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Defence Council Instructions
Mr. Matthew Taylor: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Defence Council instructions have been issued since 1 January 1996; and how many were unclassified. [24507]
Mr. George Robertson: A total of 1,920 Defence Council Instructions have been issued since 1 January 1996, of which 1,609 were unclassified.
Peacekeeping Forces
Mr. Cox:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will list the countries where British peacekeeping forces are currently operating. [25008]
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Dr. Reid:
United Kingdom armed forces are currently deployed in Cyprus, Iraq/Kuwait, Georgia, Bosnia/ Herzegovina and Croatia on peacekeeping operations under specific United Nations mandates. UK forces are also engaged in monitoring activities in Northern and Southern Iraq and in the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf, as part of a wider coalition force to monitor Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
Mr. Flynn:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions were held on the co-ordination of patrols of Trident and Triomphant submarines at the Anglo-French summit in London in November. [24606]
Mr. George Robertson:
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave to the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key) on 22 January 1998, Official Report, column 628.
Mr. Flynn:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what has been the impact of the introduction of Trident on (a) the availability of the United Kingdom's ballistic missile-carrying submarines to fire their missiles and (b) the number of submarines that can be deployed on patrol at any one time. [24602]
Mr. George Robertson:
The introduction into service of our Trident submarines has not resulted in any change in the United Kingdom's policy of maintaining continuous deterrent patrols. Submarines on patrol are at a reduced alert state reflecting improved strategic conditions.
Mr. Flynn:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what is the Government's present policy towards disclosing the number of nuclear warheads deployed on Trident submarines and the date they entered service; and if he will make a statement on changes in Government policy in respect of disclosing such information. [24604]
Mr. George Robertson:
Details of the exact number of warheads deployed on our Trident submarines are covered by exemption 1 of the code of practice on access to government information relating to defence, security and international relations. The Government are considering, in the Strategic Defence Review, whether we can in future be more open about aspects of our nuclear capabilities.
Mr. Flynn:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what is his Department's assessment of the (a) current and (b) future capacity of Russia to track and determine the whereabouts of the United Kingdom's Trident submarines when on patrol; and if he will make a statement. [24603]
Mr. George Robertson:
Although the most modern Russian submarines might be theoretically capable of detecting UK Trident submarines at close range, the operating arrangements for UK Trident submarines are designed to ensure that they remain undetected.
Mr. Flynn:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the number of warheads currently deployed on each of the United Kingdom's Trident submarines relative to the original estimates of the number of warheads required. [24605]
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Mr. George Robertson:
The original requirement for Trident was drawn up at the height of the Cold War based on 16 Trident C4 missiles on each submarine capable of carrying a total of 128 warheads. The previous Government announced in 1994 that they would not deploy more than 96 warheads on each Trident submarine. We are considering future warhead requirements in the Strategic Defence Review.
Mr. Flynn:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the relative accuracy of the Trident D5 missile against the Polaris/Chevaline system; and what are his Department's requirements in respect of the accuracy of nuclear weapons. [24594]
Mr. George Robertson:
The Trident missile system is inherently more accurate than Polaris reflecting technological advances in missile system design. The greater accuracy of Trident has allowed us to plan on our Trident force also undertaking the sub-strategic role allowing the withdrawal of our air delivered WE-177 nuclear bombs without replacement. Details of the performance of Trident are covered by exemption 1 of the code of practice on access to government information relating to defence, security and international relations.
Mr. Flynn:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if the warheads on the Trident D5 missile deployed by the United Kingdom are independently targetable. [24596]
Mr. George Robertson:
Trident warheads are independently targetable within constraints imposed by the missile system and its trajectory.
Mr. Flynn:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the relative capability of the anti-missile defence technology employed in the Trident D5 missile system against that of Polaris/ Chevaline. [24597]
Mr. George Robertson:
Chevaline and Trident utilised different technologies to overcome anti-ballistic missile systems precluding direct comparisons. We are satisfied that Trident could meet any foreseeable requirements against such systems.
Mr. Flynn:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the range of the Trident D5 missile system as deployed by the United Kingdom relative to that of the Polaris system. [24595]
Mr. George Robertson:
Polaris missiles had a range of up to 2,500 miles. The maximum range of the Trident D5 missile is in the region of 6,000 miles. The additional range of the Trident missile ensures that our strategic submarines can operate within a wider area and are therefore less vulnerable to detection.
Mr. Flynn:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which nuclear arms control treaties that place restrictions on the level of nuclear weapons capability measure that capability in terms of megatonnage. [24592]
Mr. George Robertson:
We are not aware of any nuclear arms control treaties that place restrictions on the level of nuclear weapons capability which measure that capability in terms of megatonnage. However, the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear
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Explosions for Peaceful Purposes limited the yield of underground nuclear weapon test explosions and other underground nuclear explosions. These were both bilateral Treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union, and had no other members. Both are effectively superseded by the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed by all the Nuclear Weapon States, which bans any nuclear weapon test explosion and any other nuclear explosion in any environment.
Mr. Flynn:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions in the last four years (a) representatives and (b) contractors of the Delegation Generale pour l'Armement, and the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique have visited (i) the United Kingdom to discuss the furtherance of nuclear co-operation and (ii) the atomic weapons establishments at (1) Aldermaston, (2) Burghfield, (3) Cardiff and (4) Foulness. [24608]
Mr. George Robertson:
Details of the total number of visits are as follows. More precise information is not held centrally and could be obtained only at disproportionate cost.
| Financial year | Aldermaston | Burghfield | Cardiff | Foulness |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1993-94 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| 1994-95 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 1995-96 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| 1996-97 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| April 1997 to 21 January 1998 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Mr. Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what activities have been undertaken by the Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine since May 1997; [24609]
- (2) if he will place in the Library a copy of the report of the Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine approved at the Anglo-French summit in London in November. [24610]
Mr. George Robertson: Discussions within the Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine and reports of the Commission to Ministers are confidential between our two Governments and are covered by exemption 1 of the code of practice on access to government information relating to defence, security and international relations.
Mr. Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions in the last four years members of the French armed forces have visited the United Kingdom to discuss nuclear co-operation. [24607]
Mr. George Robertson:
My Department has regular contacts with members of the French Armed Forces and French officials on defence nuclear matters. These include meetings of the Franco-British Joint Nuclear Commissions, biannual staff talks and visits to the United Kingdom on an ad-hoc basis.
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