House of Commons - Agriculture

Select Committee on Agriculture Fourth Report

III. THE FOOD STANDARDS AGENCY

The origins of the FSA: the James Report

72. We have already briefly outlined the genesis and history of the proposal that a Food Standards Agency should be established (see paragraphs 3 and 4 above). In this section of our Report we examine the history of this proposal in rather more detail, before analysing those issues which seem to us crucial if the Agency is to fulfil the high hopes which are held for it.

73. Setting the context for his comprehensive and detailed proposals for an FSA, Professor Philip James cited three causal reasons for "[loss of] confidence in the safety of British food."[186] These reasons were, first, that MAFF's dual role as the promoter of UK primary producers and agricultural industries and as guardian of the well-being of the UK consumer had led to a widespread public perception that the Ministry was taking "decisions on food safety to the detriment of public health and [the] consumer..."[187] Secondly, that there was fragmentation and lack of coordination in the administration and regulation of UK food safety policy, with an awkward division of responsibilities between MAFF, the Department of Health and the Territorial Departments, in the area of food hygiene especially. A third reason cited as undermining public confidence was the alleged uneven enforcement nationally of existing food safety regulations by the MHS and local authority EHOs.

74. Professor James's proposals sought to address these problems directly by making it "a fundamental aim [of the Food Standards Agency]...to reestablish within 3 years public confidence in the national mechanisms for handling problems concerning food."[188] The James Report advocated that the FSA should be a non-departmental public body (NDPB) with executive powers, reporting to the Secretary of State for Health and modelled loosely on the successful example of the Health and Safety Commission/Executive (HSC/E):

"The new Agency should have a remit which encompasses the complete food chain. The governing body of the new Agency (the Commission) would advise Ministers on all matters relating to food safety, food standards and nutrition and public health. The Agency ['s Executive] would draft proposed legislation, develop policy and issue guidance to the food industry and enforcement bodies."[189]

James's proposals recommended that the FSA's Commission should consist of around 10 persons selected by the Prime Minister, or a Ministerial Council, on the basis of their "expertise and knowledge." While persons representing commercial and industrial interests within the UK food chain would be eligible for consideration as Commissioners, the Report expressed the view that consumer and public interest groups should form the majority, and that there should be adequate representation on the Commission from among the different countries of the UK. As well as providing advice on food standards and safety policy to the Secretary of State for Health and to Ministers, the Commission's role would be to instruct the Agency's Executive.

75. The James Report anticipated that the Executive's personnel would in the first instance be drawn from Government Departments (principally MAFF, the Department of Health, and their Executive Agencies), although such reallocated staff would be required to "acquire rapidly a culture where public health and consumer interests clearly dominate whilst proper account is taken of economic and business interests."[190] External appointments would also be made to fill vacancies within the Executive.

76. Calling for national powers of auditing, surveillance and enforcement of food standards and safety policy for the FSA, the James Report foresaw the Agency working closely with local authorities to produce "a new cohesive organisation [for the delivery of food standards and safety policy] with a National, Regional and Local structure..."[191] Whilst not replacing local authorities in their enforcement role, the FSA would oversee all aspects of food law enforcement and would have overall responsibility for its nationwide implementation, assisting local authorities with their enforcement activities where the need arose. Partly to facilitate these enforcement and surveillance functions, and partly to address more effectively the different territorial needs of the UK's constituent countries, the James Report endorsed the creation of separate Commissions for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to advise the UK Commission.

77. In setting out the most far-reaching changes in the organisation and administration of UK food policy since the War, the James Report envisaged the FSA taking over all MAFF's activities in the sphere of food standards and safety, assuming responsibility for Department of Health duties on the public health and medicinal aspects of food policy, and acting as a supervisory/reporting body for Executive Agencies currently under the auspices of MAFF, such as the Pesticides Safety Directorate (PSD), the Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD) and the MHS. There was, therefore, heightened interest in the nature of the Government's response to the specific recommendations made by James because not only was it likely to alter radically the delivery and development of UK food policy, but it was also certain to have major administrative and organisational implications for the two principal arms of Government in this area, MAFF and the Department of Health.

