Price controls
32. The present price cap
formula of RPI- 7.5% is due to expire by the end of July 1997.
The new price cap, RPI-4.5%, effective from August, will focus
on the lowest 80% of residential users by bill size. There will
be no price caps on the business sector or on the largest 20%
of residential users by bill size, reflecting the increased level
of competition in these sectors. Only 25% of the BT's revenues
will be price capped against 65% now. To counterbalance this
lessening of price controls OFTEL has provided for greater powers
to act against anti-competitive practices, such as predatory pricing,
by BT.[85]
OFTEL intends this to be the last retail price cap since it believes
that the residential market will be sufficiently competitive by
2001 for these price caps to be abandoned, although there will
be controls on wholesale network access prices (see para 34).
33. DTI told us that BT's
prices have fallen by around 40% in real terms since 1984, and
BT's productivity has increased by an average of 3.5% a year over
the last 10 years. OFTEL and Mercury told us that the new arrangements
will ensure that customers receive a "better deal" than
the current 7.5% control[86]
because previously "cuts were focused on competitive areas,
with reductions skewed towards business customers",[87]
implying that prices may fall further than they have done so already.
We asked BT if the price controls would affect its willingness
to invest in the domestic market. BT replied that the new controls
would be "tough and challenging".[88]
OFTEL told us that "the pressures of technology will continue
to give BT cost-saving opportunities".[89]
We received no evidence from BT which indicated that the new
price controls are likely to have an adverse affect on BT's investment
plans in the UK market.
34. The companies expressed
far more concern in relation to the proposed new network charge
cap, a control on the charge by one operator for carrying the
traffic of another, due to come into effect from August 1997.[90]
OFTEL has proposed radical changes to the basis on which interconnection
charges are set, from historic to long run incremental costs,
and to the process of setting the charges: in future BT not OFTEL
will set interconnection charges. The subject is currently under
consultation and some very complex issues which are likely to
have a profound affect on the structure of the industry will need
to be resolved. We believe that our successor Trade and Industry
Committee should examine this issue again in the next Parliament.
Telephone numbering scheme
35. Since 1990, the telephone
numbering scheme has been changed three times. The first change
was to divide London numbers into 071 and 081, the second, to
insert 1 after the 0 (phONEday, 1995), and the third, and most
recent proposal (1997), to change numbers in five cities (London,
Belfast, Cardiff, Portsmouth and Southampton) to 02 codes in year
2000.[91]
Although the Director General implied that the numbers will not
need to change again, we note that the recent European Commission
Green Paper on Telecoms Numbering Policy may result in further
changes in the UK before long,[92]
possibly at the same time as the 2000 changes proposed by OFTEL.
36. Constant changes of
approach to numbering are neither appropriate nor acceptable since
they are disruptive, inconvenient and result in huge costs to
customers, especially businesses.[93]
The Director General did not accept criticisms that the numbering
system had been ill thought-out and rejected the suggestion that
the most recent proposal could have been introduced at the same
time as the phONEday change in 1995, despite having known in 1995
that there was a need to introduce new geographic codes. He argued
strongly that a staged approach was deliberate rather than a result
of poor planning, pointing out that a simultaneous change would
have "led to major customer confusion, misrouting of calls
and could have risked network failure because of the level of
misdialled calls".[94]
We believe that the most recent proposal, involving 02 codes
for London and for some provincial cities with the rest keeping
01 codes, is clumsy and likely to lead to more customer confusion.
The Director General also told us that OFTEL's capacity to estimate
future demand for numbers has improved.[95]
We are not persuaded by the Director General's arguments about
OFTEL's improved planning and forecasting methods, or that modern
technologies are used to the customers best interests. It is
also possible that prospective EC changes could cause further
complications. We recommend that the Government commission
an independent examination, by world class consultants, of the
UK's methodology and approach to numbering schemes, and that this
review should take account of EC and world numbering requirements.
