Select Committee on Trade and Industry Third Report
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY |
Source: Derived from evidence provided by OFTEL Ev. pp.7-8.
Note: ISR (International
Simple Resale) refers to international operators with ISR licences.
9. The extent to which competition
has been effective varies from market to market. Our evidence
indicates that there is effective competition in the national
long-distance and international markets, particularly in the specialised
business sector, whereas in the local market it is "less
well-established".[7]
In the long-distance market, there was a general consensus among
witnesses that competition is now well established.[8]
Mercury told us that its trunk network is particularly well developed,
offering a real choice to customers either by means of direct
connection or indirectly via BT.[9]
In the international market, "both Mercury and BT have experienced
substantial loss of market share since 1994 for international
business calls".[10]
Competition in the international sector has been further stimulated
since December 1996 with the opening-up of the facilities market
which ended the duopoly enjoyed by BT and Mercury to provide facilities
to and from the UK.[11]
This will allow other operators to build and operate their own
networks rather than rely on leasing lines from BT and Mercury.
The opening up of the European telecommunications markets on
1 January 1998[12]
should provide further substantial opportunities for UK telecommunications
operators and manufacturers.[13]
10. BT retains "overwhelming
dominance of the local loop" despite the ending of the duopoly
six years ago, with around 90% of the access lines.[14]
Mercury told us that "large areas of the country have no
alternative local loop infrastructure, and remained locked in
to a monopoly".[15]
The Consumers' Association wrote that "for many residential
consumers, there is still no choice of telecoms operator".[16]
The DTI told us that BT "now provides a minority of the
new fixed lines to the local loop" as a result of
the activities of cable companies and the roll-out of radio fixed
access services.[17]
11. BT and OFTEL argued that there is effective competition in the local market and that it is increasing continuously.[18] OFTEL insisted that reference to the 90% of the local lines is a potentially misleading statistic in judging whether the local market is competitive, because it does not reflect the level of investment undertaken in the local market and the "time it takes new entrants to complete networks and build up a customer base".[19] BT argued that better indicators are the number of competitors, the services they offer, their gain of market share and the ability of any one company to raise prices.[20]
12. Cable companies have
invested heavily in cable infrastructure, approximately £6
billion so far with another £6 billion planned,[21]
and a further 5 million households have been passed by cable operators
since 1994, bringing the total to almost 8 million by 1996. However,
take-up rates have remained low. Take-up of cable television
has remained at about 21%, whilst that of telephony has increased
from 14% to 25% since 1994.[22]
The CCA stated that the low take up of cable television is primarily
due to inadequate marketing, lack of flexibility in the way services
are offered and the increasing cost of services to the customer.[23]
The CCA expects take-up rates to increase when marketing improves
and cable operators can offer new digital services.[24]
The CCA predicts that by the end of the decade, around 70% of
UK customers should have access to an alternative operator to
BT.[25]
DTI and OFTEL share the CCA's optimism.[26]
13. There is, however, a
distinction between the number of customers who have access to
competition and the number who decide to take it up. So far BT's
market share is falling but not at a significant rate and it remains
to be seen whether cable companies can provide effective competition
to BT. The business prospects of the cable companies remain uncertain.
The take-up rates of cable television are particularly discouraging,
the level of future demand is uncertain and cable companies are
currently making losses in the order of £500 to £600
million and they are not expecting to be profitable until the
end of the decade.[27]
In the meantime they face serious further competition from digital
terrestrial and satellite television. To compete, cable companies
will need to upgrade the technology of their networks to digital.
The CCA told us that networks installed in the last three years
already have the necessary digital capability, but networks installed
before this will need to be upgraded. The cost of this upgrading
is estimated to be £80 million; £40 million for network
upgrades to allow for extra bandwidth and return path capacity
and £40 million for upgrading headend equipment. In addition,
there will be a further cost associated with providing each customer
with a new set-top box which the companies will bear themselves.[28]
It is estimated that the unsubsidised retail cost of the corresponding
set-top digital decoder for satellite transmissions may be about
£500 to £600.[29]
The CCA does not consider the overall cost of offering digital
television service to be significant against the prospective overall
industry investment of £12 billion.[30]
14. In addition to the ability
to deliver downstream digital television the networks with digital
capability will also have a high capacity return path which will
allow a wide range of interactive services. These include home
working and distance learning, both of which the companies believe
require a high capacity return path. Other services such as video
telephony, internet access and video-conferencing will also benefit
from the increased return path capacity. Once equipped with digital
technology the cable networks will therefore become full broadband
networks, able to deliver most broadband services envisaged today
as being economically viable. In some cases their functionality
would need to be upgraded by adding to or modifying the customer
terminal and headend equipment.[31]
15. Cable and Wireless plc
(the parent company of Mercury), NYNEX and Bell Cablemedia announced
their intention to merge, in October 1996.[32]
Whether coming together of two cable operators[33]
with Mercury to form Cable and Wireless Communications will create
a new and more effective competitor to BT remains to be seen.
