House of Commons - Agriculture

Select Committee on Agriculture Fourth Report

III. THE FOOD STANDARDS AGENCY

International comparisons

94. Clearly, if implemented in their entirety, the White Paper's proposals will have radical implications for UK food standards and safety policies, not least in its creating an Agency with sweeping regulatory, enforcement and surveillance powers which can intervene at virtually all stages of the UK food chain. In this respect, the FSA can be compared with analogous organisational and institutional arrangements for administering food standards and safety policies introduced at the European Union (EU) level and in the USA. The example of Sweden was also cited to us by Professor James as a country which had successfully implemented a rigorous programme of food safety improvements[213], including the virtual elimination of Salmonella from the national chicken flock.

95. In the following paragraphs, we therefore compare briefly the EU and US experiences of food safety policies to provide a context for the Government's current proposals. However, at the outset we note the marked difference in social and cultural imperatives in other EU states and the US compared with the domestic situation in the UK. The administrative structures in the United States are also different from this country, making the US in certain respects more comparable with the European Union than with the UK. The US has an estimated 9,100 food poisoning deaths per year, a per capita mortality rate greater than the UK, and yet this has not generated the same political pressures as were produced by BSE in this country. However, we also heard that a food safety and nutrition consumer magazine had a mailing list of one million - reflecting a level of consumer concern which is not evident in this country. In the United States food manufacturers had been able to win acceptance in the market for a wide range of genetically-modified products, whereas GM products have had a slow entry into the market in the country. The deeply-ingrained public scepticism in this country about scientific advice, and about politicians interpreting this advice, coupled with the mistrust engendered by the BSE disaster, lead us to conclude that the FSA may have a more difficult task in dealing with public food safety concerns than equivalent bodies in other countries.

96. In the aftermath of the BSE debacle, and the allegations of a conflict of interest within Directorate-General (DG) VI over its mandate for both EU agriculture and food hygiene policies, the European Commission has recently restructured EU administrative and policy-making responsibilities for food safety. DGXXIV, the renamed Directorate-General for Consumer Policy and Consumer Health Protection, now leads EU policy in this area and will, significantly, have responsibility for developing an EU-wide regulatory regime in food safety within which the FSA will be legally obliged to operate.

97. By contrast, the US Federal Government has considerably more experience than the EU in the implementation and enforcement of food safety and standards legislation. Two Federal agencies have direct responsibility for these activities, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the US Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). Both organisations have legal competence for the enforcement of this legislation in all US states. However, the FDA has a much broader enforcement remit, covering food safety, medicines, cosmetics, pet food, veterinary products and radioactive substances. The FSIS shares the enforcement of food safety with the FDA, but with responsibility only for meat and poultry products. In addition, a third organisation, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), also part of USDA, has complementary responsibilities with the FDA for veterinary matters, as well as competences for animal welfare and the control of animal and plant disease outbreaks. The FDA and the USDA also have to co-ordinate their food safety activities with the state authorities across the country.

98. We were unimpressed by the degree of co-ordination between the various agencies in the US, particularly in their implementation of a joint strategy for the eradication of Salmonella from the US food chain. The situation was even more complex in relation to seafood. In this respect we concurred with Professor James's observation that, as a paradigm for the UK's own policies in this area, "the US model was not particularly appropriate, in fact the United States are now rethinking their whole system."[214] It is worth noting that the US's National Academy of Sciences is currently looking at the possibility of a centralised food standards agency like the one proposed for the UK.

99. However, our impressions of the US's FightBAC! campaign - launched by the recently formed Partnership for Food Safety Education (PFSE) - were altogether more favourable. Described as "...one of the most far-reaching and ambitious public education campaigns ever focused on safe food handling"[215], FightBAC! was launched by the Partnership in October 1997. The campaign uses well-established media techniques to inform consumers of basic sanitation and food handling techniques which can be used around the home to reduce the problem of contamination by food pathogens. The FightBAC! campaign highlights "Four Key Principles" of food hygiene - washing hands and kitchen work surfaces, preventing cross contamination of cooked and raw foods, cooking food at correct temperatures, and refrigerating chilled and frozen foods promptly. These principles have been imaginatively packaged and presented to different target groups in a variety of formats, including 30 second advertisements on national TV; on a dedicated internet website; in promotional literature; and through the extension activities of more than 50 national, state and local organisations. It is essential that the FSA should utilize modern communication and information techniques. It should also survey public opinion regularly to ensure its messages on food hygiene are getting across. Merely relying on low-key public information techniques, however well-informed and well-intentioned, will not be sufficient. In Professor James's words "simply...putting out [press notice number] 103 each Monday morning is a recipe for disaster."[216]

