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The First Deputy Chairman: With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 67, in page 1, line 13, after '2', insert '(except paragraph 32)'.

No. 68, in page 1, line 13, after '2', insert '(except paragraph 33)'.

No. 69, in page 1, line 13, after '2', insert '(except paragraph 26)'.

No. 70, in page 1, line 13, after '2', insert '(except paragraph 45)'.

No. 71, in page 1, line 13, after '2', insert '(except paragraph 52)'.

No. 72, in page 1, line 13, after '2', insert '(except paragraph 53)'.

No. 73, in page 1, line 13, after '2', insert '(except paragraph 54)'.

No. 74, in page 1, line 13, after '2', insert '(except paragraph 6)'.

No. 75, in page 1, line 13, after '2', insert '(except paragraph 31)'.

No. 76, in page 1, line 13, after '2', insert '(except paragraph 55)'.

No. 7, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'(except Article 2 paragraph 44)'.

No. 61, in page 1, line 13, at end insert 'except Article 2(16)'.

No. 25, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 6)'.

No. 30, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 12)'.

No. 31, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 13)'.

No. 32, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 14)'.

No. 35, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 21)'.

No. 37, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 23)'.

No. 38, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 24)'.

3 Dec 1997 : Column 443

No. 40, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 26)'.

No. 41, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 27)'.

No. 42, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 28)'.

No. 43, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 29)'.

No. 45, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 31)'.

No. 46, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 32)'.

No. 47, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 33)'.

No. 48, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 34)'.

No. 49, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 35)'.

No. 50, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 36)'.

No. 57, in page 1, line 13, at end insert


'other than in Article 2, paragraph 44)'.

Mr. Streeter: This group of amendments deals with two specific issues: the extension of qualified majority voting agreed at Amsterdam, and the extension of the power of the European Parliament, particularly its co-decision powers. On both issues, the Amsterdam treaty amounts to a significant transfer of influence from this Parliament to the institutions of the European Union. On both issues, new Labour failed at Amsterdam. A Government without values and principles have returned to the House of Commons with a treaty that has failed the people of Britain and failed the people of Europe.

It is not part of my argument to maintain that the 15 extensions of qualified majority voting--20, if we include the social chapter--contained in the Amsterdam treaty, and the 23 additional areas in which the European Parliament has been given a veto, constitute in themselves the end of the United Kingdom as a sovereign nation state. Clearly they do not, and we do not pretend that they do. It is my strong and passionate conviction that the concessions that our negotiators gave away at Amsterdam were wholly unnecessary. They represent a significant reduction in the influence of this Parliament and of the British Government, and an increase in the influence of the EU institutions, so there is a transfer of power from the House to Brussels. Those concessions have been given away with nothing in return for the British people.

Mr. Radice: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman admits that the treaty of Amsterdam does not amount to a threat to the nation state. I listened carefully to the shadow Foreign Secretary, who said on a number of occasions that, if we signed up at Amsterdam, it would be a grave threat to the nation state. How can the hon. Gentleman square his position with what his right hon. and learned Friend said before the election?

Mr. Streeter: I can do so very easily. The hon. Gentleman misquotes me. I said that the extension of

3 Dec 1997 : Column 444

qualified majority voting and the extra powers given to the European Parliament--not the Amsterdam treaty as a whole--do not, of themselves, undermine the nation state. Many months ago, my right hon. and learned Friend made it clear that, had it been passed, the original agenda for the Amsterdam summit would have brought an end to the nation state. He did not make those comments about the consequences of the summit. Nor has the hon. Gentleman heard him say that in any of the debates, at all of which I have been present.

Mr. Gapes: If the original remarks were about the agenda, is that why the Conservative party is no longer pressing for a referendum on the Amsterdam treaty? Does it now recognise that it is a modest treaty which brings about no significant or serious change?

Mr. Streeter: Having heard the hon. Gentleman's contributions over the past three days of the debate, I believe that he would sign up to anything that comes out of Brussels. Provided that it has the word "European" in it, he is happy--never mind the consequences, or the heart or content of the policy. If it is European, he loves it; that is all he has to say.

Before Labour's negotiators even landed in Amsterdam, they revealed their hand to our partners. Before they even arrived at the Council meeting, our partners were licking their lips at the great new Labour giveaway. Before the Minister jogged even halfway through the tunnel, leaving his Union Jack shorts behind, the team awaiting him at Brussels were rubbing their hands--

Mr. Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife): Come on. Keep a straight face.

Mr. Streeter: How can I keep a straight face? I am telling a joke.

Mr. Blunt: My hon. Friend makes a good point. It is illustrated by the fact that, when in opposition, Labour announced the concessions that it would give before it entered the negotiations. No wonder it got such a rotten deal.

Mr. Streeter: That is absolutely right. My hon. Friend eloquently makes the point that I am seeking to make. Before they even left this country to go to the summit, the Government told the world media all the things that they were to give up. What a way to negotiate. No wonder they got such a bad deal.

Dr. Stephen Ladyman (South Thanet): The hon. Gentleman's thesis appears to be that the agenda for the Amsterdam treaty talks would have led to the death of the nation state. The negotiators came back with nothing as serious as that, yet, somehow, he is not giving the Government credit for coming back with something better. I do not follow that argument.

Mr. Streeter: The hon. Gentleman does not follow the argument because he is incorrect in his assessment. The original Amsterdam summit agenda from some of our European partners and from the Commission was the issue that we were discussing, not this country's

3 Dec 1997 : Column 445

negotiating position. This country's negotiating position was seriously undermined as a result of the implications of 1 May.

Our partners were licking their lips at the great new Labour giveaway. They knew that this Government had a clear agenda: to give away Britain's competitive advantage under the social protocol, Britain's veto and Britain's position of negotiating strength, established over many years. As my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Mr. Blunt) has said, new Labour had already said that it was going to give all that away, so the other member states did not have to offer a single concession in return. Given that sorry performance, I am surprised only that the Government bothered to translate the treaty into English.

One thing is clear: new Labour does not know how to negotiate. Its negotiators did not achieve the best deal on offer. It let itself, the House and Britain down. What a contrast with our approach.


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