Select Committee on Agriculture Sixth Report


III. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH FLOOD AND COASTAL DEFENCE POLICIES

The Easter floods

Introduction

107. After we began our inquiry, over the Easter period the English Midlands experienced one of the most significant flood events recorded this century. We deemed that the terms of reference established for our inquiry were sufficiently broad to permit coverage of these events in written and oral evidence should witnesses so wish, but otherwise did not seek to prioritise examination of this matter in our evidence taking. In the event, two specialist reviews were set up with the sole purpose of investigating the causes and consequences of the Easter floods[167]. Our comments in the following paragraphs are therefore not intended to be definitive, and largely derive from written evidence to the Committee from the Environment Agency, preliminary findings from the Independent Review Team into the Easter floods, and meetings held with local authority staff, the Environment Agency and residents' groups from Northampton at the Environment Agency's regional headquarters in Peterborough.

Causes and effects of the Easter floods

108. On 8 and 9 April 1998, a slow-moving depression gave rise to torrential rain over eastern Wales and the central region of England. The consequences were exacerbated by the blocking effects of an anticyclone centred over Scandinavia, causing the rain-bearing air mass to remain virtually stationary over the central Midlands for almost two days, and leading to many affected areas recording rainfall totals in excess of 75 millimetres over a 36 hour period - roughly equal to 6 weeks of average April rainfall in one and a half days[168]. The already saturated nature of some catchments worsened the impacts[169], leading to excessive surface runoff in upper reaches and widespread flooding further downstream. Over 4,200 properties were affected in England and Wales, chiefly as a result of the level of flood waters overtopping the design specification of existing flood defences installed; many of these defences were built to withstand floods with a 1 in 100, or a 1 in 150 year return period[170]. In Northampton alone, over 2,000 properties were flooded, 2 people died and 150 people treated in hospital for hypothermia and injuries sustained through flooding. The Environment Agency believed that there were serious deficiencies in the Meteorological Office forecast made to its regional control centres, commenting in particular that the forecast on 8 April "grossly underestimated the actual rainfall"[171] received.

109. The appalling damage to property and distress caused to people in Northampton, Evesham and other parts of central England during the Easter floods have a number of direct and indirect causes, including the highly intense and unusual rainfall pattern and difficulties in predicting its consequences and alerting residents. We have no intention of indulging in recriminations or in prejudging the outcome of the inquiry by the Easter Floods Review Team. The Team has supplied us with a memorandum focusing on the national arrangements for flood defence, which states that the "complicated, confusing for the public and regionally varying arrangements ... are ... not conducive to the provision and operation of flood warning and defence in a manner maximising efficiency and effectiveness"[172]. We have reached very similar conclusions in our inquiry and our recommendations for organisational change, some of which are similar to suggestions made by the Review Team[173], should improve that overall situation. When it comes to the more precise reasons for the problems encountered in various places during the Easter floods, four points stand out for us which are set out in the following paragraphs.

Difficulties in predicting floods

110. We were informed during our visit to Peterborough that Meteorological Office forecasts seriously underestimated the rainfall levels on April 9. Weather forecasting is an imprecise science, and small variations in intensity, duration and location of rainfall can have major effects on the likelihood of flooding: it is for this reason that the Environment Agency ultimately relies on telemetry equipment measuring water levels in rivers in deciding on whether to issue flood warnings. We express the hope that the Meteorological Office will always have access to the resources necessary to improve its forecasting techniques in line with best international practice. If flood warnings are not to be devalued, it is crucial that they are issued in a prudent and timely way, and only when there is a strong likelihood that floods will occur. Obtaining the evidence to establish this likelihood depends on a number of factors including the accuracy of weather forecasts, but we accept that, for the foreseeable future, it will remain considerably easier to predict storm tides than often highly localised inland rainfall.

Environment Agency's flood defence priorities

111. In its report to MAFF providing a preliminary assessment of the aftermath of the Easter floods and the effectiveness of the warning systems in place, the Environment Agency notes that "It will never be possible to eliminate all flood risks and the Agency aims to issue flood warnings in areas of greatest risk"[174]. Consequently, after taking over lead responsibility for the dissemination of flood warnings from the police in 1996, the Agency gave priority to improving the existing service, rather than to extending flood warning coverage to areas which had no pre-existing flood warning system. The consequences have been that some areas of the country at moderate rather than high risk of flooding are still not covered by a comprehensive flood warning system, other than on a "best endeavours" basis[175]. But it is precisely these regions which are worst affected when a catastrophic flood event, such as that experienced at Easter, befalls the country. We are aware that the Agency is dependent on the willingness of its RFDCs and LFDCs to provide extra funding in order to extend flood warning coverage, and that raising this funding has proved problematic in the past[176]. However, with the extra finance which is expected to be made available for flood warning following the Comprehensive Spending Review, we urge the Environment Agency to broaden its flood warning coverage to these exposed areas urgently, and to make further improvements to the flood warning systems already in place.