100. Reliable comparative data on food safety issues from other nations is in short supply. Collecting comparative international data will be an essential component of the Agency's work in constructing and furthering best practice in this country.

The White Paper's proposals: other issues

101. Virtually all witnesses to our inquiry were strongly in favour of the establishment of a Food Standards Agency along the lines proposed in the White Paper[217]. We also welcome the broad contours of the White Paper, especially in the willingness of the Government to engage positively with many of the complex food safety and public health issues raised by Professor James's report. Nonetheless, our attitude to the Government's proposals is motivated by one overriding concern: will the FSA provide a demonstrably better means of integrating food safety and consumer health considerations into UK policies than the existing institutional arrangements? We are hopeful that it will, but in our opinion there are a number of strategic issues and structural problems within the White Paper which must be overcome if the FSA is to succeed. We examine these issues in the following paragraphs. The approach which we have adopted is to ask ourselves "What could go wrong? What could undermine the success of the Agency?" In effect, we have adopted our own 'precautionary principle'.

Risk assessment

102. The public attitude to risk in food, as in all other aspects of life, is not uniform. Some sections of the population may have a greater willingness to accept risk than others. Most people, too, are more stringent in controlling risks to their children than for themselves. As one example of this, Food and Drug Administration officials told us that their warnings to the American public about the risks from E.coli O157 in eating rare hamburgers made little impact until the particular dangers for children were pointed out. Moreover, there will never be a complete absence of risk involved in eating food, whether from bacteriological food poisoning or more subtle long-term effects on health. Food safety policy is a continual series of judgements about levels of risk and about the desirability of actions to reduce risk. Such judgements can never be wholly objective or final. The question for the Food Standards Agency is whether it will nevertheless be able to rationalise food safety policy in relation to risk in such a way as to command broad public acceptance.

103. The Government's White Paper states that the essential aim of the Food Standards Agency "is the protection of public health in relation to food"[218]. Another of the Agency's guiding principles is that it will "make decisions and take action on the basis that [its] decisions and actions should be proportionate to the risk; pay due regard to costs as well as benefits to those affected by them; and avoid over-regulation"[219]. Some expressed disppointment that the so-called 'precautionary principle', which calls for action to be taken against the possibility of risks emerging which may not be apparent from existing scientific knowledge, had not been enshrined in the Agency's guiding principles. Dr Cunningham told us categorically that the Agency "should and... will proceed on [the] basis [of the precautionary principle], as I do myself"[220]. If so, then we believe it should be explicitly stated in the Agency's guiding principles, which is not the case in the White Paper. In any case, we consider that as soon as the Agency departs from the principle of taking decisions which are "proportionate to the risk" it will find itself in very deep waters, not just within the UK but within the context of the EU and international trade. EU member states which are opposed to the lifting of the export ban on British beef argue that they are adopting a 'precautionary principle' to ensure the health of their consumers, however vehemently the validity of this stance has been challenged, rightly in our judgement, by the present UK Government and its predecessor.

104. While we understand why the precautionary principle towards risk is advocated for the new Agency, we stress again that this does not mean that there can ever be no risk associated with the consumption of food. This is a very important message which needs to be conveyed to the public, not least because any implication that risk has been, or is likely to be, eliminated may unintentionally cause consumers' sensitivity to food safety to be blunted. One of the models for the structure of the Food Standards Agency is the Health and Safety Commission/Executive, and the HSE provided us with evidence demonstrating the degree of sophistication which is required in providing a risk assessment framework for decision-making[221]. One of the first tasks for the Food Standards Agency will be to draw up and publish the risk assessment criteria under which it will operate. We recommend that it consults widely on these criteria before they are adopted. A clear definition of the respective responsibilities of the Government, the food industry and the individual consumer in addressing risk is also required.

