VITAMIN B6
I.
INTRODUCTION
1. In 1995 the Department of Health's Committee on
Toxicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment
(COT) was asked by Ministers to advise on the toxicity of vitamin
B6, following concerns expressed by the Consumers' Association
about high levels of vitamins and minerals, especially vitamin
B6, in dietary supplements. COT came to the conclusion that the
level of vitamin B6 in dietary supplements sold under food law
should be limited to 10 milligrammes (mg) per daily dose[1].
COT's advice was considered by MAFF's Food Advisory Committee
(FAC), which explored with the health food industry the possibility
of introducing such a limit on a voluntary basis. The industry,
seeing no scientific justification for the proposed limit, was
unwilling to do this. Consultations undertaken by the FAC with
the industry and consumers showed a number of concerns about COT's
advice, and COT therefore reviewed the evidence a second time,
standing by its original advice in a statement issued in June
1997[2]. COT's advice followed
two separate paths: in respect of medicines containing vitamin
B6 it was considered by the Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM)
and the Medicines Commission, and in respect of food supplements
containing vitamin B6 by the FAC.
2. The FAC issued a statement in June 1997 endorsing
COT's advice and recommending that:
- dietary supplements should not provide a daily
dose of vitamin B6 above 10mg;
- all dietary supplements containing vitamin
B6 should carry a warning label about the risk of harmful effects
from intakes of above 10 mg a day.
The FAC said that these requirements should be made
the subject of legislation if necessary[3].
The Government accepted these recommendations[4],
and has drafted legislation under the Food Safety Act 1990 to
implement the necessary controls. The draft Vitamin B6 in Food
Regulations were issued for consultation on 2 April 1998, with
a deadline of 26 June 1998 for comments. Separate and analogous
legislation relating to the sale and supply of medicinal products
containing vitamin B6 is intended to come into effect at the same
time as the legislation on vitamin B6 food supplements. Should
these legislative changes come into effect, the position will
be as follows:
- food supplements and medicines containing 10
mg or less of vitamin B6 per daily dose will remain on general
sale;
- medicines containing between 11 and 49 mg of
vitamin B6 per daily dose will be obtainable over the counter
from pharmacies;
- medicines containing 50 mg and over of vitamin
B6 per daily dose will be obtainable on a doctor's prescription[5].
In other words, all dietary supplements containing
more than 10 mg of vitamin B6 per daily dose will be banned, with
higher-dose products requiring marketing authorisations as medicines,
under the Medicines Act 1968, before they can be sold or supplied.
We heard evidence that the effect of the proposed controls would
be to limit consumers to purchases of products containing 10 mg
or less of vitamin B6. This is because the cost of establishing
the efficacy of vitamin B6 as a medicinal product for sale at
dosages of 11 mg per day and above would be so great as to make
the proposition uneconomic[6].
It should be noted, however, that it would still be impossible
to prevent people achieving an intake of vitamin B6 of up to 200
mg/day, or even higher, simply by taking many times the 10 mg
daily dosage remaining on free sale.
3. The Government's proposals to restrict the levels
of vitamin B6 in food supplements on general sale have provoked
sustained and strong opposition from health food manufacturers
and retailers and individual consumers of food supplements. Some
scientific experts and medical practitioners have also publicly
opposed the restrictions. Many thousands of protest letters have
been received by Ministers and Members of Parliament.
4. Against this background, we decided to inquire
into the issue, and published terms of reference by press release
on 10 March 1998, calling for evidence on:
- the levels of public use of dietary supplements
in the UK containing vitamin B6, the degree of risk posed to human
health by high levels of intake of vitamin B6, and the state of
current scientific understanding of the toxic effects of vitamin
B6;
- the existing and future role of the Government,
its expert advisory committees and Executive Agencies (including
the proposed Food Standards Agency), and the Expert Group on Vitamins
and Minerals in determining the degree of health risk to individuals
from high levels of intake of vitamin B6 and taking any necessary
action;
- developments in EU policy on the addition of
vitamins and minerals to food and food supplements, in relation
to vitamin B6[7].
