Select Committee on Trade and Industry Second Report


CHAPTER FIVE: PRICE RESTRAINTS AND OTHER OUTSTANDING CUSTOMER PROTECTION ISSUES


  64. At present customer protection is delivered through a series of Codes of Practice which PESs are required to adhere to as a condition of their supply licences. The DGES has proposed that such arrangements should be continued, subject to appropriate modifications, in the post liberalisation market and that they should be extended to second tier suppliers. We recommend that this should be done with some urgency.

  65. In this section we consider a limited number of customer protection issues which may give rise to the need for strengthening existing Codes of Practice or adopting other measures to ensure that all customers are adequately protected.

Price restraints in the competitive market

  66. In Aspects of the Electricity Supply Industry, we indicated that we saw a need for some regulation of prices in the post 1998 market, at least for a transitional period, reflecting our concerns that not all customers might benefit from liberalisation in the short term.[146] The majority of witnesses who commented on price restraints accepted that some controls for vulnerable customers in the post 1998 market would be desirable.[147] In November 1995, the DGES gave his initial view that price restraint in relation to smaller customers should continue to apply to PESs after 1998.[148] In his second consultation document on price restraints, the DGES said that it would seem sensible to propose price restraints for tariff customers of incumbent PESs with an annual consumption somewhere in the range of 8,000 to 20,000 kWh per annum and that the restraint should be set for two years with possible extension or modification in 2000.[149] Price controls set in this consumption range would cover between 90% and 99% of all domestic consumers and between 50% and 75% of businesses currently in the franchise market. We recommend that the DGES should proceed with the establishment of price controls on consumption between 8,000 and 20,000 kWh per annum for the period immediately following 1st April 1998 for a minimum of two years.

  67. The NCC argued that price restraints should apply to all consumers with a particular level of consumption rather than excluding those who choose to take supply from a second tier supplier or on contract terms.[150] However, second tier suppliers will need to offer competitive terms in order to attract customers away from the incumbent PES. If the second tier supplier were then to increase their tariff rates, customers would have the option to return to the local PES and protected tariffs. There are similar reasons for not extending restraints to contract customers, although it may be more difficult for contract customers to return to tariff conditions as the terms of the contract may stipulate a fixed term or only permit termination after an unduly long notice period. We agree with the DGES that price regulation of second tier suppliers' tariffs will not be necessary but we recommend that he give further consideration to the need to restrain prices for contract customers who have the same consumption levels as those on protected tariffs. [151]

  68. The DGES has not yet produced firm proposals for price restraints and some fundamental issues still need to be determined, such as whether there should be a single consumption limit or different consumption limits for different groups of consumers or different regions of the country. Progress on other developments for the 1998 market, such as information systems, are not dependent on the form or the level of price restraints so final determination is not such an urgent matter at this stage.

  69. If price restraints are set too high, they will not provide adequate protection to consumers. On the other hand, as British Energy pointed out, if PESs are required to supply at a rate where the profit margin is too small, there may not be enough incentive for other suppliers to enter the market.[152] Therefore, we recommend that the Director General, in determining the level of price restraints, seeks to strike an appropriate balance between the need to protect consumers and the need to provide adequate incentives to new entrants.

Code of practice on marketing

  70. During the gas trials in the South West some of the marketing strategies employed by suppliers, and one company in particular, were less than desirable. "According to the Director of Trading Standards for Devon County Council, the complaints received in this regard probably constituted the largest number of complaints ever received in Devon and Cornwall about one trader in such a short period".[153] As London Electricity told us, it is important that there is no repetition of such events in 1998 as new and existing suppliers compete for electricity customers.[154]

  71. In response to a request from the DGES, the Electricity Association is, in consultation with the industry and consumer groups, drawing up a Code of Practice, to which signatories will have to adhere. Witnesses were split as to whether agreement to the Code should be mandatory or voluntary. The Electricity Association and the Minister believed that the Code should be voluntary.[155] However, the ECCCG argued that it would be difficult to impose sanctions against those in breach of a voluntary Code and therefore favoured a licence condition to enforce acceptance and adherence. We are not convinced that it is appropriate for the DGES to become closely involved in the marketing practices of licensees; nevertheless we are concerned that consumers should be adequately protected against the sort of abusive marketing that occurred during the gas trials. We recommend that the DGES ask the Office of Fair Trading, in consultation with the Electricity Association, to consider ways in which sanctions could be imposed upon those suppliers who breach the Code of Practice on Marketing - whether full members of the Electricity Association or not.

Meter readers

  72. The draft Competitive Supply Code at present states that persons entering customers' premises to undertake work on meters should be suitable in terms of training and expertise. The NCC argued that the definition of `suitable' should also include consideration of any criminal record. We agree. We recommend that the Director General amend the Competitive Supply Code so that the provision relating to persons entering customers' premises include consideration of criminal records.


146  Aspects of the Electricity Supply Industry, para 19. Back

147  eg. Ev. p.51, 53. Back

148  OFFER, The Competitive Electricity Market from 1998: Customer Protection, Competition and Regulation, November 1995, para 4.35. Back

149  OFFER, Competitive Electricity Market from 1998: Price Restraints, January 1997, paras 2.24 and 3.1. Back

150  Ev. p.89. Back

151  OFFER, The Competitive Electricity Market from 1998: Customer Protection, Competition and Regulation, November 1995, para 4.33. Back

152  Ev. p.39. Back

153  Ev. p.86. Back

154  Ev. p.52. Back

155  QQ.127, 199. Back


 
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