Priorities

105. The Agency will have an awesome range of food safety and standards responsibilities. As indicated throughout this Report, in the field of microbiological food safety alone there is a multitude of tasks which the Agency will either have to co-ordinate or undertake itself. Perhaps wisely the Government has made no attempt to prioritise the importance of one work area over others. In his evidence to us, Dr Cunningham noted merely that the Agency was likely to prioritise those parts of the UK food chain posing the "biggest risks" to public health and would ratchet up enforcement procedures on businesses with the "poorest [food hygiene] standards."[222] In order to prevent inundating the Agency with enforcement and policy responsibilities at a very early stage, we consider some form of prioritisation of Agency duties to be not only helpful, but essential. The Agency will need to draw up a clear work programme, prioritising its various areas of responsibility, in response to particular public concerns, scientific priorities, risk assessments, and its capacity actually to effect improvements in food safety, standards and nutrition.

Targets

106. Among witnesses, it was widely recognised that one of the most effective mechanisms for progressing food standards and safety policy, while simultaneously increasing public confidence in the FSA, would be for the Agency to operate in accordance with targets relating to its policy-making and enforcement activities.[223] Targets for the Agency's Executive, covering its operational and executive responsibilities and its financial and administrative efficiency, should be decided by Ministers in consultation with the Agency's Commission. We believe such a system is both feasible and necessary for the FSA; indeed, it provides the mechanism for achieving Professor James's stated goal of restoring over a three year period public confidence in UK food safety and food technologies[224]. Failure to meet these targets on the part of the Agency should not necessarily be met by an increase in financial resources available to it. Indeed, we are concerned to make sure that the creation of the Agency does not lead to a large increase in public expenditure, and would on the contrary hope that the Agency would be able to generate efficiency savings in existing programmes over time.

107. In his evidence to us, Dr Cunningham acknowledged that targeting was at the forefront of his own thinking: "Just let me give you some idea of the sorts of things we have been thinking about in this area of targets. Measures which show how effectively the Agency is achieving its aim of protecting the public health could be, for example, a reduction in the incidence of Salmonella in poultry, an increase in the number of businesses introducing HACCP, an increase in hygiene assessment scores at meat plants, abattoirs and meat cutting plants, driving up standards there. Other measures, the percentage of local authorities audited annually by the Agency, could be an important bench mark of how it is getting to grips with its responsibilities. Customer service indicators, such as the length of time to answer correspondence. There is a whole range of possible targets."[225]

108. The ultimate aim of the introduction of the Food Standards Agency will be to achieve a reduction in the incidence of foodborne illnesses, but we are concerned that increased awareness of the issue as the Agency is established, and initial improvements by the FSA in the levels of reporting of illness might lead to an apparent rise in incidence, because of the unreliability of existing data sets. Some of the FSA's initial targets must relate to improving the reporting of foodborne pathogen outbreaks and reducing levels of microbiological contamination of foodstuffs. Once the full extent of the national food poisoning problem is known, the FSA can then initiate concerted action, with other Government Departments as appropriate, to monitor and reduce the levels of incidence of human food poisoning across the UK, but it would be wrong to judge the success or failure of the Agency by trends in reported foodborne illnesses, during its first three years. Targets relating to nutrition and health will inevitably be more long-term and imprecise, given the range of other factors, apart from food, affecting public health, the lack of clear causal links between diet and health in many instances, and the policy responsibilities of other bodies apart from the FSA, including the Department of Health itself, in these matters.

109. The Agency has two real objectives - to increase food safety and public confidence in food. The 'hard' targets should therefore be supplemented by a range of 'soft' policy targets, such as separate initiatives to increase public awareness and confidence in food hygiene and other indicators along the lines of those envisaged by Dr Cunningham. The FSA should verify its success in achieving these 'soft' targets through regular surveying and monitoring of public attitudes. Such surveys could also be used to assess the public's opinion of the administration and delivery of the FSA's new food hygiene policies.

