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Dr. Fox: If the Minister is correct in saying that the Government want the same conditions to apply, why did they not turn to domestic legislation rather than signing the social chapter?
Mr. Henderson: That is old hat, because we have been through the argument before.
Mr. Howard: There have been no answers.
Mr. Henderson: Answers have been given.
The United Kingdom is a member of the European Union. We must consider what can best be decided by the EU at Community level and what can best be decided at nation state level. When we are talking about consultation, procedures and broad initiatives that turn on more than one country and involve companies that employ more than 1,500 people, it clearly makes sense to have common standards across Europe. I refer to companies that operate across Europe.
The importance of the social chapter is that signing up to it enables a member state to have influence. That having been done, the member state can contribute, initiate and agree to what is best decided at European level. In addition, there is the right to advance arguments, as sometimes the Government will. It is better to decide some things, however, at a local or national level.
The right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe has had a specific reply on information about the euro currency. The Government may seek support from the Commission, to provide information. Money is available. [Interruption.] An approach has been made, but no final decision has been reached. The previous Government had the opportunity to tap into those resources to provide information. There is no question of the money being used for any propaganda. Indeed, it would be an ultra vires use of the funds were that to happen.
Mr. Robert Jackson:
In relation to the Schengen opt-in, serious allegations have been made about the propriety of the conduct of the Dutch presidency. Does the Minister have anything to say in its defence?
Mr. Henderson:
I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that point. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made the position clear when he was before the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs: that Britain opposed the Spanish amendment, that there was a mix-up, that, when an attempt was made to clarify the matter, the Dutch presidency would not accept that there had been a challenge. There was no provision in the proceedings--the previous Government were involved in the same proceedings--for minutes to be taken or for a record. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to challenge what happened. Subsequently, there was a bilateral understanding between the Dutch presidency and the Spanish Government. We then secured a declaration that makes it clear that, if we wish to join any of the existing Schengen acquis, we can do so if the other countries accept that.
Speaking theoretically, if we wanted to join any Schengen acquis, we would ensure that the Commission was consulted beforehand, and if any country wished to object to our application for involvement, it would have to state that in specific terms. It is our belief that, if a strong case is made for Britain to sign up to part of the Schengen acquis, it will be extremely difficult for any country to block the application.
It is a little rich that some Opposition Members--not the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe--raise this issue when, in government, they could not make progress in negotiation and could not protect Britain's position in the treaty on border controls. That is why I find it extremely strange that the Conservative party, which is totally opposed to any involvement in the Schengen acquis, is trying to make something of the negotiations.
Mr. Howard:
It is important that my hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (Mr. Jackson) and the House should appreciate that these serious allegations, as my hon. Friend rightly said, against the Dutch presidency are made by the Government, not the Opposition. The Minister has told us something this evening that reverts to what the Foreign Secretary told us in oral answers to questions on 25 November, and differs from what the Minister told us in a written answer, published in the Official Report.
On 25 November, the Foreign Secretary alleged that this hole-in-the-corner agreement between Spain and the Dutch presidency was made subsequent to the hearings at Amsterdam. The Minister of State says, in the answer available in Hansard, that that agreement was reached on the night of 16 to 17 June, during the summit at Amsterdam. Can the Minister of State tell us which it was?
Mr. Henderson:
Initially there were discussions in the margins of Amsterdam. Subsequently, when it was discovered that there was a difference of historic interpretation, an attempt was made to clarify, and a number of exchanges took place in private between the various parties contesting the text of the agreement.
Mr. Henderson:
I shall give way once more, then I shall move on.
Mr. Howard:
I refer the Minister to the question that I asked him, which is in Hansard:
Mr. Henderson:
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is thrashing this to death. It is clear from the answer that, initially, during the discussions before the completion of the Amsterdam talks, there were discussions in the margins between the Dutch presidency and the Spanish
I shall now move on.
Mr. Gill:
Will the Minister give way?
Mr. Henderson:
No, I am not giving way. I shall continue, as I know that hon. Members are keen to conclude relatively early this evening.
The Opposition Front-Bench speeches had nothing positive to offer. There was no vision on Europe, no vision about the direction in which the Opposition want to travel. Opposition Members were split on monetary union, split on the Amsterdam treaty, and, indeed, split on the referendum. We have not yet had a reply from the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe to the point made by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, about what happened to the commitment that there would be a referendum on the Amsterdam treaty. The shadow Foreign Secretary first stated that there would be a referendum, then appeared to be overruled by the Leader of the Opposition.
The hon. Member for South-West Devon (Mr. Streeter) said that the Secretary of State, in his opening remarks, only attacked. I do not think that the hon. Gentleman was listening to what the Secretary of State said, because my recollection is that he covered very thoroughly all the issues that will be before the Luxembourg Council and, indeed, other issues that are central to our relationship with Europe.
