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6.45 pm

The main purpose of my remarks is to deal with common foreign and security policy. It may come as a surprise to Labour Members--

Mr. David Faber (Westbury): Both of them.

Dr. Lewis: As my hon. Friend observes, the Labour party is represented in this important Committee by fewer than the proverbial contents of a telephone box.

I have a confession to make. It may come as a surprise to such of those dedicated Europhiles as are present on the Labour Benches to know that I am a Johnny-come-lately Euro-sceptic.

Mr. Bercow: My hon. Friend took far too long.

Dr. Lewis: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I can even name the day on which I became a Euro-sceptic: it was 22 March 1995. I read an article in The Times, which was headed:

"Santer seeks right to shape foreign policy for Europe".

It said:

"Brussels should have the right to shape Europe's foreign and security policy, a power currently jealously guarded by the governments of the European Union's 15 member states, Jacques Santer, the President of the European Commission, said yesterday."

The article said that he had addressed the institutional committee of the European Parliament and had called for

"a strengthening of the European Commission as the guardian of the European treaties. He said the Commission should be given the right of initiative in foreign and security policy."

I have another confession to make. One does not often hear a politician say, "I was wrong," but I was wrong in my assessment of integration theory, which I learnt about when I studied international relations. Integration theory was developed more than a score years ago. As undergraduates, we were told by our lecturers that if states could not directly be persuaded openly to coalesce and to become a single nation state, they could indirectly be lured into doing so by a process of functional integration. The idea was that common patterns could be created through a particular sphere of activity so that states would be drawn together and, before they knew where they were, they would be irreversibly interlocked.

In my naivety, I thought that that would never work because states have a hard-headed understanding of their national interests. I thought that they would be drawn part of the way along that slope, but that they would see what was happening, would turn round and would retreat from it. I confess that I underestimated the power of functional integration. The process of creeping federalisation has undoubtedly been far more successful than one could possibly have anticipated.

Mr. Bercow: I am following closely the logic of my hon. Friend's thesis. Does he agree that the people of Britain will never knowingly consent to being governed by those who do not speak their language, live in their country or depend on their votes?

Dr. Lewis: I agree with my hon. Friend, but I am not saying that that will not happen because the operative word in his intervention was "knowingly". The methods

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that have been adopted bear a frightening resemblance to the methods that were used by other philosophies in the past. During the cold war, I often had to look at Marxist doctrine and the speeches of Soviet leaders. The people who delivered those speeches tried to cram as many words as possible into the smallest amount of thought. They tried to deaden the perception of people who were attempting to establish the propositions that were being conveyed by obfuscating them with massive amounts of jargon. In the end, people gave up rather than continue to try to tease out the meaning in the small print.

Not only has the technique of trying to bore people into not knowing what they are being lured into been used; people have tried selectively to misquote history. I have in mind the attempts to cite Winston Churchill and his Zurich speech in 1946 as if he were recommending that Britain should be part of a united states of Europe. I shall read a few brief extracts from his speech of 19 September 1946. He said:

"I am now going to say something that will astonish you. The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France recover the moral leadership of Europe."

Later he said:

"Our constant aim must be to build and fortify the strength of UNO."

The United Nations Organisation. He continued:

"Under and within that world concept we must re-create the European family in a regional structure called, it may be, the United States of Europe . . . In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust, Soviet Russia--for then indeed all would be well--must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine."

That was under the aegis of a world body because in 1945-46 the United Nations was seen primarily as a "world security organisation". The phrase was often used interchangeably with "United Nations Organisation". In that context, it was possible to envisage regional groupings and alliances for collective self-defence.

It was greatly to the credit of the post-war Labour Government that they signed the treaty of accession to NATO in April 1949. The treaty contained vital provisions, especially in articles 3 and 5. Article 3 stated:

"In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, The Parties, separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Article 5 stated:

"The Parties agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all".

When there is such a superbly strong, successful and impossible-to-improve NATO treaty, why is it necessary to create a common foreign and security policy? The answer is spelt out in article B of the Amsterdam treaty, which states:

"The Union shall set itself the following objectives:


--to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy".

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That is not an intention to replace the NATO treaty or to improve the security of Europe's nation states. The aim is to assert the identity of this creature, the European Union, on the international scene. If there were ever a case of poor motivation for a dangerous act, that is it.

Sir Raymond Whitney: I am listening to my hon. Friend with great interest, not least because he and I have collaborated in the past on many ventures. On this issue our views are somewhat different. Is he not satisfied that the Amsterdam treaty clearly secures the role of the Western European Union and its relationship with the European Union rather better than was done by the Maastricht treaty, which I am sure my hon. Friend would also condemn? Surely that was, from his point of view, a step forward. The close relationship between the WEU and NATO is not challenged or threatened. My hon. Friend is concerned about the potential loss of sovereignty. He spoke about our NATO defence obligations. Does he agree that to some extent our membership of and commitment to NATO are a derogation of our sovereignty?

Dr. Lewis: My hon. Friend makes two points. I warmly remember our joint ventures against the unilateralist policies of the Labour party in the 1980s. I could not have had a more staunch colleague in those battles. He was from the front rank and he held ministerial office during that important period for NATO as a whole. He asked about the pooling of sovereignty. I have another conceptual problem about that which is analogous to the one about closer political union without ever having a united political society. One cannot pool sovereignty any more than one can pool virginity. One either has it or has lost it. In the context of NATO, one must ask whether the loss of sovereignty is parallel to the loss of virtue.

Mr. Bercow: Does my hon. Friend recall that, in the past, he likened the process of European integration to the process of seduction? He has observed to me and to others that the outcome in both cases seems to be the same.

Dr. Lewis: I recognise my words of wisdom from the past, but I do not wish to be distracted from my words of wisdom in the present. On whether one has pooled sovereignty or lost virtue, the issue of NATO is a case in point. Nothing in the NATO treaty is irreversible, but the European treaties are irreversible. If there were a parallel with the NATO treaty, rather than a treaty from which one cannot withdraw or whose provisions cannot be reversed if they work out badly, I would be far more relaxed about these matters.

I am getting signs that I am using up my allotted time very quickly. The WEU is a useful political prop to NATO, but it could turn into the Achilles heel of the alliance because, naturally, the WEU does not have the involvement of America. The more that is done to build up the parts and aspects of NATO that exclude America, the more is done to undermine the basic security of Europe, which depends upon American involvement.

Mr. Damian Green (Ashford): I am worried that my hon. Friend's characteristic eloquence is masking an illogical position. He says that the European treaties that the United Kingdom has signed are irreversible and that it

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is impossible to pool sovereignty, which is like virginity; but this country has already lost its virginity and sovereignty, so all his arguments are a waste of time. On his own terms, his argument that we cannot pool sovereignty and that it is like virginity must be wrong.

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