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5.55 pm
Mr. Gwyn Prosser (Dover): I am grateful to be taking part in this important debate on the Royal Navy. My constituency of Dover, whose famous white cliffs have guarded the English channel during this country's darkest hours, has played an important part in supporting the operations of the Royal Navy. Dover continues to maintain close links with the senior service.
Most of our land-based military sites, such as the Old Park barracks in Dover and the Royal Marines barracks in Deal, were closed down in the last five years of the Conservative Administration. Most of our maritime activity is now centred on roll on/roll off ferries, which make up a significant part of the British merchant fleet. Before I became a Member of Parliament, I was proud to sail with that merchant fleet. I should like to concentrate my remarks on the crucial support role that the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the rest of the military fleet provides to the Royal Navy and the other two services.
I am pleased to welcome the proposals in the strategic defence review in respect of the Navy, especially the recognition that in the post-cold-war environment we must be prepared to go to the crisis rather than have the crisis come to us. I also welcome the recognition of the importance of strategic transport that flows from that. Particularly welcome are the two additional aircraft carriers, about which we have heard a great deal during the past 10 or 15 minutes, the additional four ro-ro vessels and the 10 per cent. increase in the Royal Naval Reserve. That new tonnage has been widely welcomed. It will help to fill the gaping holes left in the maritime support capabilities that we inherited from the previous Administration.
In the same way as the Royal Naval Reserve has an important and valued role in supporting the military, the Merchant Navy plays an essential role in supporting the Royal Navy and the other two services in times of conflict. The decline and virtual wipe-out of the merchant fleet over which the Tories presided has left us with insufficient vessels to provide the necessary level of support.
I realise that the fortunes of the red ensign lie mainly with the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions rather than the Ministry of Defence. We all look forward to the shipping White Paper--the daughter White Paper--which is about to be published. However, in these days of so-called joined-up politics, and in the spirit of the strategic defence review with its emphasis on joint action between the services and a co-ordinated approach to planning, it would have been encouraging to see some recognition in the SDR of the role of the Merchant Navy in supporting the military. It would have
been helpful to see some indication of Minister's views on the size of the fleet below which effective support could not be provided.
The British merchant fleet has long held a key role in our nation's defences, which is why it is traditionally called the fourth arm of our services. Yesterday, we remembered the dead of two world wars and all the other terrible conflicts of the past 80 years. In world war two, the merchant service fulfilled its defence role to the full and suffered proportionately greater losses than any other service. As well as providing operational support for the Royal Navy and back-up for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary in the form of tankers, supply vessels and other strategic vessels, it provides transport for our troops, weapons, munitions and aircraft. However, the dreadful decline suffered by the merchant fleet has put such guaranteed support in jeopardy. As recently as 1988, the Select Committee on Defence stated:
We all applauded the crucial role played by the Royal Navy in the Falklands war, but speaking after that conflict in 1982--16 years ago--Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse said:
Some might say that the Gulf operation proved the soundness of relying on foreign charters, but that is not true; instead, it proved that there were dangers inherent in taking such action. There was the danger of delaying military operations--because of problems with the delivery of troops and equipment, there was concern that some units were not combat ready until well after the deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. There was the danger of being held to ransom by foreign ship owners
who wanted to exploit tight markets. We heard reliable reports that the Ministry of Defence had to pay as much as three times the going rate to charter ro-ro vessels.
Mr. Hancock:
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would be the first to agree that much of the blame for those problems lies fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the previous Government, because of the way in which they somewhat gleefully presided over the decline of the British merchant fleet and did little or nothing to stop that decline or to encourage British-based companies to continue to crew their British-flagged ships with British seamen.
Mr. Prosser:
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I remember listening to debates in the House during which, time and again, the Conservatives thrust forward the ideas of non-intervention and free markets. They gave little or no support to the Merchant Navy during their 18 years in government.
Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East):
Is not the hon. Gentleman aware that, at this very moment, P and O Stena is doing precisely that--paying off British staff and putting foreign seamen on its merchant vessels? What are the Government doing to prevent that?
Mr. Prosser:
The hon. Gentleman knows that P and O Stena's current actions in Newhaven and elsewhere are the result of an inheritance from the Conservative Government who, for 18 years, abdicated their responsibilities, ignored the British merchant fleet and failed to give any support to training. The good news is that there is to be a White Paper that will help the British merchant fleet, encourage the rebuilding of it and arrest the decline that started under the Conservatives.
The third danger of chartering foreign-crewed and foreign-registered vessels is the risk that foreign crews will refuse to enter war zones to support conflicts to which they are not a party. There were several incidents in which seafarers from non-combatant nations refused to sail their ships to the Gulf.
The problems I have described were acknowledged by the deputy commander of the United States forces, Lieutenant-General Calvin Waller. Even before the end of the conflict, a strenuous debate had started in the United States about the problems resulting from having to charter non-US-flagged ships. Since the war, the Americans have taken action. An example of that is the passage last year of the US Maritime Securities Act, which includes a 10-year, $1 billion programme to ensure the retention under the US flag of 50 "military-useful" merchant vessels, thus helping the US to guarantee its sea-lift capacity. They have also introduced other supportive measures for their fleet. By contrast, in this country there was little debate and little action. Although the provision of two ro-ro vessels and the new proposals for a further four heavy-lift ro-ro vessels are welcome, it is thought that we might need twice that number to meet all our defence requirements.
The National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers, which is the Merchant Navy officers' union--to which I am affiliated--considers that the number of product carriers, tankers, general cargo vessels, ro-ros and large container ships remaining in the
UK register are now well below anticipated defence needs. The first Atlantic Conveyer, which was lost in the Falklands war and replaced with Government money, was flagged out before the last election. The loss of that high-capacity, deep-sea container ro-ro vessel represented a significant loss of sea-lift support and it is regrettable that the Conservatives failed to take any action to maintain that strategic vessel within the British registry.
The Government's proposals for the modernised Royal Navy rightly lay much emphasis on people and recruitment, training and skills. The British Merchant Navy in general, and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary in particular, will also need support for training and recruitment if those services are to maintain sufficient numbers of skilled officers and ratings to meet the needs of changing technology and to provide effective crews in times of conflict. The Government's improved SMART--support for maritime training--programme for the Merchant Navy is welcome, but it is only a start. We look forward to more assistance with training when the shipping White Paper is published later this year.
"The availability of merchant shipping for defence purposes is governed by three factors--the number of UK flagged ships, their accessibility when they are needed, and a pool of British seafarers to man them. There are grounds for concern on all counts."
When Mrs. Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979, the British merchant fleet was the fourth largest in the world; it now ranks 29th in the league table. In the same period, the number of British seafarers employed in UK ships has fallen from 63,000 to fewer than 17,000, and the fleet is now the smallest it has been this century, standing at fewer than 240 ships. Given that background, it would be unfortunate if all the good work for the Royal Navy proposed in the strategic defence review were to be undermined by our inability to provide safe guaranteed support from merchant shipping.
"Without the ships taken up from the trade the operation could not have been undertaken."
Even at that time, there were insufficient British ships, so foreign tonnage, including six oil tankers, had to be chartered from foreign nationals. Since the Falklands war and the admiral's warning, the size of the UK fleet has fallen to less than one third of its strength in 1982. With fewer than 240 ships, we now lack the ability to carry out a repeat of the Falklands task force operation. Unfortunately, the previous Government did not learn the lessons of the Falklands and they ignored the dangers of relying increasingly on foreign-flagged and foreign-crewed ships. Consequently, by the time the Gulf crisis hit us, the Admiralty was forced to charter foreign vessels on a grand scale. Only eight of the 143 ships on charter flew the red ensign and were signed up to the British registry.
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