My right hon. Friend made it absolutely clear that he believes that people see the advantage of the European Union, as a modern relationship among states, dealing with the movement of people, goods and ideas. He said that enlargement was about strength, about seeking a practical timetable to bring about enlargement at the earliest possible time, and about looking at the reform procedures for the common agricultural policy, structural funds and budgets. He gave the commitment, in answer to the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe, that the British presidency would forge ahead with those issues and others.
During our presidency, we shall be able to demonstrate what can be achieved on employment, the environment and the fight against drugs. I know that those policies are welcome in this country, and they will be welcome in Europe. We shall be very happy to pursue them in Luxembourg.
Mr. Clive Betts (Sheffield, Attercliffe):
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.--[Mr. Betts.]
Mr. David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden):
John Maynard Keynes was once quoted as saying:
I secured this debate to seek clarification from the Government about their policy on ballistic missile defence systems. Stories have recently been circulating in the press that the Government plan to abandon research on the development of ballistic missile defences. The Sunday Telegraph of 23 November quotes senior defence sources as saying:
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the relaxation of its global grip set loose the ambitions of a number of states in a world in which borders are no longer defined by the spheres of influence of east and west. The result has paradoxically been a rush to arms, and most particularly a rush to acquire weapons of mass destruction--a rush which, if we are not careful, may render NATO's whole new policy obsolete.
Many nations--most obviously Iraq, Syria, Libya, Iran and North Korea--are developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons and their delivery systems. At least 38 states possess ballistic missiles, and more than 70 have cruise missiles. For the moment, the range of systems is limited, but it will not be long before Iranian systems can hit Israel, and not much longer before the whole of Europe is within the missile range of a number of middle eastern countries.
As is well known, the North Koreans are currently developing the Taepo Dong 2 missile. As it stands, we can only guess at the maximum range, but the third report of the Select Committee on Defence published in 1995-96 says that it is
So much we know, because it is in the public record; but we should not overestimate our knowledge. The single biggest lesson to be learnt from the United Nations special commission's investigations in Iraq, and from the various issues that have been in the public domain in the past couple of months, is that our ignorance is massive.
Iraq has been a problem state for some time; yet we knew next to nothing about its programmes. In the Gulf conflict, we targeted eight out of 56 nuclear facilities. We were unable to find or destroy some 28,000 chemical munitions, and we knew little of the biological weaponry: 30,000 litres of botulin, anthrax and aflatoxin.
It is not as though we were not warned. In 1980, the Israeli air force bombed and destroyed Saddam Hussein's Osirak nuclear reactor outside Baghdad. The Israeli Government were widely condemned by the international community for that action. The Gulf war showed that we were wrong and they were right. Had they not taken that action, there is no telling whether Iraq would have had a nuclear weapon by the start of the war over Kuwait.
That ignorance is repeated elsewhere. We now know that the Soviet Union's stocks of chemical and biological warfare weaponry were 10 times that estimated by American analysts at the time of the cold war. That ignorance is endemic. Soviet nuclear accounting was primitive in the extreme--the Government have recently given assistance with that. General Lebed has said that nuclear warheads have gone missing, but no one can tell whether he is right or wrong. We know that a number of rogue states are seeking to acquire such weapons, and many experts believe that they are likely to succeed some time in the next 10 years.
Those rogue states want weapons of mass destruction and the associated missile delivery systems for two reasons. The most important reason is regional dominance. They have learnt that lesson from recent experience. The carnage of the Iran-Iraq war ended with the missile exchanges called the "war of the cities". The population fled the cities, terrified that Iraqi Scuds would be armed with chemical or biological weapons. As a result, Iran sued for peace. Both Iran and Iraq learned lessons from that.
The second reason for acquiring weapons of mass destruction is as an equaliser against western technological military dominance. If anything, the Gulf war will have sharpened that desire. Shortly after the Gulf war, a former Indian chief of staff said that
Europe's position is acute, because so many of the proliferators of weapons of mass destruction are around the Mediterranean and on Europe's southern border. Within 10 years at most--probably much less--every European capital could be within missile range of north Africa and the middle east, and will certainly be within the range of Libya and Algeria. If the Taepo Dong 2 achieves only the 3,500 km range, its limit from Iran or Iraq is probably Paris. If it achieves much more, let alone its intended 5,000 km range, the whole of Britain is within range of all the countries in the middle east. We should not forget that fuel technology is advancing all the time and can change the range of an extant missile system.
European exposure to that threat is likely to change the attitude of at least some countries to military operations beyond the borders of Europe. The fashionable interest in NATO out-of-area operations is likely to fade rather quickly under that threat. If we do not deal with this problem, they could become an obsolete concept in less than a decade. History shows that only too well. When the Americans staged their raid on Tripoli, other European countries refused to allow American warplanes overflight rights. That may have cost the lives of American service men. It showed that European countries will not always rush to support another NATO partner state, even when dealing with some of the dubious regimes of the middle east.
Many interests may motivate such reluctance: political and commercial interests, fear of the consequences, or national amour propre. As we saw with Belgium, which was an ammunition supplier during the Gulf war, international solidarity can be very delicate. The Gulf coalition was always a fragile entity.