We received several hundred memoranda and letters,
and held two oral evidence sessions on 19 May. In the morning
we heard from Consumers for Health Choice and the Health Food
Manufacturers' Association, two organisations which have been
instrumental in mobilizing opposition to the Government's proposals,
together with individual experts who felt, for a variety of reasons,
that COT's advice was scientifically unsound. In the afternoon
we took evidence from the Chairman of COT, Professor H F Woods,
and then from the MAFF Minister of State, Mr Jeff Rooker MP. This
oral evidence, and the more substantive items of written evidence,
are published together with this Report. The rest of the written
evidence which we received has been placed in the House of Lords
Record Office where it may be consulted by the public.
5. The controversy surrounding COT's advice, and
the Government's decision to act on the basis of that advice,
has generated a host of insinuations and allegations from people
on both sides of the debate designed to discredit the case of
their opponents. We have heard allegations, for example, that:
- COT lacks the scientific expertise to deal
with a nutrient such as vitamin B6[8];
- it is wrong that the safety assessment of a
nutrient should be undertaken by a committee most of whose members
have connections with the pharmaceutical industry[9];
- the health food industry has been obstructive
and unco-operative in discussions about vitamin B6[10];
- supporters of the health food industry have
made unsubstantiated claims for the efficacy of high-dose vitamin
B6 supplements in treating various conditions[11].
Though we have taken note of these allegations, for
the purposes of reaching conclusions in this Report we have disregarded
them because they are peripheral to the central argument about
the validity of COT's advice and the scientific evidence on which
it is founded. We have adopted a similar approach to evidence
which we received about the potential economic effects on the
health food industry of the Government's proposed restrictions.
This is not because these are not issues of legitimate public
concern and debate. It is because the central issue is whether
or not the potential dangers of vitamin B6 are so great as to
legitimise severe restrictions on the consumer's right to consume
vitamin B6.
6. According to MAFF, the European Commission is
concerned at the trade difficulties caused by differing national
controls on dietary supplements throughout the European Union,
and has recently consulted for the second time on the possible
harmonisation of controls. No legislative proposals are imminent,
however, and there is no guarantee that proposals will be forthcoming[12].
Apart from the Netherlands, which has no maximum limit on vitamin
B6 dosage in dietary supplements, all other EU member states for
which information is available restrict daily dosages to between
2 and 6 mg, some simply basing their limit on a low multiple of
the Recommended Daily Amount (RDA)[13].
Mr Rooker emphatically stated that the UK would not adopt such
a policy: "We will only take action based on the risk and
the evidence of the particular product"[14].
II.
VITAMIN B6
7. Vitamin B6 is the generic term for a group of
six closely-related chemicals: pyridoxine, pyridoxal, pyridoxamine
and their associated phosphates. Like other vitamins, vitamin
B6 performs essential biochemical functions in the human body.
It is involved in the metabolism of proteins and amino acids (the
constituents of proteins), and is found in a wide range of foods
contained in a normal diet, including meat, fish, potatoes, cereals,
milk, bananas and beers. The Committee on Medical Aspects of Food
and Nutrition Policy (COMA) has set a Reference Nutrient Intake
(RNI) for vitamin B6 of 1.4 mg/day for adult men and 1.2 mg/day
for adult women. The Reference Nutrient Intake, which is analogous
to the RDA, represents the amount of a nutrient which is enough
to meet the needs of nearly all of a given group. In the case
of vitamin B6, because of its role in amino acid metabolism, the
RNI is related to protein intake: it represents 15 microgrammes
of vitamin B6 per gramme of protein per day. The symptoms of vitamin
B6 deficiency include anaemia, muscle cramps and convulsions,
though this is rare in the UK where average intakes of vitamin
B6 from food are well above the RNI[15].
These basic facts about vitamin B6 are not in dispute, although
some people believe that certain individuals have a somewhat higher
daily requirement for vitamin B6[16].
8. There is also little dispute that, in very high
doses taken over a prolonged period, vitamin B6 has toxic effects
which produce a condition known as peripheral sensory neuropathy,
affecting the nerves which transmit messages from receptors to
the central nervous system. Typical symptoms are tingling (pins
and needles), clumsiness and numbness. In a seminal study in 1983,
cases of severe sensory neuropathy were identified in seven individuals
who had taken between 2,000 and 6,000 mg (i.e. 2 to 6 g) of vitamin
B6 daily over periods ranging from 2 to 40 months[17].
