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Mr. Andrew Tyrie (Chichester): On verification, how concerned are the Government about the fact that there appear to have been explosions in, for example, the Russian arctic, which it appears seismic technology has not been capable of verifying as definite nuclear explosions? Is not verification the crucial issue? After all, we had only a partial nuclear test ban treaty--a treaty covering only atmospheric explosions--because it was impossible for many decades to check what was going on underground. If explosions are taking place which have not been correctly verified, a large part of the rationale for the treaty could be undermined.
Mr. Lloyd: I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's observation. It is, however, our view that the events in the Russian arctic were much more likely to have been caused by an earthquake. Britain has significant relative expertise in seismic areas, and it was certainly the view of our experts that that was the most likely course of events. The advantage of a CTBT coming into operation is that it will provide a challenge mechanism--an opportunity where there are doubts about the credibility and good faith of the parties to the treaty--that will enable an inspection to be set up and conducted very quickly. The treaty will enable us to do a lot more than we are able to under the present system. It both advances the need for science, in which countries such as Britain have expertise, and provides an opportunity for us to pursue matters beyond simple scientific measuring from a distance, by enabling us to look actively at what happens on site. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Tyrie: Will the Minister say something about sub-critical explosions and the concern that tests of very small weapons--mini neutron bombs and the like--which may find themselves excluded from the treaty de facto, could occur because it is difficult to know whether they have taken place? Will the Minister give a view on those problems?
Mr. Lloyd: The hon. Gentleman is right; sub-critical tests are not prohibited by the treaty. It is necessary, in order to maintain not only the viability but the safety of existing nuclear weapons systems, that sub-critical tests are part of the opportunities available to all nuclear weapon states. Rather than seeing the issue as potentially threatening, I suggest that it is the opposite. It is a necessary safeguard for the whole world that nuclear weapon states maintain the opportunity to take advantage of sub-critical tests. I hope that that reassurance will be helpful to the hon. Gentleman. The issues are important.
The United Kingdom has for many years had a national research programme into the means of detecting and verifying nuclear explosions. The programme enabled the United Kingdom to play a major role in the negotiations on how best to verify the treaty. We aim to retain
a national capability to allow us to reach an independent judgment on the data produced by the international monitoring system. That will strengthen our ability to justify a request for an on-site inspection of exactly the kind that the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie) and I have been discussing.
With the advent of the treaty, the implications of any changes or deterioration in our Trident warheads will have to be assessed without nuclear testing. Similarly, after any corrective action or refurbishment, we will have to requalify warheads as safe and reliable without nuclear testing. Those requirements will place great demands on the alternatives to nuclear testing. I can tell the hon. Member for Chichester that we intend to use experiments and computer simulation for that purpose. Both are consistent with the terms of the treaty. I hope that the House will accept that that is agreed by all parties to the treaty, not just by the nuclear weapons states.
The treaty requires each state party to establish a national authority to act as the point of contact with the treaty organisation and to be the focal point for the operation of the treaty on its territory. In the UK, the national authority will be set up in the Ministry of Defence.
Although notes on clauses will be available in the Library, I shall turn briefly to the Bill's provisions. As its title suggests, its provisions fall into two broad categories: those relating to the prohibition of nuclear explosions and those enabling inspections to be carried out in the UK under the terms of the treaty.
Clauses 1 and 2 make it an offence, punishable by life imprisonment, to cause a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, other than a nuclear weapon explosion carried out in the course of an armed conflict. The offence can be committed in the United Kingdom by anyone. Abroad, the offence can be committed by UK nationals and corporations.
Clauses 4 to 9 cover various aspects of inspections in the UK, such as their formal authorisation by the Secretary of State and the necessary privileges and immunities for the inspection teams. Clause 10 covers the issue of warrants authorising entry and search of premises if offences are suspected. Clauses 11 to 15 contain various technical provisions, and also provide for the Act to bind the Crown.
Mr. David Faber (Westbury):
I thank the Minister for bringing the Bill before the House and echo his warm words of support for the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The Opposition welcome the Bill. As he said, it received a fair wind in another place. We recognise that it provides the legislation necessary to ratify the treaty. He has given us a very full and detailed technical explanation of the Bill's contents, for which I am grateful.
Like the Government, the Opposition believe that the world will ultimately be a safer place through the signing of the treaty. The signing of the treaty and discussion of the Bill show that the international community can, by acting with determination, while making sacrifices, reap the benefits at the end of the cold war and the desire for a reduction in the nuclear arsenals of all countries throughout the world.
The former Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, said on the very day that he signed the treaty in New York on 24 September last year:
As the Minister rightly said, the signing of the treaty has come after a long process--many decades--of negotiation. Since 1989 particularly, we have seen profound and significant changes throughout Europe. More people than ever now live in democratic societies. The spread of democracy has made war less likely and the curtailment of the arms race ultimately more achievable.
Threats to our society remain, however, and it is only right that we, as a country and as part of the international community, should recognise and be alert to them. The Opposition remain absolutely committed to our nuclear deterrent and to keeping it fully serviced and updated to counter any potential threat we might face.
