II. THE FOOD SAFETY PROBLEM
Introduction
14. In this section of our Report we examine the
underlying issues relating to microbiological food safety which
need to be addressed by the Government, both before and after
the establishment of a Food Standards Agency. The proposals for
an FSA itself, particularly in terms of its structure, accountability,
guiding principles, functions, powers and resources, as set out
in the Government's White Paper, are the subject of Section III
of this Report. Overall judgements about the desirability of an
Agency, and the form it should take, clearly hinge on the extent
to which it will be able to achieve improvements in the safety
and quality of the nation's food supply. Many of the recommendations
contained in this section of our Report, therefore, point to particular
policies or tasks which, while they need to be set in train now
by the Government, will be of a high priority for the Agency when
it is established. Likewise, many of the recommendations which
we make in Section III of this Report, about the Agency's structure
and functions, have to be seen in the context of the underlying
food problems which the Agency must successfully resolve.
The incidence of food poisoning
15. The available statistical information about the
incidence of food poisoning appears to be fairly comprehensive,
but is widely acknowledged to be deficient in a number of respects,
most notably in substantially understating the actual level of
food poisoning in the UK. Because reported cases, which appear
in the official statistics, are the tip of an iceberg of unknown
size[11], it is only
possible to guess at the true incidence of food poisoning. Dr
Eileen Rubery, Head of the Department of Health's Health Aspects
of Environment Division, said that "under-ascertainment"
was "somewhere between ten and one hundred fold"[12].
One consequence is that it is never possible to be sure that trends
in reported illness mirror trends in actual illness, or whether
they simply reflect such factors as changes in propensity to notify
cases and investigate outbreaks of illness. While some would argue
that increases in reported cases are largely a result of greater
public awareness of food poisoning[13],
in the absence of clear evidence it is probably most prudent to
assume that the trend in actual food poisoning cases is rising
roughly in line with reported cases.
16. A substantial amount of statistical information
on food poisoning cases and levels of microbiological contamination
of food is contained in the written evidence which we received
from the Government and from the PHLS[14].
Much information is also contained in the October 1997 report
by the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) on
Safer Eating: Microbiological Food Poisoning and its Prevention.
We recommend these sources for Members and others wishing to inform
themselves in detail of the underlying trends in food poisoning
in the UK. For the purposes of this Report, we draw attention
to those issues which appear to us to be of most significance
and concern.
17. The most recent figures for food poisoning notifications,
for 1997, show a continuation of the overall increase which has
been observed since the 1980s. In England and Wales provisional
figures for 1997 show a rate of 179.6 per 100,000 population,
up from 160 in 1996 and from 58.3 ten years previously, in 1987[15].
There has been a slight, though probably not statistically significant,
decrease in notifications in Scotland, from 199.6 per 100,000
population in 1996 to 198.6 in 1997, and a small rise in Northern
Ireland, from 87.5 in 1996 to 91.8 in 1997[16].
For the first time, in 1997, there were more than 100,000 food
poisoning notifications in the UK. The PHLS informed us that each
year hundreds of people in the UK are hospitalized with food poisoning
and "between 100 and 200 may die"[17].
18. There has been some speculation about the reasons
for the apparent divergences in rates of food poisoning between
different parts of the UK, and in particular the relatively high
rate in Scotland (most marked in terms of E.coli O157 food
poisoning) and the relatively low rate in Northern Ireland. Some
witnesses offered hunches. Mr Richard Carden, Head of MAFF's Food
Safety and Environment Directorate, said that "it may have
something to do with lifestyle and the amount of eating out and
the things that people eat"[18].
Professor Hugh Pennington, on the other hand, felt that, in relation
to Scottish levels of E.coli O157 it was worth looking
at the hypothesis that there might be higher levels of carriage
of the pathogen in cattle in Scotland[19].
He also pointed out that there were unexplained regional variations
in E.coli O157 incidence within Scotland itself[20].