In general, it is agreed that, in COT's words, studies involving
high doses demonstrated that: "the clinical signs of toxicity
were reversible once ingestion of high doses of vitamin B6 had
ceased. However, in some instances where the dose of this vitamin
was especially high, signs of damage remained"[18].
9. At daily dosages of vitamin B6 below 500 mg, the
evidence of adverse effects is more equivocal. In one study, 70
patients with diabetic neuropathy or carpal tunnel syndrome were
treated with 100 to 150 mg of pyridoxine per day for periods of
up to 5 years, with no neurological problems emerging[19].
Taking this and other corroborative research into account, the
US's Institute of Medicine has concluded that 500 mg/day represents
the lowest-observed-adverse-effect-level (LOAEL) for vitamin B6
intake[20]. This report
also arrives at a no-observed-adverse-effect-level (NOAEL) of
200 mg/day. It dismisses the 1987 study by Dalton and Dalton,
which reported peripheral sensory neuropathy in patients consuming
between 50 and 500 mg of pyroxidine per day, in the following
terms: "the weaknesses of this study and the inconsistency
of the results with the weight of evidence pertaining to the safety
of higher doses of pyridoxine rule out the use of these data to
base a [Tolerable Upper Intake Level]"[21].
10. COT effectively bases its case on the Dalton
and Dalton study. In written evidence, Professor Woods stated:
"although all relevant data were assessed, it
is the nature of risk assessment that the review of the totality
of data leads to the use of one or two critical studies for the
determination of safe doses. In humans, the lowest reported adverse
effect level was 50 mg/day. This was reported by Dalton and Dalton
(1987) who investigated women attending a clinic for premenstrual
tension"[22].
In its 1995 consideration of the toxicity of vitamin
B6, COT divided the 50 mg/day LOAEL by safety factor of 5 to set
an upper limit of 10 mg/day of vitamin B6[23].
This advice was reiterated in 1997. In its first consideration,
COT agreed that "it was not necessary to consider the animal
toxicity data on vitamin B6" because "adequate human
data were available"[24].
In its 1997 statement, COT explicitly calls in aid animal toxicity
data from a 1978 study of beagle dogs[25]
to support its recommendation of a 10 mg/day upper safe level
in humans[26]. Notwithstanding
the greater significance attached by COT to the Phillips study
of dogs in its second consideration of the toxicity of vitamin
B6, it is clearly the 1987 Dalton and Dalton study which is of
primary importance in assessing the validity of COT's advice.
11. The Dalton and Dalton study involved 172 women
attending a private practice specialising in the treatment of
premenstrual tension who had been taking vitamin B6 and who, on
examination, were found to have raised blood serum B6 levels.
Of the 172 women, 103 complained of neurological symptoms, including
paraesthesia (ie abnormal sensations in parts of the body), muscle
weakness and numbness. The remaining 69 women, who did not report
neurological symptoms, comprised a control group. The main difference
between the two groups, according to Dalton and Dalton, was that
the "neurotoxic" group had been taking vitamin B6 over
a longer period (an average of 2.9 years as opposed to 1.6 years
for the control group). Three months after stopping B6, 55 per
cent of the neurotoxic group reported "partial or complete
recovery" of neurological symptoms; after 6 months all reported
complete recovery. Women who inadvertently continued to take B6,
or restarted taking it, reported continuing or re-emerging symptoms.
Dalton and Dalton state that:
"The duration of drug exposure was greater in
this series then in previous reports and appears to have been
a significant factor in the development of neurological symptoms, ....
.If duration is an important factor in the development of neurological
symptoms it would explain the absence of side effects in reports
of double blind controlled trials lasting only a few months"[27].
COT use a similar argument to explain the apparent
lack of corroboration of Dalton and Dalton's findings in other
research: "We consider that the small number of individuals
involved and/or the short duration of administration may explain
the absence of signs of sensory peripheral neuropathy in some
studies"[28].