The Government White Paper:"The Food Standards Agency: A Force for Change"

78. Following consultation, many of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the James Report were incorporated in the Government's White Paper The Food Standards Agency: A Force for Change, published on 14 January 1998. The White Paper provides the basis for a radical overhaul of UK food standards and safety policy, founded upon a Food Standards Agency "...which will promote high standards throughout the food chain, from the point of production to the point of consumption. It will be a powerful new body, dealing with a complex area and a wide range of interest groups, from producers, manufacturers and retailers to scientific experts, public health professionals and, most importantly, consumers. The Agency will not be tied to any vested interests. It will have clearly defined priorities. It will be free to publish any of the advice it provides to Government. If Ministers decide not to follow that advice they will have to explain their reasons to the public and to Parliament."[192]

79. The principal goal of the FSA set out in the White Paper will be the protection of public health in relation to food. Chapter three summarises the anticipated administrative and regulatory changes brought about by the creation of the FSA: "...the Agency should take over responsibility from the Agriculture and Health Departments for advising Ministers on the UK policy framework in the areas of food safety and food standards, including important aspects of nutrition. This would include advising on the need for and content of legislation and the implementation of policy. The Agency should also have important responsibilities for public information and education on food matters, for representing the UK in the EU and other international organisations, for commissioning research and surveillance and for setting and monitoring standards for food law enforcement."[193]

80. The central chapters of the White Paper (four to six) specify the structure and core functions of the proposed Agency: chapter four on 'The Agency's Role in Food Safety', chapter five on 'The Agency's Role in Food Standards and Nutrition' and chapter six on 'The Structure of the Agency and its Accountability'. We consider the main proposals of these chapters briefly in the following paragraphs.

Food safety

81. Chapter four notes that "Food safety will be at the heart of the Agency's responsibilities."[194] In practice, the FSA will oversee virtually all aspects of UK food standards and safety policy with the exception of on-farm activities and the manufacture and approval of pesticides and veterinary medicine products. MAFF will retain responsibility in this area, although the Agency will be able to intervene at the farm level if it believes food safety standards are being compromised.

82. In the context of recent food scares over E.coli O157 and Salmonella, a significant responsibility devolved to the Agency is to develop and implement a national strategy for the control of foodborne zoonoses (i.e. animal diseases transmissible to humans), by working in close cooperation with the Agriculture Departments and the Department of Health. The impact of another crisis in the UK food sector - that over BSE - is also evident in the Government's proposal that the FSA has responsibility for monitoring the level of contamination of animal feedingstuffs, and for ensuring that these products are labelled in accordance with their composition. We welcome the leading role to be played by the FSA in developing an integrated preventative strategy for the control of human zoonoses as described in the White Paper.

83. Other measures set out in chapter four which are broadly in line with those of the James Report are on food hygiene (where the Government proposes that the FSA will take over MAFF's' and the Department of Health's responsibilities for advising Ministers on all aspects of food hygiene policy and the microbiological safety of food); meat and dairy hygiene (the FSA will assume "ownership" of the MHS and will henceforth have responsibility for licensing of abattoirs and the formulation of meat hygiene policy); and the surveillance of foodborne illness outbreaks (the FSA will not replace local authority activities in this area, but will lend assistance where required). The White Paper also advocates extensive powers for the Agency in the areas of regulating novel foods and processes (including GMOs), and regulating food additives and chemical contaminants in foods.

84. However, the Government's proposals for the Pesticides Safety Directorate and the Veterinary Medicines Directorate differ significantly from those of Professor James by advocating that both Directorates retain their status as Executive Agencies of MAFF and continue to have responsibility for authorising new products[195], with the FSA having an effective veto over the approvals process.

85. While recognising that the PSD would not "naturally sit...within the Food Standards Agency" and agreeing with the general tenor of the White Paper, in their oral evidence to the Committee Friends of the Earth questioned the logic of this particular proposal "when all the other safety functions of MAFF are being taken out and put into the Food Standards Agency"[196]. The Institute of Trading Standards Administration also felt that leaving the VMD and the PSD as MAFF agencies might leave the FSA reacting to problems as they arose, rather than being in the position to take effective preventative action. By contrast, industry representatives were concerned that re-assigning the PSD's responsibilities to the FSA would lead to the loss or displacement of skilled and experienced personnel, thereby impairing the existing registration and approvals process. The British Agrochemicals Association expressed their concern " that PSD might be split up under the proposed new Agency."[197] Diplomatically perhaps, PSD officials refused to be drawn on whether continuation of the existing working arrangements or inclusion within the FSA was preferable. We are satisfied that the arrangement proposed by the Government, whereby the PSD and VMD remain the lead authorities in approving new products whilst the FSA has an effective veto over both the approvals (PSD) and licensing (VMD) processes, represents an effective and workable compromise preserving the administrative efficiency of the existing systems whilst ensuring high standards of food safety. As we have already stated, however (see paragraph 49), we would like to see the FSA assuming complete control of the surveillance schemes for pesticides and veterinary medicines, so that approvals and monitoring processes are carried out by different organisations.

86. The Agency will also provide information to the consumer on food intolerance (for example, allergens in foodstuffs) and will co-ordinate central and local government responses to hazards to human health from contaminated food, including the development of emergency plans to cover these contingencies. To ensure this critical function works smoothly and effectively, we believe that the FSA should establish an emergency unit, and that the proposed mechanisms for coordinating FSA and local authority emergency responses should be clarified as soon as possible and integrated with the food industry's own responsibility to manage food safety emergencies.

Nutrition and food standards

87. Chapter five of the White Paper focuses on the Agency's role in enforcing food standards and in defining dietary nutritional requirements. It proposes that the FSA has competence over foodstuffs labelling at wholesale and retail level, and that the Agency institutes a national surveillance programme to ensure that the stated composition of foodstuffs is adhered to by manufacturers and processors. On nutrition, the White Paper's proposals are less ambitious than those set out in the James Report. James noted that "Public interest groups indicate their very strong desire to have nutrition issues considered by the Agency"[198], and suggested that the FSA should draft nutrition legislation, develop policy and issue guidance to local authorities and consumers[199]. This role is diminished and restructured somewhat in the White Paper, which envisages the FSA having responsibility for the monitoring and surveillance of the nutrient content of foods, and the provision of advice to consumers on dietary issues, while the Department of Health retains its responsibility for the health and legislative aspects of nutrition policy. Shared responsibilities will include policy formulation and advice to Ministers, and surveillance of the nutritional status of the general public.

88. The White Paper notes that the FSA's nutrition remit provoked "...considerable comment..."[200] during the consultation process on the James Report. We noted a similar reaction in the written and oral evidence submitted to the Committee, with some witnesses strongly opposed and others firmly supportive of the FSA having a substantial role in formulating UK nutritional policy.

89. In his evidence to us, Professor James confessed that he had failed to recognise that the nutritional responsibilities of the FSA would be a controversial issue[201], but pointed out that globally ten times more ill health is attributable to the inappropriate nutritional quality of diet than to infection[202]. On this basis, he suggested that scaling down the FSA's nutritional remit might have grave consequences for the organisation's long-term success: "If it is downgraded, it will be a very severe setback...The Australian experience has shown that the Australian Agency, which did not specify nutrition as absolutely clearly within its orbit, has run into a major problem."[203] The British Medical Association, the Co-operative Union and Safeway were also of the opinion that the FSA must oversee nutritional issues. However, for other witnesses, including Marks and Spencer and the British Retail Consortium, nutrition was perceived as a secondary consideration for the FSA which might divert it from its overriding purpose of enforcing food hygiene standards. Other groups were more strongly opposed to the inclusion of nutrition in the FSA's remit. The Food and Drink Federation, Sainsbury's and the Farmers' Union of Wales all believed that taking on responsibilities for nutrition might be counterproductive for the FSA, and might undermine public confidence in the Agency by embroiling it in "possible dispute over the nutritional qualities of various foods"[204]. We were interested to hear from public interest groups in the USA concerned with food safety that they thought there were merits in excluding nutrition from the remit of such agencies. We favour the inclusion of aspects of nutrition policy within the remit of the FSA, although we are concerned about the lack of clarity within the White Paper about the division of responsibilities between the Agency and the Department of Health. Nutrition is not a second-order issue: poorly-balanced diets cause much greater damage to health than food poisoning, and over the long-term the Agency could achieve significantly more in its nutritional activities than in its food safety role.