The Director General pointed out that this will "depend
crucially on the effectiveness of the management and the commitment
of the shareholders".[34]
The opening-up of the US inland telecommunications market could
potentially affect the priorities of the US companies who currently
have an interest in the UK telecommunications market and, therefore,
on the competitiveness of the UK market.[35]
We therefore believe that the process of developing competition
is far from complete, and there is a long way to go before there
is effective competition in the local markets. The cable companies
face major difficulties in trying to hold on to and increase substantially
their market share.
16. Number portability,
the ability of customers to keep their telephone number when they
change operators, had been regarded as a significant barrier to
the development of local competition.[36]
Following an MMC referral in 1995, OFTEL has modified BT's licence
in July 1996, in accordance with the recommendations by the MMC.
BT is now required to provide portability to competitors, on
a reciprocal basis and at a charge determined by the Director
General and similar modifications to other operators' licences
are planned.[37]
The CCA told us that the effects of this are beginning to be
felt and should result in improved take-up rates of cable telephone
services.[38]
OFTEL told us about its commitment to extend number portability
to "specially tariffed" numbers, such as freephone,
this July, and to mobile numbers in 1998.[39]
The evidence, therefore, suggests that this issue has largely
been resolved and OFTEL has the situation under control.
17. BT, along with other
national PTOs,[40]
are currently restricted from offering simultaneous broadcast
entertainment services to two or more dwellings over their telephone
line networks.[41]
The restrictions were imposed to encourage the investment needed
for local companies to build their networks and become established.[42]
The restrictions on both conveying and providing were to be reviewed
in 2001, although the Government was prepared to reconsider the
conveying aspect in 1998 on the advice of the Director General.[43]
18. In our Optical Fibre
Report we recommended that the restrictions be lifted progressively
on a franchise by franchise basis subject to the principle that
all cable franchises should be exclusive for seven years from
the granting of the original licence and be removed in any areas
which had not been covered by a cable franchise by the end of
1995. We further recommended that all restriction should be lifted
by 2002.[44]
The Government rejected these recommendations, pointing out the
importance of maintaining the stable regulatory framework promised
to the cable companies.[45]
19. The Director General
told us that he intends to review the restrictions in 1997, as
part of his periodic review of the competitiveness of the telecommunications
market, and reach conclusions by early 1998. The review will
cover conveying and providing because the distinction between
the two is no longer as relevant as it was in 1991.[46]
Mr. Ian Taylor however stated that the overriding policy of the
Government is "that there will be stability and the current
arrangements will prevail until 2001".[47]
The CCA pointed out that any changes to the regulatory framework
could undermine future investment and reminded us that the cable
industry is only half way through its £12 billion investment
programme and still facing significant losses.[48]
Bell Cable Media and Mercury told the National Heritage Select
Committee that cable companies needed "another two to three
years at least" to complete their networks and that BT and
Mercury should not be allowed to compete before 2001.[49]
We welcome the Director General's review and recommend that
he publish his conclusions.
20. In 1994 BT told the
Committee that it estimated that it would cost £15 billion
to upgrade its network to provide broadband service; but that
it would make an investment of a "few hundred millions anyway"
regardless of restrictions.[50]
In the present inquiry BT has stated that in the last three years
it had invested £7 billion in its network.[51]
Of the £7 billion, total expenditure on access network to
support broadband services was £294 million, half of which
related to provision for multi-line businesses.[52]
This corresponds with the "few hundred millions" referred
to in 1994. As table 2 shows, the remainder of the £7 billion
expenditure was mainly on core network, copper access and exchange
systems. As yet, BT has no plans to "install broadband capability
in the local loop to homes", which is the major element of
investment affected by the restrictions.[53]
Source: Ev. p.135. 1Approximately half relates to Private Circuits local.
2BT's
investment in its core network could also be considered broadband,
as it is 2Mbit or greater and forms part of the network platform
over which broadband services may be offered. But it would be
misleading to represent the total as wholly driven by broadband
service needs.