Availability of flood risk information

112. Several witnesses emphasised the marked regional variation in flood warning procedures across the country, with the Chartered Institution for Water and Environmental Management noting that there was a need for a "nationally consistent"[177] approach among operating authorities to this issue, and West Sussex County Council stating emphatically to us that it was "essential" for the Environment Agency to provide "detailed, up to date, publicly disseminated flood risk maps at appropriate scales"[178] for local authorities as soon as possible. Others felt that the Agency's main task should be to develop emergency plans, including evacuation procedures, for areas where significant loss of life might occur in the event of inundation[179]. In their interim report, the Independent Review Team note that the Agency has already begun to develop these plans, although some of these documents are criticised for not specifying clearly enough the areas at risk[180]. The production of flood warning hazard maps and their delivery to local authorities must be made the Agency's highest priority. Only when these maps are completed can the process of standardising flood warning procedures across the country be begun.

Interorganisational procedures and dissemination of flood warnings

113. In the Environment Agency's Flood Warning Strategy for England and Wales, the importance of providing timely and effective warnings is emphasised: "Do flood warnings get to the right people...? Are flood warnings accurate? Is sufficient warning time given to take effective action? Are the people at risk and the emergency services prepared?"[181]. We heard that during April's floods in areas where the Environment Agency had responsibility for flood warning dissemination, a combination of telephone, fax and radio media were used to convey warnings to the emergency services and the general public[182]. However, it is apparent that significant problems were experienced by the Environment Agency and local authorities in their efforts to transmit such warnings to the public. In Northampton's case, no such warning was issued. For example, during our visit to the Environment Agency's regional headquarters at Orton Goldhay, we heard from a representative of Northampton residents affected by the flood that there was no warning given to people in the St James area of the town; on the night of 8 April, in just two-and-a-half hours, flood waters rose five-and-a-half feet. In Northampton's case, the problem appears to have arisen because of the unpredicted intensity of the rainfall, leading to significant overland flow of water, which bypassed the Environment Agency's telemetry equipment. We recommend that in future the Environment Agency takes a strategic approach to managing runoff within whole catchments as part of LEAPs, treating it as a cause of flooding rather than a consequence of it. Furthermore, in our opinion a contingency fund should be established by MAFF with funds disbursed to local authorities to meet the longer term costs associated with the disruption to persons and property after catastrophic flooding events have occurred.

114. The Independent Review Team also commented on the range of different procedures and protocols in place governing the dissemination of flood warnings across the country, and the lack of quality assurance in the updating of these procedures. According to the review team, these lapses were "not conducive to good performance on the issue of warnings"[183], while the Agency itself recognised that problems were experienced in contacting relevant local authorities and in transmitting flood warnings to the public which were then acted upon[184]; in this context Dr Geoff Mance noted phlegmatically that "Having 100 per cent [of telephone warnings] received but only five per cent [of recipients] actually doing anything is not very constructive"[185]. Significantly, the Independent review team also noted that service delivery may have been impaired as "Some Agency staff involved with the warnings appear[ed] to be unclear about the relevant powers and duties of their own organisation...some have poor awareness of the roles, organisational arrangements and flood related procedures in other bodies"[186]. Flood warning is the Government's main priority: we believe more must be done to standardise interorganisational procedures for flood warning, both regionally and nationally. Co-ordination between the Environment Agency, local authorities and emergency services, although good, must be further improved. We believe a crucial element in improving dissemination is to raise public awareness of the inherent risks of living in flood prone areas, and to provide accurate, straightforward information to people on what to do and whom to contact in the event of a flood emergency. We were particularly surprised that it is not already obligatory for all local public and commercial radio and television stations to carry flood warnings on air, and would urge MAFF to make this a requirement in future.


167   The Environment Agency's own assessment of its performance for MAFF; and the Independent Review Team,into the Easter Floods, established by the Environment Agency on 28 April 1998, and reporting to the Executive Board of the Agency  Back

168   Easter Floods 1998: preliminary assessment by the Environment Agency: Report to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. April 1998 Back

169   ibid Back

170   Return periods relate to the long term average time interval between events of a particular magnitude; thus a 1 in 100 year return period flood has a one per cent chance of occurring in any one year Back

171   Easter Floods 1998: preliminary assessment by the Environment Agency: Report to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. April 1998 Back

172   Appendix 41 Back

173   ibid Back

174   ibid, p 1 Back

175   ibid, p 30 Back

176   Appendix 17 Back

177   Appendix 8 Back

178   Appendix 13 Back

179   Appendix 22 Back

180   Easter Floods 1998: preliminary assessment by the Independent Review Team: report to the Board of the Environment Agency p 17 Back

181   Appendix 34 Back

182   Q 22 Back

183   Easter Floods 1998: preliminary assessment by the Independent Review Team: report to the Board of the Environment Agency p 17 Back

184   Easter Floods 1998: a preliminary assessment by the Environment Agency: Report to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food April 1998, p 14 Back

185   Q 49 Back

186   Easter Floods 1998: preliminary assessment by the Independent Review Team: report to the Board of the Environment Agency p 17 Back


 
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