The Government's existing research programme into pathogenic micro-organisms
does not appear capable of providing much illumination on this
subject[21]. We recognize
that there may be a mixture of factors at play: agricultural and
food industry practices, social and cultural norms about diet
and food preparation, and, possibly, differential reporting and
investigation rates for foodborne illnesses. Nevertheless, the
trends are well-established and pronounced, and it cannot be the
case that Northern Ireland is simply more fortunate, and Scotland
less fortunate, than England and Wales. We recommend that the
Government explore means of devising research projects to provide
a fuller understanding of the different rates of food poisoning
in the constituent parts of the UK. The absence of clear
conclusions on these discrepancies is inexcusable, and must be
remedied if the Agency's work is to be underpinned by a real understanding
of the incidence and causes of food poisoning in the UK.
19. Before food poisoning cases can enter the national
notification statistics, they must surmount a number of hurdles,
and at each hurdle an unknown number of cases falls by the wayside.
First, many people, probably the large majority, do not visit
their doctors, usually because their symptoms are mild or pass
quickly. Secondly, though doctors throughout the UK are statutorily
required to notify cases of food poisoning (in England and Wales,
to the local authority; in Scotland to the area Health Board;
and in Northern Ireland, to the local Health and Social Services
Board[22]), it is thought
that there is a substantial degree of under-reporting by doctors[23].
The best estimate of the extent of under-reporting is provided
by data from the GP Sentinel Practice Scheme, which records the
number of GP consultations for infectious intestinal disease (IID).
In 1997 there was a mean annual incidence for such consultations
of 2,420 per 100,000 population, twenty-four times the figure
for formal food poisoning notification by doctors and thirteen
times the total number of notifications (which include cases ascertained
by other means than through GP notification)[24].
Though the ratio of consultations to notifications has decreased
substantially over the last ten years, indicating that GPs are
probably more likely now to notify cases, a wide margin of under-notification
is still apparent. This hampers efforts to understand the extent
of the problem of foodborne illness in society. Dr Rubery told
us that the Government had "actually taken quite a number
of steps like writing to GPs or encouraging GPs to notify more
frequently"[25].
Under-notification by GPs is only one part of the wider jigsaw
of under-ascertainment of infectious intestinal disease in the
UK, but it is an important part, and the Government must both
ensure that GPs are advised of developments in foodborne illnesses
and their symptoms, and continue to press GPs to meet their responsibilities
in respect of notification. This task will be a crucial one if
the Agency's work is to be informed by accurate statistical information
and not just by hunches and guesswork.
20. Complementary to the GP notification system is
the voluntary laboratory reporting system, under which laboratories
throughout the UK report faecal isolates of pathogenic organisms,
following analysis of specimens referred by doctors, to their
respective surveillance centres (in England and Wales, to the
PHLS's Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC); in Scotland,
to the Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health
(SCIEH); in Northern Ireland, to the Department of Health and
Social Services)[26].
Drawing attention to the variability in reporting levels, the
Government also pointed out that laboratory-confirmed infections
gave a "significant underestimate of the true incidence of
foodborne infections since not all cases seek medical attention
and only a proportion of these have a specimen submitted for analysis"[27].
The PHLS was critical of the laboratory reporting system's lack
of coherence and consistency, claiming that "laboratories
in different regions vary greatly in their reporting efficiency
with a concentration of poorly reporting laboratories in certain
regions"[28]. Professor
Brian Duerden, Deputy Director of the PHLS, argued that "laboratory
notifications should become a statutory responsibility"[29].
We agree. Such measures are essential in improving public health
and food safety policy.
21. In addition to formal notifications and laboratory
confirmations, local authorities ascertain cases by other means,
from outbreaks in the community, for example, or as a result of
direct contacts from members of the public or owners of food businesses.
For general outbreaks, defined as "an outbreak affecting
members of more than one private residence or residents of an
institution"[30],
the CDSC has developed a surveillance scheme in England and Wales
which involves the dispatch of a questionnaire to the local authority
for completion and return on the conclusion of the investigation
of the outbreak[31].
Implication of foodstuffs in such outbreaks may be based upon
microbiological analysis, statistical probability or more circumstantial
evidence. The PHLS pointed out that because of the voluntary nature
of the surveillance scheme, there was significant variability
between local authorities both in the rigour with which outbreaks
were investigated and in reporting levels[32].