21. Nearly all telephones
into domestic premises use copper wires; the trunk system is now
fibre-optic cable and BT said that they also use fibre-optic cable
to commercial premises with five lines or more.[54]
At the time of our Optical Fibre Networks Report BT expected
that building a broadband network throughout the UK would be based
on fibre. Since then, advances in technology have meant that
optical fibre is no longer as significant to the development of
broadband services as it was considered to be in 1994.[55]
Technologies such as Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Line, have
enabled BT to provide many broadband interactive services to residential
customers over its existing copper network.[56]
Consequently, the anticipated cost of a broadband network is
reducing[57]
but will still be considerable. BT would need to commit further
investment to upgrade its network to provide interactive broadband
services more generally.[58]
BT said that as a broad guide, for 3.5 million customer sites
provided with broadband services over 5 years the cost would be
around £4 billion.[59]
In addition, BT told the National Heritage Select Committee that
it has the capability of delivering some broadcast and on-demand
entertainment services using existing telephony networks; it can
deliver simultaneously up to six channels to any individual home.
BT also told us that with the present technology, eventually
over 90% of homes could be offered the service if it was economically
justified.[60]
The CCA said that BT could not deliver television channels "without
heavy investment in ASDL technology ... Although BT's core network
may be ready to have ADSL equipment installed, we are sure that
BT has not progressed with such an investment ... mainly because
they have not had the policy freedom to do so".[61]
22. However, BT argued that
the restrictions did "potentially distort competition",
pointing out that they affected the company's ability to plan
in the long term. In particular, it was unable to develop effectively
and efficiently its network using digital technology if it is
prevented from employing broadcast technologies.[62]
The evidence we were given suggests that the restrictions have
affected BTs investment plans, but to a lesser extent than envisaged
in 1994.[63]
They nevertheless continue to create uncertainty for BT and affect
its ability to invest in broadband services. BT estimated that
the capital expenditure involved would take six to seven years
in total to implement and would take three to four years after
the restrictions were lifted, whenever that would be, for anything
to be delivered to the market.[64]
BT told us that an announcement before 2001 would assist its
future investment plans and argued that a review now is realistic
given the changes in technology and consumer environment.[65]
We recommend that following the review by the regulator, the
Government indicate its intentions as soon as possible.
23. BT stated that removal
of one of the restrictions would not alter its current situation.
If both restrictions were to be lifted, BT would consider other
regulatory constraints such as the rate of return they are allowed
to receive, the cost of technology, consumer demand and the content
provider/service provider commitments before embarking on a programme
of delivering broadcast and entertainment services.[66]
24. The evidence in this
inquiry does not lead us to change the recommendations we made
in 1994.[67]
The CCA is now able to estimate more accurately the costs of
upgrading cable networks to digital than it was in 1994. It has
stressed to us that these costs are insignificant in the context
of the companies' overall investment. Had the costs been higher
it would have strengthened the case for continuing to protect
the companies through the restrictions. There is a case for lifting
the restrictions immediately. However, we recognise that this
could have an adverse effect on cable companies. If the restrictions
are not lifted soon and technology continues to change as rapidly
as it has done so far, there is a risk that BT will no longer
be able to compete with the cable companies. The evidence suggests
that there is a strong case for an early review of policy on the
restrictions. We welcome the Director General of Telecommunications
review in 1997. We reiterate the recommendation of our Third
Report of 1993-94 that all restrictions on PTOs should be lifted
by 2002, and that an announcement lifting the restrictions is
made immediately. 25. The Director General of Telecommunications has powers to deal with anti-competitive behaviour under three different Acts. Under the Competition Act, he has concurrent powers with the Director General of Fair Trading in relation to certain telecommunications matters. For example, he can take action if he believes that conduct by companies will restrict, distort or prevent competition, and make a reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) if appropriate. Under the Fair Trading Act the Director General can refer certain industry-wide matters to the MMC for investigation. In both cases, he cannot require cessation of any activity pending completion of the investigation.[68] The Telecommunication Act 1984 gives the Director General powers to take action on anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position through enforcement and modification of licence conditions. If a licence condition is breached the Director General can issue an order and non-compliance can result in a referral to the MMC. A recent example where OFTEL has issued such an order is BT's marketing campaign to win back customers from other operators. The Director General believed "BT has discriminated unduly in targeting other operators' customers" and had failed to obtain his consent to the below-cost element of the offer.[69]
26. The Director General
told us that BT's licence was "littered with such detailed
licence conditions"[70]
and that in an increasingly competitive market it was more appropriate
to regulate in a more general way on the types of behaviour which
would be prohibited than on a condition by condition basis.[71]
Consequently, the Fair Trading Condition (FTC), a more flexible
and less interventionist arrangement, was introduced into BT's
licence in October 1996, effective from December 1996, after the
High Court ruled that the introduction of the FTC by OFTEL was
legal. The FTC is due to lapse in 2001. OFTEL intends to incorporate
the FTC in other PTOs' licences.[72]
The FTC is based on Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome
but without the powers to fine or to allow third parties to claim
damages for past breaches.[73]
BT challenged the Director General's power to make the modification
through the High Court.
