for the study of Regulated Industries; also in Public Services Yearbook 1997-98 (forthcoming).

* Proposal referred to MMC.

  36. Both electricity and gas prices to customers have fallen since privatisation. Electricity prices (before VAT) to domestic customers have fallen by 15% in real terms, and industrial electricity prices to moderately large users fell by about 21% in real terms.[52] In 1995 industrial electricity and gas prices in real terms were at their lowest since records began in 1970. However, not all of this fall in prices is directly attributable to the price controls. ESTUC argued that "the fall in electricity prices since 1992 owes more to favourable circumstances in the market for generation fuels than to greater competition in supply".[53] The DGES stated that primary fuel prices, including the prices of coal and gas used by generators, have fallen since 1990/91, and that "the impact of such reductions on prices cannot, however, be considered independently of the introduction of competition in the generation market".[54] He estimated that of the 15% fall in electricity prices in real terms to domestic customers since 1990/91, "about 5% is the result of the operation of price controls on distribution, transmission and supply charges. About 6% arises from reductions in the purchase cost of generation which the RECs are permitted to pass through to franchise customers under the supply price control. The remaining 4% is the result of reductions in the fossil fuel levy".[55] Of the 21% fall in industrial prices, "just over 3% ... can be attributed to the operation of price controls on distribution and transmission charges, about 13% to reductions in generation prices, and 5% to reductions in the levy".[56]

  37. The price of gas to domestic customers has fallen by 24% in real terms since privatisation,[57] while prices to commercial and industrial gas customers have fallen by 59% in real terms. In 1995, the latest year for which data are available, UK industrial gas prices were the lowest in the European Union.[58] Table II below shows the extent to which the fall in prices to consumers is associated with reduced wholesale gas prices and to what extent it is the result of lower transportation, storage and supply costs.

Table II: British Gas Customers consuming at or below 2,500
therms of Gas a year (real 1996 prices)
1987 p/therm 1996 p/therm % reduction
Gas Costs 22.25 20.21 19.96
Other Costs1 38.94 28.52 26.76
TOTAL 64.19 48.73 24

1 transportation, storage, supply Source: Ev. p.268.

OFGAS told us that the substantial reduction of prices to [industrial] customers was largely associated with lower wholesale costs, and that "much of the real price reduction to smaller customers who are still protected by price controls is the result of direct regulatory intervention".[59] The broad reductions referred to by OFGAS were confirmed by the DTI, who stated that "around two-thirds of the fall in real consumer prices ... was due to the fall in beach prices, with around one-third attributable to the price cap on non-gas costs" and that, during 1992 to 1996, "when beach prices have fallen less sharply and have been subject to a separate capping arrangement, the contribution to the fall in final gas prices (excluding VAT) of the gas cost element in the formula and the non-gas cost element have been similar" (see Table III).[60] (A more detailed examination appears in paras 182-188).

Table III: Movements in Gas Costs since 1980/81

(a) Movement in gas prices in cash terms
a b c d e f % change
1980/1 1985/6 1986/7 1991/2 1992 1996 b/a d/c f/e
RPI gas

(Excluding VAT)

49.4 89.18 90.3 107.8 107 113

104

80.5 19.4 5.5

-2.2

Non-gas cost p/kWh

(Excluding VAT)

0.51 0.76 0.84 1.05 1.10 1.20



1.06
48.1 25.0 9.0



-3.0
Beach-gas cost p/kWh 0.282 0.675 0.61 0.66 0.60 0.59 139.4 8.2 -0.8
Total gas cost p/kWh

(Excluding VAT)

0.79 1.43 1.45 1.71 1.69 1.79



1.65
80.5 17.9 5.5



-2.2

(b) Movement in gas prices in real terms
a b c d e f % change
1980/1 1985/6 1986/7 1991/2 1992 1996 b/a d/c f/e
RPI gas

  (Excluding VAT)

87.1 115.4 113.4 99.8 95.8 91.4

84.6
32.5 -12.0 -4.6

-11.7
Non-gas cost p/kWh

  (Excluding VAT)

0.90 0.98 1.06 0.99 1.01 1.00


0.89
9.4 -6.6 -1.0


-11.9
Beach-gas cost p/kWh 0.5 0.87 0.76 0.61 0.53 0.47 74.0 -19.7 -11.3
Total gas cost p/kWh

  (Excluding VAT)

1.40 1.85 1.82 1.60 1.54 1.47


1.36
32.5 -12.1 -4.6


-11.7

Note:     Base year= 1990

Source:    Ev. p.341.

  38. The Trades Union Congress and ESTUC argued that part of the productivity gains have also been due to reductions in employment costs. ESTUC told us that since 1989/90 employment in the RECs has fallen by 38%.[61] Overall, in the electricity industry, "there have been job losses of 50% in generation, 30% in transmission, and 16% in distribution".[62] The DGGS said that "British Gas has achieved substantial gains in labour productivity".[63] During the period 1990 to 1995 there was a 43.6% fall in the number of employees.[64] Job losses in electricity and gas industries since privatisation total some 45,000 (Company Reports HOC Library). We have not attempted to quantify the fraction of the job losses which relate to the productivity gains or to the savings passed on to the consumer by way of price reductions but against any benefit or lower prices, there is an offset for the cost to the nation of the related unemployment.

  39. While many of the savings made in both the gas and electricity industries cannot be directly attributed to the operation of price controls or regulation, there is no guarantee that these savings would have been identified or passed on to the consumer if it had not been for the competitive environment created by privatisation.


48  Ev. p.324. Back

49  Ev. pp.276, 247. Back

50  OFGAS, Annual Report 1995, pp.16-17.  Back

51  OFFER, Annual Report 1995, p.8; It should be noted that where the controls (wholly or partly) cap revenue as well as prices, then the outturn maximum allowed price may be different from the regulators' forecast price caps, shown in the table. In practice, the presentation of price cap controls by regulators may also have included reference to cuts in the base tariff (ie Po), for example, in the electricity distribution review for the year 1995/6, the price controls were calculated as a set of Po cuts plus RPI-2 for that year. Back

52  Ev. p.300. Back

53  Mem. p.88. Back

54  Ev. p.300. Back

55  Ibid. Back

56  Ibid. Back

57  Ev. p.251. Back

58  HC Deb (1996-97) c.1095 w. Back

59  Ev. p.269. Back

60  Ev. p.341. Back

61  Mem. p.90. Back

62  Mem. p.113. Back

63  Ev. p.247. Back

64  Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General on The Work of the Directors General of Telecommunications, Gas Supply, Water Services and Electricity Supply, 1996, p.179. Back


 
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Prepared 18 March 1997