12. COT concedes that the Dalton and Dalton study
has "some methodological deficiencies"[29]
but argues that the symptoms described are consistent with peripheral
sensory neuropathy and with the reported symptoms of patients
in other studies involving higher doses of vitamin B6. Others
claim that the methodological deficiencies of the Dalton and Dalton
study wholly invalidate its findings. Professor André McLean,
Professor of Toxicology at the University College London Medical
School, said that although Dr Katharina Dalton was "a
most eminent gynaecologist and an inspiring woman", the underlying
reasoning and the method employed in her study were "quite
wrong"[30].
13. A long list of criticisms of the Dalton and Dalton
study was provided by the Vitamin B6 Scientific Task Group. These
included:
- the lack of an untreated control group;
- a methodology including the asking of leading
questions;
- a retrospective methodology, which therefore
failed to take account of possible confounding factors and relied
on the recall of participants about their past vitamin B6 intake;
- rechallenges with vitamin B6 were not conducted
in a blinded fashion;
- the symptoms described could have been due
to other factors than vitamin B6 - induced neuropathy, including
premenstrual tension itself[31].
14. Professor Woods has made some response to a number
of the criticisms levelled at the Dalton and Dalton study, and
therefore, by implication, at COT's advice. In written evidence
to us he stated that "The safety of long-term intake of low
doses of vitamin B6 has not been adequately studied", and
that "The data of the Dalton and Dalton study are weak but
consistent with an inverse relationship between dose, duration
and time to adverse effects"[32].
He claimed that it would have been "remiss" of COT to
ignore the Dalton and Dalton study[33].
In relation to other criticisms, he denied that the lack of an
untreated control group negated Dalton and Dalton's findings[34];
stated that toxicological studies were commonly retrospective[35];
denied that Dalton and Dalton had used leading questions[36];
and said that he did not think that the symptoms described by
Dalton and Dalton could be attributed to factors other than vitamin
B6 neuropathy[37].
15. Opponents of the Government's proposed 10 mg
daily limit have claimed that Dalton and Dalton's findings have
in important respects been contradicted by subsequent research
and by a lack of evidence of cases of vitamin B6-related peripheral
sensory neuropathy in the general population in the years following
the publication of their study. We have heard evidence that up
to 3 million people in the UK alone regularly take vitamin B6
in dietary supplements, many at continuous dosages exceeding 50
mg/day[38]. It is argued
that, had Dalton and Dalton been correct, at the very least many
thousands of individual cases of peripheral sensory neuropathy
would have occurred in the eleven years since the study was published[39].
Professor Woods has stated that nothing seen by COT would support
a statement that no significant hazards had emerged from vitamin
B6 consumption at levels up to 200 mg/day[40].
He argued that there was no surveillance system for the effects
of vitamin B6 in dietary supplements which would allow such data
to emerge[41].
16. Just as opponents of COT's advice have sought
to discredit the Dalton and Dalton study, so COT and MAFF have
sought to discredit research which has contradicted the Dalton
and Dalton findings. A survey in 1997 carried out in the USA by
Alan Gaby showed that "the symptoms Dalton attributed to
vitamin B6 toxicity are extremely common among women with PMS
or depression, regardless of whether or not they have been taking
vitamin B6"[42].
Professor Woods did not consider that the Gaby study altered COT's
view that there was no "satisfactory long-term epidemiological
study" of vitamin B6 toxicity. At a symposium held at the
Royal College of Physicians in September 1997 Linda Ferguson of
Taylor Nelson AGB Healthcare presented the findings of a controlled
retrospective study of long-term vitamin B6 users which showed
that the proportion of people reporting tingling fingers was about
the same for vitamin B6 consumers (7%) as for non-consumers (8%),
and there was also no appreciable difference between consumers
of differing dosages of vitamin B6 up to 200 mg/day[43].
Professor Woods stated that this study "can be criticised
as an epidemiological study" and had appeared in a "non-peer
reviewed publication"[44].
Finally, COT remained unmoved by the US National Academy of Sciences'
Institute of Medicine's recommendation of a Tolerable Upper Intake
Level of 100 mg/day, arguing that:
- the safety factor of 2 used by the NAS in deriving
a Tolerable Upper Intake Level of 100 mg/day from a NOAEL of 200
mg/day was inappropriately low; and
- although Dalton and Dalton had weaknesses,
there were also weaknesses in reports used by the NAS in determining
the NOAEL[45].