27. OFTEL told us that regulation
of anti-competitive behaviour is particularly important to interconnection
and access issues in the network industries.[74]
The Director General stressed that complaints about anti-competitive
behaviour are not "BT's fault or the industry structure's
fault" but arise out of the normal interplay of companies
in a market that is in transition from a monopoly to full competitiveness.[75]
28. Both OFTEL and DTI believe
that the FTC does not give the Director General any additional
powers or powers that overlap with those of the Office of Fair
Trading (OFT). The Director General told us that issues such
as the extent of his competition powers and the distinction between
his and the Director General of Fair Trading's roles are addressed
in the judgement of the court. He said the judgement makes it
very clear that "Parliament in 1984 saw the Director General
and the Telecommunications Act as being the first line of defence
against anti-competitive behaviour ... and that the powers available
to me, and to the Director General of Fair Trading under the Competition
Act and the Fair Trading Act, are a back-up ... not the other
way round".[76]
Mr. Taylor, the DTI Minister, told us that "any further
moves to reinforce the powers or extend them would need to be
done through competition law on the floor of the House here, where
we can have a wider debate about its implications in either the
specific telecom sector, or utilities, or more generally".[77]
29. BT told us that the
Telecommunications Act 1984 framework for dealing with anti-competitive
behaviour is limited because it lacks certain checks and balances,
rights of appeal and powers to fine. BT stated that whilst the
FTC gives the Director General greater powers to deal with anti-competitive
behaviour, it does not allow for the right of appeal, nor does
it provide a proper separation of the Director General's roles
of investigation and adjudication.[78]
On the latter point, BT viewed the setting up of a panel of expert
advisors by OFTEL in relation to the FTC as only a partial solution
to the problem.[79]
BT said that the flaws in the current arrangements could only
be rectified if the changes were made under general competition
law and if Articles 85 and 86 were fully incorporated into general
competition law. Such changes would require primary legislation.
BT's call for reform was supported by the CCA and Mercury,[80]
who also regarded the FTC as an interim measure. OFTEL also supported
such reforms, pointing out, however, "that the Government
has, however, made it clear that it does not intend to introduce
such law reform measures".[81]
Mr Taylor confirmed this, adding "the consultation document
that we put out some time ago did not go completely down that
path, but ... we are consulting more widely and listening very
closely to the arguments".[82]
30. BT had no objections to OFTEL becoming more like a competition authority and having increased powers provided it was done by statute and there was a right of appeal to the courts.[83] BT also argued for a system in which decision-making was the responsibility of a small panel rather than of one individual, similar to the American collegiate system, since this would de-personalise decision-making.[84] We recommend that this should be a matter for consideration.
31. We see great merit in
the arguments put forward by the companies and OFTEL for a system
enshrined in statute and incorporating Articles 85 and 86, allowing
proper mechanisms for appeals and rights of third parties. The
consideration of reforms to general competition law is outside
the scope of this inquiry. It is too early to assess how effective
the FTC, licence-based, approach to anti-competitive behaviour
will be. We believe that the lapse of the FTC in 2001 gives the
opportunity to reconsider the position as regards general competition
law, bearing in mind whether Articles 85 and 86 have been incorporated
and whether it is appropriate to have sectoral or general competition
authorities to deal with anti-competitive issues in the telecommunications
industry.
