| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
Mr. Henderson: I hope to meet the hon. Gentleman's wishes in that regard.
Mr. Maples: We have found something on which we can agree. I hope that not all the debates will fall on a Thursday--or at least on days such as today on which the North Atlantic Assembly is meeting, which may affect people's ability to attend.
I welcome discussions with the Government and with other parties on whether a proper format for the five days of defence debates might not continue to be two days for debate on the estimates, with the other three days perhaps split slightly differently so that each one does not necessarily focus on a single service. We are open to suggestion on that.
Events in Iraq are certainly hotting up. The Navy would be involved in action there. I do not intend to deal with Iraq in my speech, because the Minister clearly cannot deal with them tonight. However, if and when our forces go into action in the Gulf, I hope that there will be an immediate statement by the Secretary of State in the House so that we can cross-question him on what is happening, and on what policy is being pursued.
I have already apologised to Madam Speaker, and now do so to the House, for the fact that I have a long-standing speaking engagement--arranged before the debate was arranged--and I shall not be able to stay for the whole debate or to return for the winding-up speeches. I shall eagerly collect Hansard tomorrow to read the speeches that I have not heard.
Since the end of the cold war, we have seen a fundamental change in defence policy. Nowhere has that been more true than in our naval strategy. In some ways, we are returning to a more traditional defence policy of expeditionary forces and the use of naval power to support land operations. The 20th century has been somewhat continentalist, dominated by continental powers such as Germany, Russia and China, and that has dictated British naval planning and deployment. We were previously the great practitioner of maritime strategy based on naval predominance and expeditionary operations. From world war one, that changed. Continental issues dominated, and our naval strategy changed accordingly.
Since the end of the second world war, our naval deployment has been almost entirely configured for anti-submarine warfare in the north Atlantic, designed for the essential task of keeping open supply and communication lanes, and helping to maintain access to Europe for the United States fleet. The end of the cold war has, at least for the time being--though I doubt for all time--ended that continentalist situation. We no longer have to configure and deploy our forces solely to meet the Warsaw Pact threat. The new strategic environment demands the ability to respond flexibly and quickly outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation area. We must be able to respond to threats and challenges not only in Europe, but in the middle east, the Gulf and north Africa. That will involve joint force operations in conjunction with allies. Such a concept is far from new, but it was largely irrelevant during the cold war.
Forces will have to be able to provide a wide range of options: the ability to deploy, respond and reconfigure rapidly and flexibly, offering a range of military options to policy planners. Navies cannot respond as quickly as air forces or provide the territorial presence of an army, but those are not always the most important qualities required. Navies can reach most of the world. They can engage and disengage rapidly. They are largely self-sufficient. They can operate aircraft and land forces. They can operate without host nation approval or support. They can switch quickly from a diplomatic to an aggressive role. Those concepts have increasingly come
to influence defence policy over the past six years or so and they are carried forward in the strategic defence review.
We can already deploy a brigade-sized force. RAF GR7s can operate from carriers. HMS Ocean will add a whole new dimension. We can deploy a joint force headquarters at sea. The new landing platform docks on order will be able to land forces quicker and with greater air support.
The return to a more maritime strategy is the appropriate response to this situation. It involves a return to a more traditional British defence stance, but this time with far greater emphasis on joint operations. We in the Opposition support those aspects of the strategic defence review which carry that forward.
I shall take a moment to express the enormous admiration in which our Navy are held. They are constantly involved in deployments--in the south Atlantic, the Gulf and all over the world. They consistently acquit themselves with success and distinction. We are lucky to have them. Our duty as politicians is to ensure that they have the men, equipment and training to do what we ask of them.
That leads me to the issue of recruitment and retention. I understand that surface ships are sailing with crews about 5 per cent. short of their full complement on a fairly regular basis. Recruitment and retention are therefore vital. Undermanning leads to more frequent tours of duty, longer periods away from home and excessive workloads and that, in itself, causes people to leave early and makes recruitment difficult. It is a vicious circle which must be broken. In the past three years, far more people have left the Navy than have joined it. That must change. I know that the Government realise the seriousness of the matter and attach importance to solving the problem. We shall support them in their efforts, but we shall watch closely to see whether they achieve their aims.
Where better to begin my consideration of procurement issues than with the new carriers? These were and are the centrepiece of the strategic defence review. They were the most heavily leaked or trailed part of it. That document was especially heavily leaked and trailed by the Secretary of State's special adviser, who was comprehensively briefing the press on every aspect long before the House was told and the carriers were in the shop window. The carriers were what justified the cuts in money, men and equipment. In the case of the Navy, it was those new carriers that were to make up for the cuts in the number of submarines and surface ships. The Navy was paying today for promises of a great future in 15 years' time.
I expressed my doubt at the time that this Government would ever build the carriers and I still have doubts. The Treasury, whose bootprints are all over the review, will be back for more. As the Chancellor's public spending plans come under increasing pressure as the economy slows, so he will be back for more cuts in the defence budget.
Even I could not have expected that the Government were actively investigating an alternative option. On 7 September, just a few weeks after publication of the SDR, the Government advertised in the "Ministry of Defence Contracts Bulletin" for a study designed to extend the life of the existing carriers. It stated of the existing carriers:
The Secretary of State must have come to the same conclusion because, in his first great climbdown of the year, he has abandoned part of those plans. In a further announcement in the same "Ministry of Defence Contracts Bulletin" of 4 November he sneaked out his climbdown in small print:
Unfortunately, this climbdown cannot be seen to be the end of the matter because it appears that the studies are now to go ahead internally. How can these studies possibly be compatible with firm plans to build the carriers? The Secretary of State cannot bluster his way out of this one. If those studies show that the lives of our existing carriers can be extended within acceptable operational and financial parameters, what will happen? Logic dictates--from experience I know that the Treasury is logical--that the new carriers can be postponed for at least 10 years. That must be the case. I cannot believe that that option was not studied as part of the SDR and rejected. It is the sort of option that must be considered early on, not after an alternative major procurement decision has been taken. I do not think that Ministers even now are being straight with the House.
"conversion would be expected to extend the operational life of the Vessels for a period of 10 years from around 2012 to 2022."
12 Nov 1998 : Column 514
That is wholly incompatible with launching two new carriers in 2012. The Government's bad faith has been there for all to see.
To be fair to the Secretary of State, I expect that that was imposed on him by the Treasury against his wishes. However, his explanations in the SDR debate were so pathetic that he could not have thought up the idea for himself. He did a manful job, pretending that standard practice was being followed and attempting to rubbish what was abundantly obvious to all--that the Government had been caught out in an act of breathtaking duplicity. How can it be standard practice to announce a firm procurement decision and then subsequently to announce a study for an alternative which would completely destroy the case for the original decision? It was a fatuous explanation and the Secretary of State knew it. It must have done immense damage to morale in the Royal Navy and dealt a terminal blow to the Secretary of State's credibility.
"The Ministry of Defence now believes it can meet the study need without involving the shipbuilding/ship repair industry and the previous advertisement is thus withdrawn."
What a humiliation. What incompetence. What a climbdown. I can promise the Secretary of State that any further duplicity will be met by the same relentless exposure and questioning from the Opposition. It is unlikely that the climbdown would have taken place if we had not pursued the issue to the embarrassment of Ministers. I look forward to many more climbdowns, starting I hope on Monday with a change of heart about the Secretary of State's damaging plans for the Territorial Army.
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |