Select Committee on Agriculture Sixth Report


III. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH FLOOD AND COASTAL DEFENCE POLICIES

Fragmentation of policy responsibility

Overlapping roles and responsibilities of operating authorities, and resulting public confusion

61. At the outset of our inquiry, we were nonplussed by the number of organisations in England and Wales with flood and/or coastal defence responsibilities, so it came as little surprise to us that there is bewilderment among the general public over the precise roles and functions of each. We were told about the "confusion in the minds of the public"[73] over the identity of responsible agencies for flood and coastal defence, and the system was described as "over complex and difficult for the public to understand"[74], although the National Farmers' Union maintained that only "at face value" did the national administrative structure appear "complex"[75].

62. The existing organisational arrangements for flood and coastal defence are the product of relatively self-contained items of legislation (see paragraphs 16 and 17), formulated at a time when socio-economic and political needs were different from those of the late 1990s, and, arguably more important, when scientific understanding of the interrelationship between natural cycles of erosion and deposition, both in river catchments and at the coast, was far more rudimentary than it is today. For example, the Environment Agency has responsibilities to maintain flood defences on designated 'main rivers', while local authorities have duties for all other watercourses (other than those in IDB districts), even though we were told that often they do not have "the skills and resources needed to manage the rivers for which they are responsible"[76].

63. We are concerned that the lack of public clarity over organisational responsibilities may have serious negative impacts on the delivery of vital services in times of emergency. For example, the Environment Agency's first public awareness survey in flood risk areas revealed that under a third of those approached were aware of the Agency's responsibilities[77], while during our visit to the Agency's offices at Orton Goldhay we were told that routinely a lot of time was spent redirecting public inquiries from the Agency to the relevant organisation concerned.

64. A similar situation exists in respect of responsibility for coast defence. As we have pointed out, under the provisions of the Coast Protection Act 1949, maritime local authorities and private owners have permissive powers for coast protection, while the Environment Agency has permissive powers under the Water Resources Act 1991 to prevent flooding from the sea, notwithstanding these coastal processes being inextricably bound together. The result is overlapping responsibilities for coast defences. Of the 1019 kilometres of defences around the English coast, 693 kilometres are maintained by the Environment Agency, 169 kilometres by maritime local authorities and 157 kilometres remain in private ownership[78].

65. The effects of the seemingly arbitrary division of coast defence responsibilities between local authorities and the Environment Agency were graphically demonstrated to us in our visit to the Norfolk coast. On the east coast along a 14 kilometre frontage between Happisburgh and Winterton, the Agency has provided sea defence for the Norfolk Broads behind this low-lying section of coast by constructing a broken line of offshore reefs composed of massive blocks of stone, supplemented by nourishment of the supporting beaches. As well as reducing the risk of inundation, these sea defences have altered the pattern of erosion along the coast, alleviating some of the ravages of rapid erosion.

66. However, at Happisburgh, responsibility for coast defence is assumed by North Norfolk District Council. The juxtaposition in policy approaches could not be more emphatic. Coast defences failed here in 1992, and were deemed not capable of repair. The cliff face is now rapidly eroding, with average losses of 7.5 metres a year; low property values have prevented proposed defence schemes from qualifying for MAFF grant-in-aid under PAGN.

67. Many witnesses drew attention to the need for a more coherent approach to the provision of sea defence and coast protection[79], with the Country Landowners' Association stating "an integrated approach" to these responsibilities was "essential"[80], and the Institution of Civil Engineers recommending that the current legislative provisions "need...to be looked at" with a view to unifying these responsibilities[81]. We agree. In our opinion, the Government should rationalise the legislative base of flood and coastal defence policy in England and Wales as soon as possible, with, among other aims, the ending of the artificial distinction between sea defence and coast protection responsibilities. We recommend that coastal groups take responsibility for coastal flooding and erosion (see paragraph 77). Similarly, the logical basis for dividing responsibilities for main river and non-main river flood defence between the Environment Agency and local authorities should be re-evaluated by the Ministry. We recommend that the RFDCs take on responsibilities for flood defence activities on non-main rivers currently undertaken by local authorities and riparian owners.

National strategy, local level implementation

68. While we are firmly convinced of the need for accountability and involvement at every administrative level in the formulation and implementation of flood and coastal defence policy, we are mindful that the involvement of so many organisations in this policy area may have led to the gap, observed by witnesses, between national policy pronouncements and local level implementation. English Nature spoke guardedly of failure "in the translation of agreed national policy into practical action"[82]; more bluntly, the Wildlife Trusts/WWF-UK told us that "The approaches employed at a local level are increasingly disparate from the thrust of national policy. The local...decision-making machinery is apparently dampening national policy implementation...The effect in many cases, five years after considerable improvements in policy, is business as usual"[83].