Structure

90. The proposed organisational structure of the FSA is described in chapter six. In essence it is very similar to that articulated in Professor James's report, with the Agency having NPDB status, but with an expanded Commission of 12 persons drawn from "...a wider public interest background without any specific affiliation."[205] Whilst agreeing wholeheartedly with the notion of impartial and objective Commissioners, we find it highly unlikely that persons of the calibre required will be found without some 'specific affiliation' - whether it be derived from experience in local government, academic, corporate or other non-Governmental sectors. Indeed, the Commission's utilisation of collective experience gained in these different fields by individual Commissioners should be viewed as a strength rather than a weakness, providing the basis for the informed decisions which must be taken by a truly independent FSA. We note the insertion at this point in the White Paper of the phrase 'wider public interest background'. Professor James supported the broadening of the word "consumer", as contained in his report, to "public interest" on the grounds that "you do not get locked into the Consumers' Association, the National Consumer Council or the other 60 organisations which are intimately involved in this area"[206].

Financing

91. For several witnesses, the issue of financing the FSA was the most controversial aspect of the White Paper. In response to the Government's proposal that "the food industry should bear the bulk of the costs of improving food safety and standards"[207] through the introduction of charging through licensing arrangements, the Institute of Trading Standards Administration in their written evidence to the Committee commented that this recommendation was "the most critical and arguably the most contentious part"[208] of the White Paper, while Sainsbury's described the suggested licensing scheme as "most controversial" and "quite inappropriate".[209] Similarly, the Food and Drink Federation characterised the proposed licensing fee as "a levy placed upon the food industry", noting that "as a matter of principle...public health should be publicly funded"[210]. The Association of Port Health Authorities commented that "It would seem unreasonable to us that the food industry in the UK should pay the costs of enforcement of food standards, while local authorities continue to bear the costs of checking imported food"[211].

92. A range of arguments were advanced by the industry in support of these views, including the large amounts already being invested by manufacturers and retailers to provide the public with high standards of food safety; the uncertainty over the use to be made of monies raised by the FSA through charging for licensing; and the danger that payments made to the Agency from the food industry might be seen as compromising its independent status. Some non-industrial groups, including the Consumers' Association, concurred with this latter point, calling for the FSA to be wholly publicly-funded. We believe that the UK consumer is entitled to expect safe foodstuffs from the UK food industries, and we recognise that, whether or not the taxpayer or the industry contributes to the cost of ensuring this safety, ultimately members of the public will pay through taxes or higher food prices[212].

93. We are not in favour of the Government's proposed licensing fee as a mechanism for raising revenue for the Agency. It would, in effect, be a regressive tax as food is proportionately a larger item in the budgets of low-income households, and the costs would be passed on to consumers by industry. We believe that licensing should not be the subject of charges and should be selective, not universal. Where there is a recognized scientific need to control the risk of food contamination in particular retail and catering outlets, such as butchers' premises, licensing should be made obligatory, but other outlets should be exempted from this requirement. In our judgement, individual food businesses should only be charged for specific, identifiable activities or services, such as inspections, carried out by the FSA or local authority officers on the public's behalf. All other operating costs accruing to the Agency should be borne by the Government, as should the Agency's start-up costs. Food safety is a matter of public responsibility and should, therefore, be publicly-financed. Our approach has significant advantages over the Government's proposals, not least in ensuring tighter overall control of the FSA's expenditure, and more exacting supervision of the public service it offers, consequent on the Treasury's interest in accounting for public finances. There is a danger that any charging regime will discriminate against domestically-produced food and in favour of imports, damaging the competitiveness of the UK industry. Consideration should be given, consistent with EU legislation, to charging importers of food for the actual cost of food safety checks carried out at ports of entry.

186 Food Standards Agency: an interim proposal by Professor Philip James, p5 Back

187 ibid Back

188 ibid Back

189 ibid, p 18 Back

190 ibid, p 6 Back

191 ibid, p 5 Back

192 Cm. 3830, Foreword Back

193 ibid, para 3.2 Back

194 ibid, para 4.1 Back

195 Cm. 3830, para 4.27 Back

196 Q1051 Back

197 Q986 Back