THE
MASON
REVIEW
25. The cuts proposed in the Healey Review were slowed
only slightly by the Conservative government between 1970 and
1974, although the Prime Minister's undertaking to rebuild the
Territorial Army was put in to effectit took some six to
eight years to return its establishment to the new effective levels.[59]
In March 1974, the Secretary of State for Defence of the newly-elected
Labour government, Roy Mason, ordered a defence review on his
first day in office.[60]
Like the current SDR, it was declared to begin first with a reconsideration
of the UK's defence commitments, but pre-empting this was a government
decision that defence spending should drop from around 5% of GDP
to around 4.5% over ten years, a decision founded on the presumption
that the UK's spending should move towards the NATO average. The
Expenditure Committee commented in its preliminary report on the
review that
... the Ministry's analysis
quickly established that our commitments outside the NATO area
were of lowest priority in strictly military terms ... NATO would
remain the first charge on resources available for defence ...
We endorse this approach.[61]
Three major commitments were deemed essential: the
UK's contribution to NATO's front-line forces in Germany; the
anti-submarine forces in the eastern Atlantic; and home defence.[62]
The three other major commitments examined were the nuclear deterrent,
reinforcements earmarked for defence of NATO's northern flank
and naval forces in the Mediterranean. It was decided to withdraw
all British forces from the Mediterranean theatre with the exception
of Cyprus.[63] The overall
defence budget was projected to fall by 12% over ten years, with
manpower falling by 11% over the same period. The Army's strategic
reserve division was broken up, the RAF's transport fleet cut
by half and amphibious forces reduced. The commitment to airdrop
two parachute battalions and supporting services was scrapped,
and the 'airportable' capability was to be reduced from three
brigades to one.[64]
The Expenditure Committee commented
The period following the
1967-68 defence review and the adoption of the strategy of flexible
response by the Alliance has seen considerably more emphasis on
mobile forces and reinforcement capabilities in NATO. In this
field, the United Kingdom has hitherto given a lead amongst the
European partners. The review proposals will tend to reverse this
trend and therefore reduce the options open to NATO Ministers
at the lower levels of strategic escalation. While the commitment
to the Central Front is to be maintained, the cuts affecting mobility,
support and reinforcement capability will have a weakening effect
on both the Northern and Southern flanks.[65]
26. In other words, the last review conducted under
a Labour government, still in the heat of the Cold War, shifted
the UK's defence posture away from mobility and flexibility of
responsethat is in precisely the opposite direction to
that in which the SDR, in response to a very different world situation,
is to push us. In a further Report, in January 1976, the Expenditure
Committee concluded
... that the Ministry's previous
long-term programme had become unrealistic ... In the public debate
on defence, the view is often expressed that the defence budget
can safely be cut, with instant savings or other benefits to the
economy, and with acceptable consequences for national security.
Our examination ... has convinced us that this view is largely
fallacious ... The force reductions resulting from the defence
review may over-stretch the Services in the fulfilment of their
remaining commitments, and may leave an inadequate margin for
dealing with unforeseen tasks. [66]
27. In 1976, the sterling crisis precipitated a decision
to relinquish virtually all other overseas commitments by withdrawing
entirely from Singapore, closing the Gan airbase in the Indian
Ocean and withdrawing from the Simonstown Agreement with South
Africa. British commitments to permanently stationed forces were
thereafter effectively, with some minor exceptions, confined to
Europe.[67]
THE
NOTT
REVIEW
28. The review which took place under Sir John Nott's
tenure at the MoD ran from January to June 1981. It was conducted
in the international context of a Soviet military build-up and
the domestic context of a severe economic downturn and the introduction
of cash planning to control public spending.[68]
As our predecessors put it, in their Report on the 1981 Statement
on the Defence Estimates (SDE)
The Secretary of State in
his introduction says that the right balance must be re-established
"between inevitable resource constraints and ... necessary
defence requirements". In other words, the Government's commitments
to spend money on defence have outstripped the availability of
funds ...[69]
29. The Nott review confirmed the decision to proceed
with the purchase of the Trident system from the USA to replace
Polaris as the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent.[70]
The Territorial Army and the other reserve forces were to be merged
and rebuilt to meet the requirement for home defence,[71]
which was also to be reinforced by a new fighter aircraft (eventually
the Eurofighter programme).[72]
The British Army of the Rhine was to be held at the level of 55,000
but to be re-equipped.[73]
The main cuts under the Nott review were to fall on the Navy which,
although it took on the Trident submarines, was to lose around
one fifth of their 60 destroyers and frigates. Despite the supposed
abandonment of the carrier programme, three so-called 'through
deck cruisers' had been built, designated as the Invincible
Class. One of these three carriers and the two amphibious ships
Fearless and Intrepid were also to be cut.[74]
Out-of-area, or expeditionary, warfare capacity was therefore
to be further significantly reduced. With Trident, greater reliance
was once again to be placed on the strategic nuclear deterrent