69. It is all too apparent that much local level decision-making is driven by short-term economic circumstance and localised priorities[84], rather than the long-term sustainable approach the Government is seeking. Ms Sue Collins, Policy Director for English Nature, commented to us that "the strategy developed by MAFF over the last five or so years...has been a very good policy lead but we are very much in touch with local practice and we know that the culture...of looking at a narrow bit of the proposed coastline because your democratic framework for solutions is the local authority strip, militates against this holistic and long term perspective..."[85].

70. It is clear to us that this culture will only be overcome if the Ministry adopts a more dirigiste role in guiding the efforts of operating authorities, whilst continuing to develop its innovative approach of recent years. In our opinion MAFF, collaborating with the Environment Agency, must strive to implement its national strategy in a more dynamic and proactive way than it has done over the last six years. We recommend that MAFF and the Environment Agency, as appropriate, provide clearer guidelines for RFDCs and coastal groups to ensure that, while local needs are respected, the regional targets set through SMPs at the coast, or Local Environment Agency Plans (LEAPs) inland, also advance relevant national strategic requirements. These guidelines should be updated in the light of the latest scientific research, and be monitored by MAFF or the EA at regular yearly or biennial intervals to ensure that they are being observed. Not only would this prioritise policy objectives and refine organisational roles and responsibilities; Ernst and Young stated to us that financial benefits might also be derived from a policy which takes "a wider view of...overall flood defence needs and priorities[86]" than is currently the case. We have a national flood and coastal strategy in principle, but not in practice. More must be done by the Ministry to ensure operating authorities translate national strategic priorities into positive action on the ground.

Institutional change

71. Taken together, these funding, strategic and administrative issues prompted some witnesses to call for sweeping change in the national institutional framework of flood and coastal defence policy[87]. As we have mentioned already, we are less convinced of the merits of such an approach. However, we believe that there is scope within the present administrative structure for rationalisation of the number of institutions delivering policy at the local level. The activities of RFDCs, LFDCs and IDBs are all supervised already by regional staff of the Environment Agency, and we heard evidence on the performance of these organisations which was, by turns, both highly praiseworthy and extremely critical.

72. Some witnesses - particularly those closely involved with RFDCs and LFDCs - claimed there was no need for any change in the operation of Flood Defence Committees[88]. Others suggested that these Committees, in particular LFDCs, did not reflect the breadth of local community interests[89] and failed to address adequately the Government's national flood and coastal defence priorities[90], and believed that they should be divested of their executive powers and given advisory responsibilities instead[91]. A similar, variable, picture emerged for the overall national performance of IDBs, with groups including the Association of Drainage Authorities, the Central Association of Agricultural Valuers and the National Farmers' Union commending their activities[92], while stern criticism came from other quarters, including proposals for the abolition of all IDBs[93].

73. It is, of course, impossible for us to make an authoritative pronouncement on the fate of individual institutions: some appear to be performing excellently, others, according to the Wildlife Trusts and WWF-UK are "very, very heavily steered [with]...the benefits [of local level policy decisions] accruing to private landowners"[94]. Some general points emerged, however, from evidence on the operation of Flood Defence Committees. While the strength of these Committees lies in their ability to address local concerns directly, with activities financed through their local precepting powers, there is a danger that this admirable self-reliance can develop into parochialism - a tendency noted among certain LFDCs especially[95], where agricultural interests can become dominant[96]. Nonetheless we do accept the National Farmers' Union's comment that there is "a fine line" between adequately representing local community interest on LFDCs and their "being parochial"[97], and that in the past the consent and support of the farming community has been instrumental in securing an effective national flood defence policy, for example by granting access to farm land to facilitate the maintenance of flood defences.

74. We also heard evidence that the administrative boundaries of some Flood Defence Committees may not coincide with the Environment Agency's own regional boundaries, leading to omissions or duplication in national policy delivery[98]. The Agency's own view was that there were inconsistencies from region to region in the inherited provision of FDCs, and that the present arrangement was "inconsistent and may not be an efficient use of resources. Clearly, this could be addressed by some rationalisation"[99]. This comment was echoed in evidence to us from the Independent Review Team into the Easter Floods[100].

75. It is clear that the implementation of flood and coastal defence policy presents substantial problems in attempting to address the often catastrophic consequences of naturally-occurring coastal and fluvial processes through an administrative system which takes no account of the scale of operation of these effects. Both inland and at the coast, the scope of local authority responsibilities seldom coincides with the vagaries of accretion and erosion, often greatly exacerbating the potential risks posed to people and property. With this in mind, we propose a reorganisation of institutional and administrative responsibilities for flood and coastal defence which we urge the Government to consult upon with relevant parties. We describe these changes in the following paragraphs and summarize them in diagrammatic form in paragraph 95.