Universal Service Obligation
37. Currently only BT and
Kingston Communications are required to provide a universal service
in areas such as voice telephony, directory inquiries, emergency
services and payphone provisions.[96]
We are pleased that OFTEL has undertaken an extensive review
of the provision of a universal service in a multi-operator and
rapidly changing market and consumer needs. Their consultation
document was published at the end of February 1997. OFTEL told
us the document makes proposals on the definition, cost, funding
and secure delivery of basic universal service in a manner which
does not distort competition.[97]
One important aspect is the question of setting up a universal
service fund. OFTEL's conclusion, although BT not surprisingly
disagrees with it, is that the cost to BT of providing universal
service in the UK is not significant; consequently a separate
universal service fund may not be warranted.[98]
If such a fund were to be set up, the CCA told us that cable
companies would contribute, pointing out that the cost will ultimately
fall to consumers already subscribing and therefore the fund should
be kept as small as possible.[99]
38. The Rural Development
Commission was concerned about the low penetration of country
areas by cable companies.[100]
The DTI has recently issued licences to BT and RadioTel to run
radio fixed access systems in rural areas.[101]
This should make provision more economically viable[102]
and, in addition, the Independent Television Commission (ITC)
is increasingly awarding more licences which cover rural areas.[103]
However, the CCA does not support the expansion of the universal
service obligation as a way of providing more services.[104]
The merger between BT and MCI Communications Corporation
39. In November 1996, BT
announced its proposals to merge with MCI, an American company,
to form a new company called Concert plc.[105]
The proposed merger is currently being considered by US and EC
authorities.[106]
Concert plc would be one of the largest telecommunication enterprises
in the world with annual revenues of over £25 billion and
43 million business and residential customers in 70 countries.[107]
A number of potentially significant regulatory consequences are
likely to arise from the merger if it goes ahead, for example:
BT's already dominant market position may be further strengthened,
presenting a threat to the development of competition in the UK;
whether BT will continue to meet its `reasonable demand' obligations
in the UK; and the need to ensure that BT's international activities
are not financed using monopoly profits.[108]
40. Mr Taylor did not regard
the merger as a threat to domestic competition, pointing out
that "the UK market is now sufficiently mature" for
this not to concern him.[109]
The Director General has a number of concerns which he intends
to address. One of these is whether BT's proposed structure and
licence holding arrangements allow sufficient regulatory assurance,
for example, to monitor whether adequate levels of service are
being provided to UK customers and there is transparency and accounting
separation in respect of Concert's UK activities. He may choose
to rely on the existing licence conditions, strengthen the obligations
on the directors of Concert, or take a more intrusive approach
to the regulation of Concert.[110]
The Director General is still considering the actions he needs
to take and has not yet reached any conclusions.[111]
41. Mr Taylor disagreed
with the view that the merger marked a shift in BT's priorities
away from the UK market.[112]
He also told us that he did not intend to interfere in the affairs
of BT and such decisions were a matter for its shareholders.[113]
BT said that the bulk of its investment over the next five years
will be in the UK market and, regardless of the merger, the UK
will remain a major part of its forward plan.[114]
Nevertheless, with the telecommunications markets changing rapidly
and the merger giving BT exposure to the US market, especially
now that the US Telecommunications Act 1996 has opened-up the
US market to full competition,[115]
there is no guarantee that BT's plans will not change. We remain
concerned about the consequences of this merger for UK consumers
and the level of future investment in the domestic market. Both
the Government and OFTEL have an important role to play in safeguarding
the interests of UK consumers and ensuring a proper level of
investment by BT in the UK. We recommend that the Government
should make a commitment to safeguarding the interests of UK consumers
and should give appropriate policy direction to OFTEL to have
regard to the level of future investment in the domestic market.
42. If Concert retains the
MCI share in News Corporation, the parent company of BSkyB, this
could give BT an indirect stake in BSkyB, leading to an indirect
link to media communications. It is important that OFTEL assesses
how this relationship between BT and BSkyB is likely to affect
the current prohibition on BT carrying entertainment services
on its telecommunications network.[116]
In addition, the CCA and Mercury drew our attention to the potential
collaboration between two dominant market players[117]
at a "crucial time in the development of our [cable] industry",
in particular, to preferential rights of supply of either BT's
network assets or BSkyB's set-top boxes.[118]
The CCA would, therefore, prefer the shareholding to be divested.[119]
BT told us that it would regard its interest in BSkyB as passive
but that it would be interested in potential collaborations, such
as the distribution of information, particularly in the interactive
market.[120]
We note that the merger would require regulation by both OFTEL
and ITC,[121]
a matter considered below. We recommend that the Director
General examine the potential consequences, on the development
of competition, of a closer relationship between BT and BSkyB
and take appropriate action including, if necessary, requiring
Concert to dispose of its interest in News Corporation or amending
BT's licence conditions.