Let us imagine the Gulf war occurring in 10 years' time against an opponent with missile systems able to hit any European capital. That opponent would almost certainly have chemical or biological weapons capable of killing hundreds of thousands. They might have 10 or 20 nuclear warheads capable of destroying cities. In such circumstances, how easy would it have been to hold together the alliance that won the Gulf war?
This is no fantasy. Recent history shows all too clearly that missiles are now being used to intimidate and break up coalitions. I have spoken about the war of the cities, and we know that Saddam used his Scud missiles to rain terror on Israel in the hope of provoking retaliation that would break up the alliance. More recently, China used missiles to intimidate the Taiwanese during their elections. That is the tactic of the future.
The effect of such proliferation will be to shut down the ability of the major powers to intervene. The new missile empires will be free to crush democratic states, indulge in genocide or hold the west to ransom over the control of critical resources or trade routes. That means that we have a 10-year or less window for action. If we do not act now, we shall face a geopolitical, tectonic shift, an irreversible fragmentation of the world into regional hegemonies, some of which could easily become no-go areas for western states.
There are four stages in any process that western Governments could use to deal with the danger. First, we could attempt to deny the rogue states the technology and, of course, we try to do that. For example, we can try to ensure that the missile technology control regime is adhered to. We became chairman of that regime while
I was at the Foreign Office. It is an agreement between 28 states to curb exports of vital components. China is not a signatory, nor are any of the rogue states. However, the regime has no means of enforcement, so it has not been able to prevent advances in missile technology. All the associated regimes relating to dual technology, weapons of mass destruction and the components thereof are equally porous.
Secondly, we can attempt to deter missile attacks by retaliation. That is a necessary aspect of the policy, but it is not certain. Deterring such attacks will work only if the offending states make a rational calculation of their self-interest. The rationality of leaders such as Saddam Hussein is a dangerous plank on which to base a policy.
Thirdly, western states can attack missile launch sites and other facilities. However, the Gulf war showed how difficult that can be. The United States air force failed to destroy the Iraqi mobile missile launchers.
The fourth and final way to deal with hostile missiles and the one about which I am concerned in this debate is to develop missile defence systems. Such systems cannot be created or completed overnight. They take time to develop, and if we delay now it may be too late 10 years down the line if we discover that Iran, to take one example, has nuclear missiles.
Some of the information that has come out of Russia in the past week or two shows that if we start to develop anti-missile system when we discover that a prospective opponent has nuclear missiles, that could cause destabilisation and provoke an attack. If we develop a defence system now, it could cause rogue states to re-evaluate their priorities. I am speaking not just about Britain but about all the European NATO states, any one of which could face any of these problems. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are expensive. If the west is adequately defended, the calculations may show that the costs outweigh the gains.
It is vital for all of NATO to be defended against the missile threat, but if anything it is even more important that Britain be defended. Throughout the world we are rightly seen as particularly good allies of the Americans. I hope that that is as true today as it was under the Government of which I was a member. It attracts plaudits such as "special relationship", but it also attracts words such as "running dogs". However it is described, we are seen as close allies. The strength of that alliance means that any conflict involving the United States would make us a prime target. We may currently be at the edge of the missile range, but the political situation means that we are a prime target, and that distance edge may not last long.
"To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs . . . when the bilateral agreement between Spain and the Dutch presidency of the EU was concluded."
The Minister replied:
"We believe that the text reflected discussions in the margins of the Amsterdam European Council on 16-17 June."--[Official Report, 2 December 1997; Vol. 302, c. 123.]
This is important, and we are entitled to a clear answer from the Minister.
8.48 pm
"Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist."
In a similar way, whole generations of politicians can be captivated by a beguiling phrase. Today's Governments--not just the British Government--are captivated by the beguiling phrase "peace dividend". It is a phrase that carries within it the idea that we have somehow finished our investment in peace, and that all we have to do is to sit back and enjoy and spend the rewards. That is a fallacious idea. The only proper dividend of peace is peace itself. By seeking to "spend" this dividend by cutting defence spending, the Government run the risk of bankrupting their own defence strategy.
"Even if this has not been abandoned completely, it has been kicked into the long grass."
My fears were reinforced by the Institute of International Strategic Studies, whose journal Strategic Comments said last month:
"The MoD and Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials agree that the Review will not recommend any significant new expenditure on . . . ballistic missile defence systems."
As a former security command Minister in the Foreign Office, I do not always believe everything I read in the newspapers. I have a great deal of respect for the Minister for the Armed Forces, and I want clear guidance from him on the Government's policy. If those stories are true, it could have disastrous consequences for the United Kingdom and our NATO allies.
"planned to have a range of around 5,000 km."
Libya and Iran already have an interest in buying that system. If they manage to get their hands on missiles with that range, it could put Britain at risk. Even if they do not, the Russians and Chinese might be alternative sources.
"the next conflict with the United States would involve weapons of mass destruction."
We can deduce from that that lessons will also be learned by so-called third world countries.
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