17. The 1978 study of beagle dogs by Phillips et
al is cited by COT as establishing the lowest observed adverse
effect level of vitamin B6 in animals of 50 mg per kg of bodyweight
per day. COT state that: "With a safety factor of 300 (10
for the use of animal data, 10 for inter-individual human variation,
3 for the use of a lowest observed adverse effect level) and assuming
that an individual weighs 60 kg, extrapolation from the lowest
observed adverse effect level in dogs... would give a maximum
daily safe dose for humans of 10 mg"[46].
Critics of COT's conclusions do not dispute the rigour of the
Phillips study, but question the size of the safety factor used
by COT to translate the animal data to humans. Professor McLean
described COT's methodology as "most unusual and not accepted
procedure"[47],
and the Vitamin B6 Scientific Task Group claimed that "the
300-fold safety factor was designed to be used in conjunction
with chemicals that are foreign to the body such as pesticides,
drugs, and food additives. It is quite absurd to apply this factor
to an essential nutrient"[48].
Professor Woods, on the other hand, maintained that the use of
safety factors for xenobiotics (i.e. substances foreign to the
body) but not for nutrients was an unscientific distinction which
was difficult to justify provided that the resulting recommended
intake was nutritionally adequate[49].
III.
CONCLUSIONS
18. The investigation of the toxicity of vitamin
B6 began in the context of wider concerns about the dietary supplement
industry. The policy eventually adopted on controlling vitamin
B6 dosages will inevitably form a precedent for a much wider range
of products. It is vital that the Government's decisions are based
on a clear philosophy of how and why it should intervene in this
area together with a proper understanding of the toxicity of vitamin
B6 and any risks involved, balanced with a recognition of the
consumer's absolute freedom to consume such products when the
risks are negligible or non-existent. There is often a tension
between safety and liberty.
19. There is a case for the proposition that the
Government should not intervene at all in this matter, apart from
publishing its view of the potential risks, leaving the issue
to the informed decisions of individual consumers. The fact of
the toxicity of vitamin B6 in excess is probably not appreciated
by many consumers but then nor are the effects of the consumption
to excess of other foodstuffs. But the Government, after all,
does not seek to regulate or limit consumption of toxic substances
occurring in food and drink, such as caffeine, alcohol or salt.
Without a clear policy framework it is hard to judge how to treat
dietary supplements, which are, by definition, not constituents
of a normal diet composed of natural foodstuffs. There is no evidence
of any urgent health risk from B6 consumption. We would therefore
urge that the Expert Group on Vitamins and Minerals be asked to
produce recommendations for a framework for deciding whether regulation
of dietary supplements is necessary at all, or whether consumer
advice is sufficient.
20. We consider that the arguments over the 300-fold
safety factor applied by COT to the Phillips study are inconclusive,
and that COT's case therefore stands or falls on the validity
of the findings of Dalton and Dalton. It is our view that the
doubts concerning the 1987 Dalton and Dalton study are so serious
that it is scientifically unjustifiable to use them as the basis
for establishing a lowest observed adverse effect level in relation
to vitamin B6 intake. We base this conclusion principally
on the following points:
(i) the methodological flaws in the Dalton and
Dalton study are such as to render it unreliable in drawing firm
conclusions which could form the basis of regulatory action. We
note that Dr Katharina Dalton herself has stated that "the
only reason our 1987 paper was written was to alert our medical
colleagues of the possibility of vitamin B6 overdose neuropathy"[50].
We also note that COT did not approach Dr Dalton for clarification
of the methodology used in the study because it was not the policy
of the committee to do so[51];
(ii) no other piece of scientific evidence has
been adduced to illustrate that vitamin B6 has toxic effects in
adult humans at levels of intake below 500 mg/day[52],
and, indeed, a number of studies have indicated that intakes of
up to 200 mg/day, for periods longer than those reported by the
patients in the Dalton and Dalton study, have produced no evidence
of neurotoxicity whether by subjective or objective neurological
assessment[53];
(iii) we do not agree with Professor Woods' view
that there is no evidence available to support the statement that
no significant hazards have emerged from the use of vitamin B6
by millions of people at levels above 50 mg/day. We find it worthy
of note that, in the eleven years since the Dalton and Dalton
study was published, and particularly in the last twelve months
when there has been so much publicity about the possible toxicity
of vitamin B6, not a single case of peripheral sensory neuropathy
shown to be related to vitamin B6 has come to light. The probability
that this could have occurred, had Dalton and Dalton been correct,
is, in our view, infinitesimal.
