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7.57 pm
Mr. David Heath (Somerton and Frome): It is a pleasure to speak on this important Bill and to welcome whole-heartedly its speedy introduction by the Government. I hope that it makes fast progress through the House, because it is an historic Bill and will achieve a result that we have desired for a long time. It is surprising that, after the sound and fury of the preceding debate, in which many Conservative Members felt prompted to participate, the Opposition Benches are much emptier for proceedings on this Bill, which is of much more significance than the privileges of lawyers.
The comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty is an important stepping stone to what I am sure everyone wants to see--the eventual multilateral elimination of nuclear weapons. I hope that ratification will take place at the earliest possible opportunity. However, as the hon. Member for Westbury (Mr. Faber) has suggested, there are problems with ratification. It is no fault of the Government--or even of the previous Government's negotiations--that the ratification process will be so
rigidly applied that it will be difficult to ensure that the worldwide ban comes into effect at the earliest opportunity.
The hon. Member for Westbury referred to the three states that are refusing to sign, or have said that they are not prepared to do so at the moment. The situation in India and Pakistan is different from that in North Korea. We should--perhaps we do--have some influence with the Governments of India and Pakistan. The Foreign Secretary, in what we are told was a thoroughly successful trip to the Indian sub-continent, may have had discussions on that points, and I should be interested to hear from the Minister whether that is the case. Those countries are also members of the Commonwealth, and if that is to mean anything, it surely means that we can apply influence on a matter of such great importance.
There is also a problem with the United States, where a two-thirds majority is needed to achieve ratification. The chairman of the Senate's foreign affairs committee may have a different view from some Senators on this. Are there measures that the Government can take to reassure our American allies and allay doubts in the American legislature?
Baroness Symons said in another place on 24 July that the British Government would do all they could to encourage the signing and ratification by all states. I should be interested to know what progress has been made towards that objective and what action the Government have taken to engage the attention of allies around the world and encourage them towards signature and ratification.
There are also problems for Britain in the application of the treaty. Only America has the computer technology available to simulate testing and ensure proper maintenance. It is an interesting reflection on Britain's independent deterrent that the only way we can test it is to go to America. Therefore, America has complete control over our deterrent.
Mr. Fabricant:
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that much of the software used by the United States for computer simulation was developed in the United Kingdom by UK engineers?
Mr. Heath:
I am aware of that, but it is under the control of the United States. Does Britain have the technology to provide a British alternative to testing and simulation in this country so that we do not have to subscribe to an American hegemony? How else are we to know whether the warheads on the British deterrent are safe and functional? That is a matter of importance if Britain is to have confidence in the process.
Mr. Tyrie:
I think that I am right in saying that our nuclear weapons would be targeted from Omaha and, to all intents and purposes, co-operation would be required with the Americans for our missiles to be successfully launched and delivered to their target. In those circumstances, the idea of total independence is a fiction.
Mr. Heath:
The hon. Gentleman makes precisely the point that I was seeking to make.
Is there no scope within the treaty for a commitment not to work on qualitative improvements to nuclear technology, and should not the British Government pursue
that as a further objective? It is absent from the treaty, but it is likely to undermine the confidence of non-nuclear powers if they are aware of further improvements in nuclear weapons technology made by the nuclear powers, yet outwith the terms of the treaty.
The hon. Member for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie) made a good point about sub-critical testing, and the Minister's response was a little sanguine. However necessary sub- critical testing may seem to a Government undertaking it, it none the less undermines confidence in the process of non-proliferation and de-escalation of nuclear weapons. The Government have a role in urging their allies not to engage in actions that would undermine that process.
There may well be a legal requirement in the treaty. The hon. Member for Westbury referred to article 18 of the Vienna convention on the law of treaties. That clearly lays a responsibility on other countries, following their signature on a treaty, not to do anything that would undermine the spirit of that treaty while awaiting its entry into force. I must ask whether American sub-critical testing does or does not do that. I must ask whether the underground tremor in the Russian arctic does that. The Minister was happy to ascribe that tremor to a seismic disturbance; I am not sure that everyone would do that, and certainly we do not have the technology to be sure. It is clear to me that all signatories must refrain from any behaviour that undermines the treaty as a whole.
Are we confident that we have the verification methods available to be sure that the treaty is being complied with? Is the sensor network sufficiently sophisticated? Does it have a sufficiently wide geographical spread? Is the international monitoring sufficiently robust to provide reassurance, as that is critical to the process?
There are further moves that the British Government could make. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) referred to some of those during the defence debate this week, and it would be otiose of me to repeat them. I hope that the Government, having taken the welcome step of introducing the Bill at an early stage, will apply all their energies to diplomatic initiatives to take the measure one stage further.
Mr. Michael Fabricant (Lichfield):
Nobody who lived through the Cuban missile crisis could do anything other than welcome the Bill, and we hope that the comprehensive test ban treaty will soon be ratified. I recall when I was at school that an air-raid siren was placed on top of the building at the time of the Cuban crisis. There was a real fear among children in their early teens, as I was at the time. I hope that we never witness anything like that again.
During an intervention on the Minister, I talked about the role of the previous Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, but he was not just there to take part in discussions. A briefing prepared by the international affairs and defence section of the Library says:
"At the end of May 1996 the Conference chairman, Ambassador Ramaker of the Netherlands, proposed a solution based on a British idea."
The British idea emanated from the Foreign Office, which at the time was under the leadership of Malcolm Rifkind. Britain's idea was that all eight countries with nuclear weapons, as well as those "threshold nations" on the brink of having them--they may already have them--
"would have to ratify before entry into force, but they would not be singled out as such."
We must not forget the history since the Cuban crisis. Before I entered the House of Commons, I paid regular visits to the former Soviet Union. It was apparent that the citizens of the Soviet Union had no desire to witness or to take part in any nuclear war, as they well remembered that 24 million Russians died in the second world war. We should not, however, forget that in those days the Soviet Government were not answerable to the people of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union brought SS20 missiles into Czechoslovakia as it was then known, the German so-called Democratic Republic and Poland to threaten western Europe, many Labour Members who were members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament at the time, opposed the western and British Governments' reaction, the deployment of Cruise missiles.
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