as the counter to the Soviet threat (together with an increased
submarine fleet),[75]
and the overall force structure emphasised the UK's increasing
expectation of acting only as part of NATO for overseas expeditionary
operations.[76]
30. These proposals were rapidly scotched by the
experience of the Falklands conflict in the Spring of 1982, which
was commented on by our predecessors in three separate Reports.[77]
In the White Paper on the lessons of that conflict, published
in December 1982, it was announced that the 5th Infantry Brigade
was to become an airborne force including an all-arms assault
parachute capability of two battalion groups (withdrawn under
the Mason Review); Fearless and Intrepid were to
be retained in service.[78]
The third aircraft carrier (HMS Invincible) was to be retained,
and the number of destroyers and frigates held at around 55.[79]
The White Paper concluded by signalling a return to 'flexibility
and mobility', but as an extra rather than a central feature of
force structure
The many useful lessons we
have learned from the Falklands Campaign ... do not invalidate
the policy we have adopted following last year's defence programme
review. The Soviet Unionits policies and its military capabilitiescontinues
to pose the main threat to the security of the United Kingdom
and our response to this threat must have the first call on our
resources. Following the Falklands Campaign, we shall now be devoting
substantially more resources to defence than had been previously
planned. In allocating these, we shall be taking measures which
will strengthen our general defence capability by increasing the
flexibility, mobility and readiness of all three Services for
operations in support of NATO and elsewhere.[80]
However, by 1985, our predecessors were commenting
Our concern that there might
be difficulties in managing the Defence Budget into the 1990s
has ... turned into the strongest suspicion that there will indeed
be ... cancellations, slowing-down of acquisitions and the running-on
of equipment beyond its economic life-span. The evidence we have
received from the Ministry has not allayed our fears ... A likely
consequence is that important issues will be decided as a result
of short-term financial considerations and not in the context
of a long-term view of defence requirements or by weighing priorities
in a sensible manner. We have drawn attention in this Report to
substantial pressure developing on the defence budget over the
coming years, and have no doubt that this will require some hard
decisions. We are told that there is no immediate need for a major
defence review; but we fear that the cumulative effect of managing
the defence budget in the manner endorsed in the White Paper may
result in a defence review by stealth.[81]
This call for a defence review was to be a constant
theme of the Defence Committee over the next decade, but was to
remain unanswered until 1997. The government preferred to adopt,
in the face of a dramatically changed international security environment,
a process of almost continuous review.
35 The Defence Review Process 1643-1939,
A submission to the House of Commons Defence Committee Inquiry
into the Strategic Defence Review from Stuart Testar, University
of Hull (not printed) Back
36 ibid
passim Back
37 ibid,
p 10; Commons Journals, 1855, p 394 Back
38 Testar,
op cit, p 14 Back
39 ibid,
p 15 Back
40 ibid,
pp 17-21, see also Strachan, RUSI Journal, June 1998 p 4 Back
41 ibid,
p 22 Back
42
Army Reform and other Addresses RB Haldane 1908 Back
43 The
Territorial Army During the Early Inter-War Years,
Captain Peter Caddick-Adams, RMLY Back
44 Ev
p 180 Back
45 Cmnd
124, Defence: Outline of Future Policy, April 1957, para
47 Back
46 ibid,
para 46 Back
47 ibid,
para 33 Back
48 ibid,
para 17 Back
49 House
of Commons Library Research Paper No. 93/91, pp 4-6 and Cmnd 124,
paras 12-16 Back
50 ibid,
paras 8, 9, 67, 71-73 Back
51 Cm
3999, paras 12, 14, 15 and 16 Back
52 Cmnd
2901, The Defence Review, February 1966 Back
53 Cmnd
2855, The Re-organization of the Army Reserves, December
1965 and Cmnd 2901, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967 Back
54 Cmnd
3357, Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1967, p
5 Back
55 ibid
p 1 Back
56 Cmnd
3701, Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1968, pp
3-5 Back
57 Cmnd
2901, op cit, 4-10 Back
58 ibid,
p 20 Back
59 Q
2610 Back
60 ibid,
p 8 Back
61 Second
Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1974-75, The
Defence Review Proposals, HC 259, para 11 Back
62 ibid,
para 16 Back
63 ibid,
para 17 Back
64 ibid,
para 18 Back
65 ibid,
para 19 Back
66 Second
Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1975-76, Defence,
HC 155, paras 139-142 Back
67 House
of Commons Library Research Paper No. 93/91, p 7 Back
68 Cmnd
8288, The United Kingdom Defence Programme; the Way
Forward, June 1981, paras 1 and 2 Back
69 Second
Report, Session 1980-81, Statement on the Defence Estimates
1981, HC 302, para 3 Back
70 Cmnd
8288, op cit, paras 9 and 10; Fourth Report, Session 1980-81,
Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy, HC 36 Back
71 Cmnd
8288, op cit, para 15 Back
72 ibid,
para 20 Back
73 ibid,
paras 16-18 Back
74 ibid,
paras 29-31 Back
75 ibid,
para 26 Back
76 See
also Sixth Report, Session 1987-88, The Future Size and Role
of the Royal Navy's Surface Fleet, HC 309 Back
77 First
and Third Reports, Session 1982-83 The Handling of Press and
Public Relations during the Falklands Conflict, HC 17 and
The Future Defence of the Falkland Islands, HC 154 and
Fourth Report, Session 1986-87, Implementing the Lessons of
the Falklands Campaign, HC 345 Back
78 The
Falklands Campaign: The Lessons,
Cmnd 8758, December 1982, para 304 Back
79 Cmnd
8758, op cit, paras 307-309; see also Third Report, Session
1984-85, Defence Commitments and Resources and the Defence
Estimates 1985-86, HC 37-I, paras 75-86 Back
80 Cmnd
8758, op cit, para 313 Back
81 Third
Report, Session 1984-85, op cit, paras 36 and 107 Back