Political accountability

110. There seems to be a belief in some quarters that the Agency, through its operations, will be able, to some extent, to 'depoliticize' the issues of food safety and standards in the UK and to create thereby a consensus on food safety policy which will be immune to political 'interference'. Proponents of the Agency consider this to be one of its main strengths. Professor James himself was somewhat disparaging about the political process, talking of the "political fray" and the "quirk of [ministerial] succession"[226]. We consider such views to be naive and wrong-headed. The Agency's activities will have an immense impact on food producers and consumer alike, and it cannot expect to escape full political scrutiny and questioning of its decisions. This scrutiny will inevitably encompass the Agency's work programmes and the targets set for it.

111. Uniquely amongst Government Agencies, as far as we are aware, in instances when the Government decides not to act on the advice of the Food Standards Agency, the Agency will be able to publish its advice independently and, in effect, argue its case in public, forcing the Government to justify its decision not accept it. This proposal, originating in the James Report, is described in the Government's White Paper as a freedom which "will provide a powerful guarantee of the Agency's independence and will enable it to exercise considerable influence"[227]. Supporters of this power tend to assume that the public will tend to rally to the side of the Agency, but this is not, in our view, a safe assumption. This power may prove to be a double-edged sword for the Agency. In some circumstances it may be necessary for Ministers to adopt less stringent measures than the Agency advises; in other circumstances Minister may wish to be more stringent. There are fine political and economic judgements to be made, for example, about issues such as banning the sale of unpasteurised milk and cheeses made from such milk. Likewise, an Agency basing its decisions on proportionality to risk, and not on wider political considerations relating to the European Union, might well disagree with the precautionary approach adopted recently by the Government in banning the sale of beef on the bone. There will also be difficult judgements on the extent of the burdens imposed on domestic producers vis-à-vis importers. These are all issues of legitimate political and parliamentary concern.

112. We agree with the proposals in the White Paper that the Agency should be accountable to Parliament through the Secretary of State for Health, and that it should "produce an Annual Report, Corporate Plan and Business Plan" and "be subject to an annual accountability review and a more fundamental quinquennial review"[228]. The White Paper further states that "The Chairperson of the Commission might be invited to give evidence to Parliamentary Select Committees. The Chief Executive would be the Agency's Accounting Officer. It would be for Parliament itself to consider Professor James's suggestion that a Select Committee on Food should be established to monitor the Agency's activities"[229]. In evidence to us Professor James refined his thoughts to propose joint meetings of existing select committees to take evidence from the Agency on its activities. We consider this suggestion to be more appropriate than the creation of a new Food Select Committee. The Agency would then also be accountable to individual select committees, principally ourselves and the Health Committee. While we recognize that select committees have the freedom to determine their own subjects of inquiry, we consider that the departmental select committee system would be failing in its responsibilities if the Chairperson of the Commission and the Chief Executive were not called at least once a year to give evidence, at a Committee meeting, on the Agency's Annual Report and Accounts. We also recommend that a full day's debate should take place each year on the floor of the House on a motion to take note of the Agency's Report and Accounts, and any related reports by departmental select committees and the Committee of Public Accounts. Taking evidence from the Chairperson of the Commission on his or her appointment is also something which we would wish to consider seriously, in consultation with our colleagues on the Health Committee.

Enforcement and inspection powers

113. Tightening up the enforcement of existing food hygiene standards will be a vital component of the Agency's work. Many witnesses cited the Agency's enforcement duties as of paramount importance, specifically noting the necessity for the FSA to ensure that local authorities enforce legislation consistently in all parts of the UK. This point was emphasised to us in oral evidence from the British Meat Manufacturers' Association: "it is control and enforcement that is the problem. There is a huge variance across the country in the way that is carried out. That is the biggest impact the FSA is going to have on food safety."[230] Similar comments were made by representatives from the Chilled Food Association.[231]

114. The extent to which the FSA itself should undertake an inspection and enforcement role, and the extent to which such responsibilities should remain primarily with local authorities, have been subjects of substantial interest both in our own inquiry and in the wider debate about the proposals to establish an Agency. Arguments in favour of a centralisation of enforcement activities under the FSA include the variability of resources deployed by different local authorities, and the relatively successful precedent of the establishment of the Meat Hygiene Service in 1995 to take over from local authorities the responsibility for meat hygiene inspections in slaughterhouses and cutting plants. Others argued that the existing enforcement system made an important contribution to local democracy[232]: LACOTS and the Local Government Association, for example, said that local authorities were "closer and sensitive to local public views, complaints and pressures"[233]. However, we note that the democratic framework does not necessarily promote better standards of food hygiene enforcement.