In concert with the SCIEH, the CDSC is undertaking a Department
of Health-funded project to seek to improve consistency and comparability
of approach between local authorities in investigating outbreaks[33].
22. The Government informed us that much valuable
information about the level and causes of food poisoning in England
would result from its study of infectious intestinal disease,
which was set up in 1993[34].
Giving evidence to us on 11 November, Dr Rubery expressed the
hope that the IID study would shortly be available[35]
and that it would provide "really useful definitive data"[36].
Towards the end of our inquiry we asked for an update of progress
in completing this study, and the Government said that "detailed
analysis and careful interpretation" was still required before
publication, although it was confident that it would be able to
publish a report on the findings "later this year"[37].
The Government confirmed the point, set out in its original memorandum,
that the findings of the study supported the view that the current
reporting system "significantly underestimates the true magnitude
of infectious intestinal disease" in England[38].
The publication of this report should be extremely important in
understanding the true prevalence of food poisoning in the UK.
23. It is relatively easy to diagnose weaknesses
in the UK's notification and reporting systems in relation to
foodborne illness, but important to recognize that it will never
be possible to establish a fully comprehensive and accurate picture,
given the nature of the problem. Even for the minority of cases
which present to a GP, it is rarely possible to link illness to
a particular foodstuff. This is especially so as the great majority
of food poisoning cases are sporadic, rather than part of a general
outbreak. Moreover, an unknown proportion of infectious intestinal
disease is not associated with food. We also have no reason to
dispute the Government's contention that "by international
standards the UK has one of the better systems" for reporting
food poisoning cases[39].
24. With such imprecise data, it is difficult to
arrive at an assessment of the overall costs to society of such
foodborne illness. The IID study referred to above (see paragraph
21) is intended to provide updated information on this subject[40].
Until then, the best available study, based upon data collected
in 1988-89 and expressed in terms of 1992 prices, estimates that
costs to the public sector were approximately £70 million
a year. This figure, which Dr Rubery advised us had to be "treated
with considerable caution", omits estimates of costs to industry
and the family. The Chartered Institute of Environmental Health
cited a number of rather higher figures, up to between £0.5
billion and £1 billion a year at 1988 prices[41].
Purely for indicative purposes, we sought from the Government
details of the cost of smoking-related illnesses and road accidents:
the former are estimated to cost the NHS in England between £1,400
million and £1,700 million a year, and the latter £490
million a year in casualty-related medical and ambulance costs.
It is important to have some idea of the economic costs to society
of food-related illness, both in absolute terms and in relation
to other public health risks, to inform the allocation of resources
to deal with the problem. Major food safety issues such as the
BSE epidemic may also impose huge costs on the economy in an attempt
to prevent widespread illness and deaths. At the same time, the
consumption of food is a biological necessity, and not directly
comparable with smoking or driving. As Dr Rubery said, public
concern and public perception, as well as the effectiveness of
action which can be taken, are also very important factors in
determining policy[42].
We also take to heart the comments of Professor Philip James that
"there is ten times more ill health... which comes from the
inappropriate nutritional quality of the diet compared even with
infection"[43].
11
Safer Eating: Microbiological Food Poisoning and its Prevention,
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, October 1997,
p 23 Back
12
Q 21 Back
13
cf Q 1263 Back
14
See especially Ev pp 1-26, 78-127, Appendices 90, 94 Back
15
Appendix 90 Back
16
ibid Back
17
Ev p 81 Back
18
Q 12 Back
19
Q 1402 Back
20
Q 1403 Back
21
Q 13 Back
22
Ev pp 7-8 Back
23
Ev p 9 Back
24
Appendix 90 Back
25
Q 31 Back
26
Ev pp 7-9 Back
27
Ev p 9 Back
28
Ev p 99 Back
29
Q 163 Back
30
Ev p 99 Back
31
Ev pp 99-100 Back
32
Ev p 100 Back
33
Ev pp 100-1 Back
34
Ev p 9 Back
35
Q 14 Back
36
Q 20 Back
37
Appendix 90 Back
38
Ev p 10; Appendix 90 Back
39
Ev p 18 Back
40
Qq 14, 20 Back
41
Ev p 211 Back
42
Qq 17-19 Back
43
Q 1359 Back
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