21. The scientific evidence pointing towards a NOAEL
of 200 mg/day and a LOAEL of 500 mg/day is not perfect, but it
is a good deal stronger and more consistent than the evidence
on which COT has based its advice. We have been dismayed by the
stubbornness and defensiveness which COT has displayed following
the serious scientific challenges which have been made to its
findings. Although Professor Woods responded fully to our questions
when he gave evidence to us, COT has been curt almost to the point
of rudeness in responding to articulate and well-argued criticisms
from organisations such as the Vitamin B6 Scientific Task Group[54].
When it has been coaxed out of its defensiveness to respond to
specific questions, COT has tied itself up in casuistical knots
in its efforts to strengthen its own case and discredit its opponents,
particularly in claiming that the absence of evidence of vitamin
B6 toxicity from general clinical experience does not affect the
question at issue.
22. In oral evidence, Mr Rooker referred to a paper
prepared by the COT secretariat for that Committee in its consideration
of vitamin B6 toxicity[55].
That paper, which provides a comprehensive summary of the research
base and other documentation relating to vitamin B6, was subsequently
supplied to us on a commercial-in-confidence basis, and we have
taken it into account in reaching our conclusions. We make no
criticism of the thoroughness with which the COT secretariat went
about the task of collating and summarizing published research
on vitamin B6 toxicity for the Committee, but consider that the
conclusions drawn by COT from this evidence are palpably wrong.
The crucial error made by COT was not to establish clear criteria
for evaluating the significance of different research data. In
other words, it failed to establish criteria for distinguishing
between "good" and "bad" science. These criteria
would include factors such as study size (i.e. number of subjects)
and study design (i.e. whether the study is randomised, controlled
and blinded), which are precisely those at issue in judging whether
the Dalton and Dalton study or conflicting research is more reliable.
The error made by the FAC was not to place any B6 risk in a context
of other unregulated food risks or to advise that a clearer rationale
for intervention in this food sector was required before tackling
one product in isolation.
23. It follows from our assessment of COT's advice
on the toxicity of vitamin B6 that we do not feel that the Government
would be correct to follow that advice. In relation to dietary
supplements, the Government should withdraw its proposed draft
regulations to limit the level of vitamin B6 per daily dose to
10 mg.
24. We consider that the scientific evidence we have
heard tended to support the US's National Academy of Sciences
report that the weight of evidence on vitamin B6 points towards
an LOAEL of 500 mg/day, and an NOAEL of 200 mg/day. Inevitably
there is a degree of arbitrariness in determining any safety factor
which should be applied to these levels, but we concur with the
NAS, given the extent of evidence available from scientific research
and wider experience of the use of vitamin B6 dietary supplements
in society, that a factor of 2 applied to the NOAEL is appropriate
in the light of current knowledge. We note that the resultant
upper safe limit of 100 mg/day represents the same safety factor
of 5 in relation to the NAS's 500 mg/day LOAEL as was applied
by COT to their LOAEL of 50 mg/day. Although the establishment
of food safety controls can never be a bargaining process, we
also note that supplement consumers and the health food industry
would consider a 100 mg/day limit to be acceptable[56].
We recommend that the Government should seek to introduce a voluntary
limit, pending the report of the Expert Group on Vitamins and
Minerals, with the industry, of 100 mg per daily dose. All dietary
supplements containing vitamin B6 should display a clear warning
that intakes above this level may carry health risks, particularly
when taken over an extended period. No legislation should be considered
until the Expert Group has reported.