Regulatory structure
43. In our Optical Fibre
Networks Report in 1994 we recommended that the Government
should review the structure of telecommunications and broadcasting
regulation in the light of increasing convergence between the
two industries.[122]
The Government rejected this recommendation, saying that this
would be premature "in the absence of much more concrete
information about how convergence will occur".[123]
The DTI agrees in principle that some convergence of regulatory
structures will be required, but apart from stating that this
should be after the advent of digital television, its position
on when this should be is unclear. It cited the "medium
term" and 1998 as possibilities.[124]
We note that in 1995 the Government gave OFTEL the responsibility
for regulating conditional access systems for digital broadcasting,
reinforcing the view that the industries are converging.[125]
44. The evidence indicated
that an earlier rather than later review would be appropriate:
BT suggested the next year or two and certainly within the next
five years;[126]
OFTEL believed that legislation needed to be changed before the
end of the century.[127]
Among the arguments put forward for reform were that the boundaries
of responsibility were no longer clear and "becoming increasingly
blurred";[128]
that because of globalisation markets could no longer be defined
by boundaries;[129]
that the market is moving rapidly towards digital information
which may be transmitted over phone lines or satellites and if
the regulations are not reviewed anomalies will begin to arise;[130]
and that the current division of duties between OFTEL, ITC and
the Radio Authority has the potential to act as a barrier to effective
economic regulation (the example of the overlap in the regulation
of electronic programme guides was cited by the Consumers' Association).[131]
45. With regard to nature
of the reforms, only the Consumers' Association argued for a single
regulatory body for the communications industry.[132]
BT and CCA made suggestions about redefining the boundaries and
allocation of responsibilities between OFTEL and ITC, suggesting
that the regulation of the distribution networks should be separated
from the regulation of the content of services.[133]
The Hansard Society recommended enhancing the role of OFTEL by
creating an "Office of Communications" which would regulate
infrastructure in telecommunications and broadcasting, leaving
the ITC to regulate issues relating to content.[134]
OFTEL agreed with them.[135]
46. The case for examining
whether the current regulatory structures of telecommunications
and broadcasting is appropriate is now even stronger than it was
in 1994, given the significant technological and market developments.
We are not convinced by the arguments for having a single regulatory
body for both industries, but we see great merit in redefining
the roles and responsibilities of OFTEL and ITC along the lines
suggested by CCA, BT and the Hansard Society. It is important
that responsibilities are allocated to where the expertise resides.
Furthermore, there appears to be a lack of urgency on the part
of DTI as to when the regulatory structures should be reviewed
and reforms implemented. We believe that the DTI should attach
greater urgency to these. Given that digital technology will
be introduced from 1998 onwards, we recommend that the Government
undertake a review of the regulatory structures of telecommunications
and broadcasting within the next two years, with a view to redefining
roles and setting clear responsibilities in all matters relevant
to the regulation of the communications industries, and that this
review should have due regard to the suggestions made by BT, CCA
and the Hansard Society.
85 Ev. p.86. Back
86 Ev.
pp.2, 19, 94. Back
87 Ev.
p.94. Back
88 Ev.
p.82. Back
89 Q.43. Back
90 Ev.
pp.73, 83, 94-5. Back
91 Ev.
pp.13, 58. Back
92 ECC
Green Paper, ref: 12194/96, "Telecoms Numbering Policy".
Back
93 Q.146. Back
94 Ev.
p.53; See also QQ.47-61. Back
95 Q.51. Back
96 Ev.
p.58. Back
97 Ev.
pp.13, 36. Back
98 Q.91;
Ev. p.84. Back
99 Ev.
p.86. Back
100 Ev.
p.131. Back
101 Ev.
p.27. Back
102 Ev.
p.55. Back
103 Ev.
p.133. Back
104 Ev.
pp.133-4. Back
105 BT
News Release NR 9691, November 96. Back
106 Ev.
p.36. Back
107 BT
News Release NR 9691, November 1996. Back
108 Q.17. Back
109 Q.90. Back
110 Q.20. Back
111 Q.16. Back
112 Q.90. Back
113 Q.95. Back
114 Q.133. Back
115 BT
News Release NR 9691, November 1996. Back
116 Ev.
p.124. Back
117 Ev.
pp.87, 95, 133; Q.192. Back
118 Ev.
p.133; Q.192. Back
119 QQ.192-193. Back
120 Q.141. Back
121 Ev.
p.95. Back
122 Third
Report from the Trade and Industry Committee, Session 1993-94,
HC 285-I, p.46. Back
123 DTI,
Creating the Superhighways of the Future: Developing Broadband
Communications in the UK, 1994, Cm 2734. Back
124 Ev.
p.59; Q.97. Back
125 Ev.
p.20; Q.97. Back
126 Q.151. Back
127 Q.23. Back
128 Ev.
p.24. Back
129 Ev.
p.72. Back
130 Q.150. Back
131 Ev.
p.127. Back
132 Ibid. Back
133 QQ.153,
194. Back
134 The
Hansard Society, "The Report of the Commission on the Regulation
of Privatised Utilities", December 1996, pp.47-51 Back
135 Ev.
p.24-25. Back