Memorandum on The Future Battlefield—The
Maritime Dimension submitted by Dr Eric Grove
Much of the so called "Revolution in Military
Affairs", the essence of which is the digitisation of the
battlefield, the ability of modern sensors and communications
to collect information and transmit it in digital form to enhance
greatly the situational awareness those upon the battlefield,
down to the lowest level necessary. The essence of this is the
use of the term "battlefield" that implies operations
ashore. To a considerable extent, the maritime battlefield, with
its multi-dimensional threat axes and potentially catastrophic
high speed threats, has been digitised form some time. As early
as the 1950s the Royal Navy pioneered the electronic synthesis
of tracks from sensor data and the digital transmission of plots
to other units. These systems went to sea in the carriers Victorious
and Hermes and the County class guided missile destroyers and
were the inspiration of all current computerised action information
systems. No modern warship is worthy of the name without such
a system to compile a picture and data link it to other units.
Special pleading by submariners and airmen would
have one believe that the surface ship is obsolete, a mere target.
In reality both submarines and aircraft can become targets in
their own right in certain circumstances. An inability to move
surface ships against opposition would have disastrous effects
on the strategic reach and agility of the USA and its allies.
The laws of physics have not been repealed; water provides by
far the most efficient and flexible medium of deploying large
and bulky items such as operating airfields, missile batteries
and associated control systems, heavy vehicles or fuel supplies
and other logistical support. Most of the world's surface is covered
in water and most of the world's population lives close to the
sea. There is thus enormous potential for maritime operations
and support in the true, joint sense of the word "maritime";
in which the sea is a principal but far from the only factor.
Modern systems allow the most intimate integration
of maritime platforms with themselves and units ashore and in
the air. The American "Cooperation Engagement Capability"
(CEC) which has been under trial for some time converts a force
so equipped into effectively a single radar system with the same
picture on everyone's screens allowing at best remote engagements
and at worst the receipt of precision cues enabling missile engagements
at maximum weapon range. Ships receive fire control quality data
far beyond the range of their own sensors. CEC also allows the
integration of forces afloat with those ashore, experiments having
been carried out with anti-tactical ballistic missile and anti-cruise
missile systems with both ship based and shore based components.
Given the future digitisation of land systems the potential for
integration seems enormous, with warships afloat providing anti-air
and surface strike capabilities capable of application many miles
inland.
The key to this is the acquisition of the required
command and control technologies and the establishment of a high
degree of compatibility to retain and improve interoperability
both with the United States and other allies. CEC and related
technologies also promise an enormous jump in capability even
at national level. Just as navies without Link 11 are second class
navies today, so navies without CEC will be second class navies
tomorrow.
Just as surface ships will have their capabilities
transformed and extended other maritime platforms will improve
their already existing leverage. The coming of improved short
take off, vertical landing (STOV/L) variants of more conventional
designs will reduce the gap between STOV/L and other types of
combatant aircraft. In the longer term the uninhabited combat
air vehicle (UCAV) offers the potential both to provide more aircraft
for smaller carriers and perhaps extend the integration of air
platforms with the surface fleet beyond the existing helicopter,
flexible though those machines are. Amphibious forces will become
even more useful as the potential of the hovercraft and the tilt-rotor
are more fully exploited. Sea basing of attack helicopters such
as the Apache Longbow would also greatly increase their flexibility
and deployability, while the development of lighter scales of
equipment—as well as increasing the marginal utility of
airlift—could also significantly increase the inherently
greater striking power of sea delivered forces.
Although power projection is the essence of
the foreseeable maritime future one should not ignore the enhanced
sea denial capabilities available to future nations. CEC may cope
with the missile threat but torpedo armed submarines will require
enhanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities designed to deal
with the quiet conventional boat. One can imagine distributed
CEC type systems being developed to create multistatic sonar networks
for advanced sonar operations, both passive and active. In the
meantime SSNs provide an underestimated potential against conventional
submarines. Advanced mines—and not so advanced mines—also
require the maintenance of mine countermeasures systems and platforms
if this cheapest of all modes of sea denial is not to prove at
best embarrassing and at worst a serious problem, especially in
the littoral context. This is a "niche" the British
still most effectively fill.
The future maritime battlefield will continue
to be a challenging and dangerous place where threats can come
from all three dimensions. Given the overall improvements in weapons,
sensors and command and control systems, however, there is nothing
in sight to prevent maritime forces continuing to exploit their
inherent advantages in the future as effectively as they have
done in the past. Indeed, the technological catching up a land
warfare with naval combat promises the production of a truly integrated
maritime battlespace in which navies will be even more useful
than ever.
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