25. Our conclusions should not be taken as endorsement
of all the practices of that industry, nor as an absence of concern
on our part about the position of dietary supplements under food
law. We are concerned, for example, that certain dietary supplements
may be promoted as beneficial to general health when no proof
of efficacy exists. The evidence on the efficacy of vitamin
B6 is inconclusive, and many consumers may experience a placebo
effect rather than any actual health benefit. Nevertheless, such
people are perfectly entitled to make such choices for themselves,
so long as they are provided with sufficient information to avoid
the potential health risks of high levels of intake, and so long
as dietary supplements do not make medicinal claims. These issues
should have no bearing on the toxicological assessments of the
safety of vitamins and minerals, whether in the case of vitamin
B6 or in the case of the wider review of dietary supplements to
be undertaken over the next 18 months or so by the new Expert
Group on Vitamins and Minerals. We trust that the unfortunate
row which has taken place over vitamin B6 will act as a constant
reminder to that group of the need to base its recommendations
and advice on sound and substantiated scientific knowledge, and
adherence to a clear definition of the role and limits of Government
intervention in this area as it recommends and Parliament agrees.
26. The membership of the Expert Group is being drawn
from the existing membership of COT, the FAC, COMA and the CSM,
with provision for the industry, complementary medicine and consumer
interests to nominate observers[57].
We recommend that, to assist in avoiding any repeat of the
vitamin B6 controversy, consumer and industry interests should
be able to nominate one or two independent scientific experts
in nutrition and toxicology for appointment as full members of
the Group.
1 Ev p 63 Back
2
Ev p 48 Back
3
Ev p 63 Back
4
HC Deb 18 July 1997, col 358w Back
5
Ev p 64 Back
6
Qq 68, 111-2; Ev p 129 Back
7
Agriculture Committee Press Release No. 20, Session 1997-98,
10 March 1998 Back
8
Ev p 166 Back
9
ibid Back
10
Qq 278, 298 Back
11
Qq 318-322 Back
12
Ev p 66 Back
13
The RDA is described by MAFF as "the average intake needed
for a population to minimise the risk of deficiency" (Ev
p 66) Back
14
Q 306 Back
15
Ev p 62; Vitamin B6, POST note 105, Parliamentary Office
of Science and Technology, November 1997. Back
16
Q 23 Back
17
Sensory neuropathy from pyridoxine abuse, Schaumburg et al, New
England Journal of Medicine, 309 : 445-488 (1983) Back
18
Ev p 49 Back
19
A clinical and electrophysiologic study of the treatment of painful
diabetic neuropathies with pyridoxine, Bernstein and Lobitz, Current
Topics in Nutrition and Disease, 19 : 415-423 (1988) Back
20
Dietary Reference Intakes: Thiamin, Riboflavin, Niacin, Vitamin
B6, Folate, Vitamin B12, Pantothenic Acid, Biotin and Choline,
Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, 1998, p 7-23 Back
21
ibid p 7-24 Back
22
Ev p 38 Back
23
Ev p 39 Back
24
ibid Back
25
Subacute Toxicity of Pyridoxine Hydrochloride in the Beagle Dog,
W E J Phillips et al., Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology
44, 323-333 (1978) Back
26
Ev p 49 Back
27
Characteristics of pyridoxine overdose neuropathy syndrome, K
Dalton, M J T Dalton, Acta Neurol Scand., 76 : 8-11
(1987) Back
28
Ev p 49 Back
29
Ev p 48 Back
30
Q 43 Back
31
Ev pp 176-9 Back
32
Ev p 40 Back
33
ibid; see also Ev p 191 Back
34
Q 230 Back
35
Q 233 Back
36
Qq 235-6 Back
37
Q 243 Back
38
Ev p 2 Back
39
Ev p 189 Back
40
Ev p 39 Back
41
Q 218 Back
42
Ev p 144 Back
43
Vitamin B6: New Data New Perspectives, Council for Responsible
Nutrition, 1997 Back
44
Q 245 Back
45
Ev pp 59-60 Back
46
Ev p 49 Back
47
Q 57 Back
48
Ev p 166 Back
49
Ev p 40 Back
50
Ev p 121 Back
51
Qq 246-8 Back
52
A study by Parry and Bredesden (Neurology, 1985, 35, 1466-68)
included a single case of pyridoxine toxicity in an individual
who had taken between 100 and 200 mg over 3 years. This study
is not referred to by COT in its June 1997 statement, and Dr John
Marks, Life Fellow of Girton College, Cambridge, was highly critical
of it (Q 61) Back
53
Ev pp 170-1 Back
54
Ev p 191 Back
55
Qq 268-272 Back
56
Qq 61, 92-4 Back
57
Ev p 65 Back
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