115. The White Paper squares this circle by leaving the principal responsibility for food law enforcement with local authorities, while proposing powers for the Agency to enable it to improve the effectiveness of enforcement by "firmer co-ordination and oversight"[234]. The Government is considering the introduction of powers for the Agency to "exercise real influence over individual local authorities' activities"[235]. These might include powers to issue directions to local authorities or to take over enforcement activity from an authority, or re-assign its work, in the case of deficiencies.

116. Clearly some local authorities are consistently failing to enforce food hygiene standards. Equally however there are exceptional authorities who, in Dr Cunningham's words, fulfil these responsibilities "excellently, expeditiously and punctiliously"[236]. If a new system of food hygiene inspection were being established de novo it would not necessarily be logical for it to be the responsibility of local authorities. However, upheaval would be caused by taking these functions away from local authorities. We recommend that the Government explore the possibility of the Agency having contracts with local agencies for the delivery of food hygiene enforcement functions. These contracts would include detailed specifications and targets for work to encourage standardisation of enforcement across the country and to ensure that there were adequate resources for the work. They would normally be placed with local authorities, for delivery through their Environmental Health Departments. However, in some instances, the contracts might be placed with other agencies. Whilst the FSA headquarters would be responsible for drawing up and awarding the contracts, it is possible that the monitoring of the contracts would be better done at local or regional level to achieve the level of co-operation and partnership needed to both deliver the service and drive up standards. With this in mind we recommend that at least one member of the FSA's Commission should have extensive knowledge of local authority enforcement of food legislation; and that a specialist division be set up within the FSA's Executive to oversee the contractual process, staffed by personnel with extensive knowledge of local authority food safety functions and procedures. This division should also ensure that the FSA has the capacity, in cases of emergency, to assume direct control over enforcement acitivities.

The dangers of over-regulation

117. It is conceivable that in certain circumstances legislation proposed by the Agency, or food hygiene standards enforced by it, might have serious negative financial consequences for small and medium enterprises which play a significant contribution in maintaining the variety and vibrancy of rural economies across the UK. We would not wish to see as one of the Agency's first 'achievements' an increase in the rate of bankruptcies among such businesses, and the consequent disappearance of the producers of traditional foodstuffs that contribute so much to the culinary diversity of the British regions. However, neither would we wish to see this argument used to compromise the process of driving up food hygiene standards across the industry. Hence as a matter of priority we believe the Government, and subsequently the Agency, should give sympathetic consideration to the possibility of introducing derogations from certain legislative requirements for specific types of small producers and retailers offering exemplary levels of food safety, but whose business livelihoods may be threatened by increased administrative costs consequent on greater regulation.

Leadership

118. It is impossible to overstate the importance of appointing the right individuals to the Commission, and to the post of Chief Executive. This is particularly relevant, bearing in mind the sourcing of much of the FSA staff initially from MAFF and the need for the Agency to acquire rapidly a new open and trustworthy ethos. We believe that the key criterion for successful leadership will be the Agency's credibility with the consumer. In particular, the Chief Executive will need to demonstrate considerable experience of serving and working for consumers; communication skills of the highest order; a vigorous target-driven approach to the solution of complex problems; and experience of managing a high-profile national organisation. Public advertisement of key posts is essential, and the Chairperson of the Commission and the Chief Executive must be able to command the confidence of consumers without alienating producers. They will both need to be outstanding communicators. In particular, they will need to demonstrate considerable experience of serving and working for consumers; a rigorous target-driven approach to the solution of complex problems; and experience of managing a high-profile national organisation. These "paragons of virtue", in Dr Cunningham's phrase[237], will also need to carry authority within the scientific community (though they would not need to be scientists themselves). If it is not possible to identify individuals of sufficient calibre, the formal launch of this Agency should be delayed. A poorly-led Agency would be worse than no Agency at all.

