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Mr. Desmond Swayne (New Forest, West): May I draw my right hon. and learned Friend's attention to the fact that article J.7 of the Maastricht treaty, which becomes new article J.4, refers to the "eventual" framing of a common defence policy, whereas the Amsterdam treaty refers to "progressive" framing. The clear intention is that, from ratification of the treaty, the common defence policy begins.
Mr. Howard: My hon. Friend is right to identify that important difference between the two treaties.
The treaty of Amsterdam declares that
Let us take a step back and consider what role the European Union ought to have in the field of foreign and security policy. Of course, the member states of the
European Union will have many interests in common. There is a role for a common foreign and security policy in safeguarding and advancing those interests, and that is a role in which this country can play a prominent part; but for half a century the peace and security of Europe have been guaranteed by NATO--perhaps the most successful alliance in history. NATO is founded on the democratic and liberal values that are common to its members. Those are not exclusively European values: they unite the whole of the western world.
The importance of NATO is not only political, but military. The European allies alone lack the air and sea capacity, the missile defence, the advanced communications satellites and the military computers provided by the United States. There can be no more harrowing demonstration of the danger of seeking to exclude the United States from allied action or taking such action without the United States than the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. It is therefore essential that any development of a common security policy should not in any way impair the effectiveness of NATO, nor should it seek to duplicate what NATO does so effectively.
The common foreign and security policy of the European Union should strengthen the European pillar of NATO. It should allow Europe to take on a more equitable share of the costs of its own defence, and it should provide a forum in which common interests can be discussed. During the course of this debate, I hope to get from the Government a clear statement of their vision of the role of the common foreign and security policy. How do they see its relationship with NATO? How can duplication of NATO's work be avoided? How can they justify the remarks made by the Prime Minister on his return from Amsterdam? I hope that the Minister will cover those points fully in his response to the debate.
Mr. Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife):
The implication running through what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has been saying for the past minute or two seems to be that there are no circumstances in which Europe should act alone. Was not the concept of combined joint task forces a recognition by the whole of NATO that there were circumstances in which the European nations would act alone and would be provided by the United States with the very resources to which the right hon. and learned Gentleman referred, without the United States taking an operational role?
Mr. Howard:
That can all be done within the context of NATO. The implication that the hon. and learned Gentleman identified was not intended. It is true that there might be operations such as those to which he referred, but they can take place perfectly well within the context of NATO.
It is also important to bear in mind that the implementation of decisions under the common foreign and security policy is to be decided by qualified majority vote. Given the new structure of decision making set out in the Amsterdam treaty, how does the Minister envisage the operation of qualified majority voting?
Suppose, for example, that a general resolution was passed by unanimity calling for action to be taken in certain circumstances against Iraq. Suppose that that was followed up by a resolution passed by qualified majority vote calling for the implementation of the resolution by
all measures short of the use of force. Suppose that the United Kingdom considered that the use of force was justified. Would it be precluded from using force in those circumstances? Those are vital questions, and I hope that we will hear some answers from the Minister this evening. It is because of our concerns about those issues that we have tabled new clauses 37 and 38, which seek to give Parliament an enhanced role in the consideration of such matters.
The Minister also has questions to answer in relation to articles K.12 and K.15. They contain the provisions on closer co-operation between member states when not all 15 wish to proceed. In principle, I welcome those provisions: they provide a basis for a different approach by different member states that reflects the differences which inevitably arise as a result of different national circumstances. However, as the Minister will be aware, the previous Government always insisted that the decision as to whether such actions could proceed should be taken on the basis of unanimity. The provisions in the treaty on this question are not straightforward: they might appear to provide for a kind of unanimity, but it is not at all clear whether they in fact do so. They are to be found in Article K.12.
I have a number of questions to put to the Minister on the provisions of that article. First, was it indeed the intention that decisions on that subject should be taken on the basis of unanimity? If so, why was there not a straightforward provision to that effect rather than the circuitous route we find in article K.12? That article provides that the decision should in fact be taken by qualified majority, except where a member of the Council declares that,
Is the action of a member state in that position subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice? Could the court rule that the reason relied on by the member state in question was not in fact "important"? If so, does that not mean that any appearance of unanimity would in fact be illusory? Those are crucial questions, and I hope that we can receive clear assurances from the Minister today.
Mr. William Cash (Stone):
Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that there is absolute absurdity in the idea that a common foreign and security policy should be subject in any way to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice? Imagine a situation in which we are moving towards a crisis such as the Gulf conflict. The court should have no role whatsoever in determining questions relating to control and command in such an emergency.
Mr. Howard:
Were it the case that the European Court of Justice had jurisdiction in such matters, my hon. Friend's strictures would be entirely justified. He will no doubt put that question to the Minister himself.
Article 1 of the treaty of Amsterdam represents an unnecessary move towards further integration of the European Union. It contains a series of measures that transfer powers to Brussels from the national Parliaments of the member states of the European Union. I have touched on some of those points and my hon. Friends will
touch on more of them during the debate. Perhaps, more than anything, the treaty reflects a failure on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom.
On measure after measure, the Government failed to press their case, failed to persuade our European partners of the merits of the argument and failed even to try. Why? Because they feared isolation. That attitude goes back to that phrase used by the Prime Minister in his first speech to the Labour party conference as leader of the party, when he promised that he would never be isolated in Europe. In the Government's view, the fact that there was no support for their proposals from other member states meant that the points were not worth pursuing. That approach augurs badly for the future--badly for Britain and badly for Europe.
The truth is that the only real achievement to come out of Amsterdam was our opt-out on common immigration and frontier policies--and that was all thanks to the efforts of a Conservative Government. We shall not hesitate to press our reservations about article 1 of the treaty in the Division Lobby at the end of the debate.
Mr. Ted Rowlands (Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney):
It is tempting to follow up on the host of issues raised by the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard). It was a little like hearing the speech that he would have made if there was to be a referendum on the treaty. It is noticeable that the referendum on the treaty has disappeared--perhaps it will reappear in a new clause to the Bill. Assuming that it does not, at least we have heard a rehearsal of what might have been said.
I shall confine my observations to a single paragraph of the revised article 1, which lists the objectives of the European Union, including the achievement of "a high level of employment". I welcome that assertion and the consequential employment chapter of the treaty, but I would examine more closely the objective and the revised wording to find out how much substance they contain.
Much emphasis has been placed on that wording by Ministers and by those who feel that they have achieved a great deal in the revised version of article 1, paragraph 9. It has been described as a vital re-balancing of the Union's objectives and priorities. It is claimed that the Amsterdam treaty remedies the omissions relating to employment in the Maastricht treaty.
I believe that that was the claim made by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary when he came before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee to discuss the Amsterdam treaty--I do not think that I bowdlerise his views. In his evidence to us, he said:
"the WEU is an integral part of the defence component of the Union"
and provides that
"the Union should accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union."
Again, that suggests that Amsterdam brings us closer to a common defence than before. The Prime Minister claimed to have ensured that NATO would remain the basis of Europe's defence. He has ensured nothing of the kind. The reference to NATO under the second pillar was inserted not at Amsterdam but at Maastricht.
"for important and stated reasons of national policy",
it intends to oppose the granting of an authorisation by qualified majority.
"it would be rather odd if we ended up with a Treaty of the European Union which gives specific tough targets on deficits, on inflation or on interest rates . . . but made no reference and offered no commitment to employment".
That statement was supported by later remarks by my right hon. Friend. It is clear that the provisions in the article and the references to high employment, followed by the employment chapter, are meant to balance the Maastricht treaty in terms of employment.
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