4 Ev. pp.1, 3, 5, 54-5. Back
9 Ev.
p.92; See also Ev. pp.54-5. Back
11 International
facilities refers to facilities that are required to convey telecoms
signals between countries and could involve, amongst other things,
cables under the sea and landing stations on the shore. Back
12 Following
the Green Paper on liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructure
and cable television networks, the European Commission adopted
directive 96/19/EC on the implementation of full competition in
the telecoms market. This provides for the abolition of all exclusive
rights for the provision of telecommunication services, including
the establishment and the provision of telecommunications networks
by 1 January 1998. It also required the liberalisation of provision
of infrastructure by 1 July 1996 (OJL 74 March 96). Back
14 Ev.
p.3, 92. The local loop provides the connection between the customer
and the local exchange, as opposed to the long-distance trunk
network. The infrastructure runs past residential and business
properties to which these properties can be connected for telephone
(and possibly other) services. Back
16 Ev.
p.126. Back
17 Ev.
p.55. Radio fixed access uses radio link to provide the local
loop (with fixed termination points), thereby avoiding the need
for land lines (or other equivalent infrastructure) which can
be expensive and time-consuming to put in place. This makes the
provision of telecommunications services to rural areas far more
cost-effective for the operators, and opens up the possibility
of greater competition to provide a wide range of services to
remote areas at low cost. Back
20 QQ.117-119;
Ev. pp.68-69. Back
21 QQ.177-178. Back
22 Third
Report by the Trade and Industry Committee, Session 1993-94, on
Optical Fibre Networks, HC 285-I, p.18; The Cable TV
and Telecoms Factbook, Cable Communications Association, October
1996. Back
26 Ev.
pp.6-7; See also, QQ.3, 5, 79-80. Back
29 New
Scientist, 22.2.97. Back
33 Bell
Cablemedia has recently acquired a majority shareholding in Videotron. Back
39 Ev.
p.14; See also DTI Press Notice P/97/178, 27.2.1997. Back
40 For
example, Mercury and Kingston Communications. Back
41 Ev.
p.92; Fourth Report from the National Heritage Select Committee,
Volume II, HC 147-II, Appendix 11. Back
42 Third
Report from the Trade and Industry Committee, Session 1993-94,
on Optical Fibre Networks, HC 285-I, p.16; Ev. p.92. Back
43 Ibid.
See also Q.8. There is
a ban on conveying broadcasting over BT lines and only those holding
a Broadcasting Act Local Delivery Service Licence may offer broadcast
services to customers. BT has no licence to do this nationally. Back
44 Third
Report from the Trade and Industry Committee, Session 1993-94,
HC 285-I, p.41. Back
45 DTI,
Creating the Superhighways of the Future: Developing Broadband
Communications in the UK, Cm 2734, November 1994. Back
49 Fourth
Report from the National Heritage Committee, Session 1996-97,
on The BBC and the Future of Broadcasting, Volume II, HC
147-II, QQ.500, 502; See also Ev. p.92. Back
50 Third
Report from the Trade and Industry Committee, Session 1993-94,
on Optical Fibre Networks, HC 285-I, Minutes of Evidence,
pp.16-20. Back
52 Ev.
p.134. Back
54 Fourth
Report from the National Heritage Select Committee, Session 1996-97,
on The BBC and the Future of Broadcasting, HC 147-II, Minutes
of Evidence, Volume II, QQ.340, 351, 355. Back
55 Ev.
p.134. Back
56 QQ.103-104;
Ev. p.81; Fourth Report from the National Heritage Select Committee,
Session 1996-97, on The BBC and the Future of Broadcasting,
HC 147-II, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix 11. Back
57 Ev.
p.134. Back
58 Fourth
Report from the National Heritage Select Committee, Session 1996-97,
The BBC and the future of Broadcasting, HC 147-II, Minutes
of Evidence, Q.355. Back
60 Fourth
Report from the National Heritage Select Committee, Session 1996-97,
The BBC and the Future of Broadcasting, HC 147-II, Minutes
of Evidence, QQ.341,355, Appendix 11; Q.111. Back
61 Fourth
Report from the National Heritage Select Committee, Session 1996-97,
The BBC and the Future of Broadcasting,HC 147-II, Minutes
of Evidence, Appendix 10. Back
64 QQ.103,106 Back
66 Fourth
Report from the National Heritage Select Committee, Session 1996-97,
The BBC and the Future of Broadcasting, HC 147-II, Minutes
of Evidence, QQ.346, 357. Back
67 Third
Report from the Trade and Industry Committee, Session 1993-94,
on Optical Fibre Networks, HC 285-I, p.41. Back
69 OFTEL,
Press Release, 10/97, 3 March 1997. Back
72 Ev.
pp.2, 29, 57. OFTEL Press Release, 50/96, 2 August 1996. Back
80 Ev.
pp.85, 93-94, 127. Back
84 QQ.127-130. Back |
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© Parliamentary copyright 1997 | Prepared 20 March 1997 |