Crisis management

119. In the short term at least, the existence of a Food Standards Agency will not of itself diminish the likelihood of food crises or scares arising. The success of the Agency in establishing credibility will probably hinge on its ability to handle the first crisis it encounters. A clear crisis management plan is required, establishing a procedure for dealing with the public and the key elements of the food chain. The Agency must clearly demonstrate that it is more effective at dealing with crises than MAFF has been in the past.

Openness

120. Over the course of this inquiry, we heard from many witnesses about the need for the FSA to be open in all its activities, transparent in its decision-making, and accountable to the public as well as to Parliament[238]. In particular we noted that this was an issue of great importance to academics and consumer groups, possibly because of "the secrecy which surrounded the decision making" of MAFF in the past[239]. The creation of the FSA provides an opportunity to break with these traditions. The activities of the Agency and its advisory committees must take place in the open sunshine of public scrutiny and accountability. We look to the Agency to reach its decisions by open processes and to develop imaginative ways of ensuring its accountability and openness to the general public at both national and local level.

Consumer representation and input

121. A stated aim of the FSA is that it will "deal...with a...wide range of interest groups...most importantly, consumers"[240]. However, despite the fact that a majority of the Agency's Commissioners will "come from a wider public interest background without any specific affiliation"[241] we are not convinced that adequate mechanisms exist in the present proposals either to consult with consumers or to bring the consumer viewpoint to the heart of the FSA's decision-making. Our feeling is that only by introducing these mechanisms into the FSA's organisational structure will the Agency be in a position to engender a universal sense of consumer trust. In our inquiry we found that the lack of a national, dedicated and effective consumer voice in food safety was a problem. Our view is that this shortcoming should be remedied by the Government through additional provisions, both within the FSA itself and in the wider public and policy environments. At the national level, the Agency should use surveys, focus groups and market research to ascertain issues of consumer concern. We recommend that a Consumer's Committee, representative of the broad range of consumer interests, be established to advise the FSA's Executive and Commission on general issues; that a specialist Consumer Commissioner be appointed to the FSA to represent the consumer's interests directly in a similar way to the three Territorial Commissioners representing Northern Irish, Scottish, and Welsh interests; and that local or regional consumer panels, run by local authorities, should be established to provide a consumer viewpoint on local and regional issues relating to food safety and standards. We consider that the FSA should itself finance this consumer role to allow consumer panels to conduct their own research on the effectiveness of the Agency and its staff.

Conclusion

122. In this Report we have analysed the safety of food, particularly in terms of microbiological contamination, and looked at some of the main issues surrounding the Government's proposals for a Food Standards Agency. Our view is that an adequately resourced and structured Agency will make a significant impact on the safety of food in this country, and in public perceptions about the safety of food. The single greatest advance in food safety policy will be the Agency's ability to oversee the entire length of the food chain, fully integrating veterinary and public health concerns in a way which has not proved possible under the existing institutional arrangements. However, any over-optimistic expectations that the Agency will achieve success immediately are bound to be disappointed. Food safety crises will still occur, and the Agency will not be able to pursue its activities untroubled by political debate and criticism. Provided that the Agency recognizes this, bases its decisions on clear and scientifically-founded evidence, and fosters public confidence and participation in its operations without alienating food producers and processors, it should be able to cope with these demands and place food safety and standards policy on a surer basis for the next century.

213 Qq 1348-9 Back

214 Q1348 Back

215 "New Safe Food Handling Campaign Urges Americans to 'FightBAC!' " News Release, Partnership for Food Safety Education, 24/10/97, Washington D.C. Back

216 Q1386 Back

217 One exception was the Provision Trade Association; see Appendix 74 Back

218 Cm. 3830 p 5 Back

219 ibid Back

220 Q 1541 Back

221 Appendix 83 Back

222 Q1562 Back