76. It is evident to us that some LFDCs and IDBs execute their duties in an effective and expeditious manner. Nonetheless, we are firmly convinced that the functions of these bodies would be more appropriately discharged by RFDCs, which should be responsible for the delivery of all inland flood defence policy nationally working under the guidance and supervision of the Environment Agency. The decision on how policy should be implemented in particular regions - for example, by bodies represented within the RFDC, or by letting contracts - would be the responsibility of the relevant Committee in consultation with the Environment Agency and, where appropriate, Regional Development Agencies. This does not necessarily imply the abolition of IDBs, although the decision whether or not to devolve duties relating to the implementation of inland flood defence policy would rest with the appropriate RFDC. As we make clear in paragraph 95, they would remain in existence and would retain, at the very least, an important consultative role. We believe a higher proportion of RFDC funding should be provided from central Government, which need not necessarily involve higher expenditure: indeed, it might provide some savings though reducing the convoluted bureaucracy of the current financing system. An element of local level funding should, in our view, be retained for permissive projects agreed by the RFDC. Membership of RFDCs should be vetted to ensure they fully reflect stakeholder interests and that the levels of democratic accountability offered by the existing administrative arrangements are not in any way compromised.

77. At the coast, we believe that there is, if anything a stronger need for regional policy delivery to take account of the ceaseless natural cycle of deposition and erosion. We therefore advocate conferring formal powers on coastal groups to assume the responsibilities and resources of constituent local authorities for coastal defence, and the sea defence duties presently undertaken by RFDCs and LFDCs. As in the case of RFDCs, these new responsibilities would be supervised by the Environment Agency. Both sets of proposals would grant greater strategic responsibility to the regional level, while ensuring local level accountability is still strongly represented. While our model still falls short of a perfect system, we are convinced that it represents a major improvement on existing arrangements and would ensure that policy effectiveness and efficiency is advanced with the least possible diminution of local political accountability, while ensuring the institutional structure more closely represents the natural processes with which it deals.

78. A recurring theme in our evidence sessions was the possible policy benefits which might arise from the introduction of a single national agency with responsibility for all aspects of flood and coastal defence. A variety of arguments were advanced on this topic by witnesses, but, for us, the most important centred on weighing the likely potential benefits of such an agency in terms of improving the efficiency and/or effectiveness of national policy delivery[101], against any reduction in democratic accountability offered by the new institution compared with that under the current administrative framework[102]. In this context, the Wildlife Trusts/WWF-UK and the National Association of Flood Defence Chairmen recommended that the Environment Agency take on the mantle of the responsible national agency[103]. After being initially reticent to us on this subject[104], in a subsequent written memorandum the Agency noted its willingness to take on these powers, providing the extra resource implications of its new role were recognised by MAFF[105].

79. Clearly the arguments for and against the introduction of a single national agency create a difficult institutional knot to untie. We are in complete agreement with English Nature's assessment that any proposal for " ...a new...institution...needs very careful thought"[106] to ensure that the advantages of the present system are not compromised or lost in any way. We are aware, of course, that the Ministry has already carried out preliminary work on this subject as part of its input to the Comprehensive Spending Review. On balance however, we think it inappropriate to introduce a single agency with sole responsibility for policy in this area, taking into account the Government's plans for enhancing decision-making responsibility at the regional level and the implications that this will have for the delivery of flood and coastal defence. Our general view is that, with the appropriate mechanisms to ensure local level accountability, flood defence responsibilities should instead be enhanced at the regional level and through the Environment Agency assuming new powers, for example to discourage inappropriate property development on land liable to flooding.


73   Appendix 7; also Ev p 6 Back

74   Appendix 41 Back

75   Ev p 144 Back

76   Ev p 177; Qq 495-496 Back

77   Q28 Back

78   Ev p6 Back

79   Ev p 87; Ev p 116; Appendix 8 Back

80   Appendix 26 Back

81   Q 491 Back

82   Ev p 157 Back

83   Ev p 111; Ev p 115 Back

84   Appendix 8 Back

85   Q 432 Back

86   Appendix 20 Back

87   Appendix 8; Ev p 117 Back

88   See for example Ev p 144; Appendix 11 Back

89   Appendix 16 Back

90   Ev p 158 Back

91   Ev p 109 Back

92   See for example Ev p 37, Ev p 144; Ev p 180 Back

93   Appendix 4; Appendix 16; Appendix 45 Back

94   Q 318 Back

95   Q 321 Back

96   Q 326 Back

97   Q 414 Back

98   Appendix 8 Back

99   Appendix 43 Back

100   Appendix 41 Back

101   See for example Appendix 20; Q 433  Back

102   An argument advanced by virtually all local authorities; for example see Appendix 9; Appendix 13; Appendix 28 Back

103   Appendix 11; Q 352 Back

104   Q 9 Back

105   Appendix 43 Back

106   Q 440 Back


 
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