It is a shame that the Minister of State did not take the opportunity to reassert the Government's--and his personal--support for the retention and upgrading of the nuclear deterrent, given that he and many of his colleagues have called for the cancellation of the Trident programme in the past.
As Baroness Symons pointed out on Second Reading in another place, the implications of the treaty are profound, and the Minister of State rightly reminded us of that. Any deterioration in the Trident warheads will have to be assessed without recourse to nuclear testing. Such requirements will undoubtedly place an ever greater demand on the computer simulation techniques that provide an alternative and on the shared information and technology that we pool with our allies. However, I know that all hon. Members will agree that that is preferable, and that the treaty must succeed in its ultimate aim to do away for ever with nuclear testing, of whatever sort, and thus lead to a steady reduction in the world's nuclear arsenal.
The Minister of State was helpful in his explanation of the mechanisms in the Bill and the organisations that will flow from it for the monitoring and inspection of nuclear weapons, and he answered questions from my hon. Friends the Members for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie) and for Lichfield (Mr. Fabricant). However, he skirted quickly over the issue of ratification. He said that, to date, 147 countries had signed the treaty. According to the Library, 148 countries have signed the treaty, but perhaps the Library has added a country. Of those 147, only seven have so far ratified the treaty and, of the 44 required to sign to bring the treaty into force, I understand that only Japan has ratified it.
I do not suggest that the vast majority of states have anything other than an intention to ratify the treaty, and it is accepted under international law that a moratorium
comes into effect once the process of ratification has begun. Both France and China have now agreed to abide by that understanding. However, problems exist in other countries. The Minister of State mentioned three in particular and I shall turn to those in a moment.
The most important country involved is the United States. Does the Minister of State have any information from his American counterparts about when ratification will take place there? President Clinton recently told the United Nations Assembly that the treaty would be presented to the Senate shortly, but some in American political circles are concerned about several aspects of the treaty, including compliance verification and the safety and reliability of their nuclear arsenal. Clearly, it is important that the rest of the world see that the one remaining super-power takes a strong lead, and I hope that the Minister and his colleagues will encourage American ratification as soon as possible. It is important that we, as another major nuclear power, set a good example, and I assume that the United Kingdom will ratify the treaty as soon as possible after the Bill receives Royal Assent.
On the vexed question of the signature of the treaty by India and Pakistan, it is of primary importance that India signs the treaty, as it is likely that Pakistan would follow suit. On Second Reading in another place, Lord Jenkins of Putney called on the Minister to use Labour's long and, for the most part, friendly relationship with India to push for a resolution to the problem. At that stage, he could not predict the Foreign Secretary's disastrous visit to India this summer and the insensitivity that he showed to the Indian Government.
I was surprised that the Minister of State made no mention of the trip in his speech. Can he tell us anything about the discussions that the Foreign Secretary had with his Indian counterparts? Did he push for Indian ratification, and what response did he get? Baroness Symons referred to the sacrifices made by this country in signing the treaty and to the moral arguments that the Government would bring to bear on India. What were those arguments, were they forcefully made, and what response was received?
The most worrying case is that of North Korea. It is clear that, in spite of repeated warnings from the international community, North Korea continues to develop and improve its ballistic capability. Whether it yet possesses the technology to put nuclear warheads on those ballistic weapons, we do not know. However, we live in dangerous times. Economic deprivation is rife in North Korea, and the leadership is constantly looking for ways to deflect local attention from the domestic crisis. Anti-western rhetoric is usually the favourite course and we have all seen many examples of that.
When the former Defence Secretary, Michael Portillo, visited South Korea in January this year, he made clear the then Government's support for the United States policy in the region. The response in one of the North Korean newspapers was to condemn his bellicose utterances. It continued:
On Second Reading in another place, Lord Moynihan referred to the real problems that the world faces as a result of the possible proliferation of rogue states. Some such states seem positively to revel in their status as the bad boys of the world. While the specific strategic threat to Europe from a communist Soviet Union may have evaporated, we are only too aware of--and frequently debate--the many localised flashpoints around the world.
The procurement of nuclear weapons by several states could quickly turn localised problems into very real concerns for the international community. Both Iran and Libya appear to be working hard to develop their nuclear capacity and to acquire the technology. In Iraq, the situation is very tense, and it is worrying to suppose that the reason why the Iraqi authorities have suddenly cut access for United Nations inspectors is because they have been close to discovering evidence of a nuclear programme. What are the Government's current views on the stand-off in Iraq? Can the Minister confirm that we also stand four square alongside our United States allies on that issue?
"It is our firm conviction that this treaty is in the interests of all, and I urge all states to give it their full support."
The full support of all states is, of course, crucial to the success of the treaty.
"Our people and army are keeping a close eye on the British military whipping up war fever in the Korean peninsula."
I understand that the Minister and some of his colleagues may have a problem, because in the past many of them have held strong views on Korea. Indeed, the Minister has gone so far as to describe American troops in South Korea as a major obstacle to peace talks and to call for their withdrawal. Can he tell us about the
Government's view of the continuing tension in that country and how it might be persuaded to sign the test ban treaty? Is it now the policy of the Government to stand four square alongside our United States allies in that region?
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