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Mr. Sayeed: Will the Minister give way?
Ms Jowell: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not. We have almost run out of time, so I shall not take his intervention, other than to say that I accept his analysis that the cancer care framework set out in the Calman-Hine report provides a model for the development and delivery of health care services in other areas. The Government have made it clear through the development of service frameworks that we intend to build on that approach to provide an integration of prevention, health promotion, community care, primary care and acute care, available where it is needed and on the basis of need alone.
Let me finish by recalling the words of William Farr, the first Registrar-General, who said 150 years ago:
"Good health is as dear to the rich as it is to the poor."
We are determined to remove the many obstacles which stand in the way of the poor enjoying the good health to which they are entitled.
Strategic Defence Review
11 am
Mr. Keith Simpson (Mid-Norfolk): Mr. Deputy Speaker, I thank you and the House for the opportunity to have an Adjournment debate on this important subject. I applied for an Adjournment debate on the strategic defence review before Christmas, as I thought it unlikely that we would have an opportunity to have a major debate on it before it was published some time in the spring or summer. It is coincidental that the debate has been selected this week, against the background of the Iraq crisis. There is no conspiracy in the Speaker's Office; this also happens to be the week in which the Defence Committee visits Washington, but this is not a method by which we can debate defence in the absence of the distinguished members of the Select Committee.
This is an opportunity for hon. Members to question the Minister about the strategic defence review and for him to provide an interim report on where we are. There is a rumour that the Secretary of State for Defence, apart from official appearances in the House, is now in purdah and will no longer accept outside speaking engagements for fear of lifting the veil on the strategic defence review.
We last debated defence in the two-day defence debate in October. Since then, we have had a good Adjournment debate in November, introduced by the hon. Member for Chorley (Mr. Hoyle), on the defence industry. I compliment the hon. Gentleman on his assiduity and his great interest in defence. In December, we had an Adjournment debate, introduced by my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr. Davis), on the important subject--given the Iraq crisis--of anti-missile defence.
It is usual at this time of the year, as more experienced hon. Members know, to have single-service defence debates. Perhaps at the end of the debate the Minister will confirm whether the Ministry of Defence intends to go ahead with the single-service debates, or whether we will have a further hiatus.
The strategic defence review is as much about continuity as change. One thing we should establish this morning is how much is continuity and how much is change and what that change means for the United Kingdom and for defence. I do not have to tell the House that defence is still important. I would like to believe that there is a consensus among the majority of hon. Members that the defence of the United Kingdom, our people and our interests is of paramount importance and cannot be taken lightly. It cannot be cut back, nor can the capability be given up lightly as we may be forced to readopt it in the event of a major crisis. Ultimately, the defence capability of our country is a war-fighting capability. The defence of our country gives us the political leverage that is important in the new world disorder in which we live.
The defence budget, of nearly £22 billion, is by no means the largest in Whitehall; it comes well below social services, health and education. I do not need to remind the House that the MOD has 210,000 regular service personnel and employs 109,000 civilians. It is UK industry's largest customer--11,000 UK companies have a defence interest. Defence affects virtually every Member of the UK Parliament. Some 10 per cent. of all UK industrial employment and 11 per cent. of all
industrial output is connected with defence. Defence exports are probably worth in excess of £4 billion a year. It is a major earner for UK plc.
During the Prime Minister's statement to the House yesterday on the Iraq crisis, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition asked whether the Prime Minister agreed that the
I want to take the Government at their word. They claim, not only on defence but across the board, that they are into greater openness and public accountability. The Government have continued, and indeed expanded, the policy of previous Conservative Secretaries of State by providing more information about defence. It is exceptionally good that the wide range of expertise in our universities and establishments of higher education on defence and security matters has been consulted. The defence industries have been brought in, as have non-governmental organisations, which have much to offer. The public have also been consulted. We can all agree on that and the Government have undertaken a major programme.
That is the easy bit. The hard bit is making decisions. How do we assess the progress of the Government's strategic defence review? How do we judge the strategic defence review when it is published? I suggest five tests. First, does it provide effective security and defence for the United Kingdom? Secondly, does it succeed in meeting the United Kingdom's national and international obligations? Thirdly, will our armed forces be organised, manned and equipped to meet those obligations? Fourthly, has the strategic defence review taken into account the twin revolutions in political and military affairs? Finally, will the financial resources be allocated to meet this remit? That final point is the crunch in terms of the strategic defence review.
There are two ironies connected with the Iraq crisis. One is a question of national identity, the other a question of defence direction and capability. Certain elements of the new Labour Government--the Minister does not fall into this category--have been keen to rebrand Britain as cool Britannia, whatever that means, yet there is a certain irony that the reality of sending a task force to the Gulf in the Iraq crisis has been more traditional and--without jingoism--more rule Britannia than cool Britannia.
Secondly, despite all the Government's allegations of how weak the defence capability was after 18 years of Conservative government, the reality is that the command and control system set up as a consequence of the experience of the Falklands and the Gulf war--the Cabinet, the MOD and the permanent joint headquarters--was established by the Conservatives. The remit to send a task force was established and tested by the Conservative Government, as were the doctrine, weapons, equipment, manpower and resources.
Here is a great irony. If the Government think that our forces were in such an appalling state, how did they successfully command, control and organise a task force of the type that was sent to the Gulf, and which has made such an important contribution to maintaining international security? There is a certain bijou irony there.
Some observers might argue that fulfilling major deployments such as Bosnia and the Gulf while undertaking the strategic defence review places great strain on our services. Thirty years ago, another Labour Government were--surprise, surprise--carrying out one of their many defence reviews. Later, the then Secretary of State for Defence, now Lord Healey, observed the contradictory nature of simultaneously deploying and trying to review defence. Later he wrote:
In opposition, new Labour faced reality. It moved away from unilateralism and argued that there was a need for a strategic defence review that would stop the decline in Britain's defences. The Labour Opposition said that they would properly assess Britain's strategic priorities and that the process would be foreign policy led. Every question asked by hon. Members--Conservative and Liberal, at least--to ascertain more detail was met with what appeared to be the reasonable holding answer that Labour Members could not commit themselves until they had looked at the Ministry of Defence books.
Nevertheless, in the lead-up to the general election, the Labour Opposition felt able, without looking at the books, to commit themselves to maintaining our strategic nuclear deterrent and to honour the Conservative commitment to Eurofighter--a commitment, at that time, of about £16 billion. That blew a hole through the carefully constructed arguments for a strategic defence review. On what basis did the then Labour Opposition decide to maintain Trident and Eurofighter when the strategic defence review was supposed to be foreign policy led? Why did they not commit themselves to order Challenger tanks or purchase carriers? Where did the information come from that they said in other areas was so vital that they would have to wait until they had looked at the books?
"strategic defence review, which is now approaching completion, could not reasonably conclude that there is scope for reducing the defence budget?"
The Prime Minister replied:
"I have always thought and said that this country's defence forces are vital to our foreign policy and Britain's standing in the world. That is precisely why the strategic defence review will ensure that our armed forces have a secure and certain future."--[Official Report, 24 February 1998; Vol. 307, c. 177.]
On that, we would all agree, and that is the litmus test for the review. I sincerely hope that those words of the Prime Minister will not come back to haunt him in six months' time.
"I did not think it made sense to carry out an appendix operation on a man while he was lifting a grand piano".
I suggest that many members of our armed forces feel just like that man or woman attempting to lift a grand piano.
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