Select Committee on Environmental Audit Minutes of Evidence


Supplementary Memorandum Submitted by Friends of the Earth

INTRODUCTION

  1. Friends of the Earth (FOE) is grateful for the opportunity to elaborate our views on this critical topic. The oral examination session highlighted that the Committee's interest in effective greening of Government is broad, and extends, critically, to the pursuit of sustainable development objectives across the whole of Government. This is a welcome, if challenging, interpretation. To deliver on it depends on several factors, including, at least:

    —  the establishment of targets for the Government and the UK that provide a clear quantitative measure of sustainable development for the Government and other key actors;

    —  the elimination of perverse incentives—such as subsidies and price signals that encourage unsustainable behaviour, short-term spending limits which discourage investment in sustainable development and inappropriate measures or indicators of success; and

    —  institutional structures and processes that reinforce policy integration across Government Departments.

  2. In this supplementary evidence we highlight examples of challenges in each of these three areas. First we outline a methodologically and ideologically consistent approach to setting long-term sustainability targets for the UK. Then we turn to two perverse incentives—the first pervasive and structural: the inappropriate use of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as an overall measure of progress, and its indiscriminate use as a yardstick for specific policies, especially in the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The second perverse incentive we examine is the tax system. Finally we comment briefly on the new "aide-memoire" designed to stimulate better and more comprehensive policy appraisal in all departments.

TARGET SETTING

  3. A clear idea of the final destination is important in selecting, designing and appraising policies, especially where specific policies in a range of Departments are all expected to contribute to an overall objective for Government. Most countries have been slow to develop long-term quantified targets for sustainable development, although some have made more progress. FOE is concerned that, despite recent welcome statements by the Minister of State for the Environment regarding long-term CO2 reduction targets, the extent and depth of action implied by sustainable development is not widely recognised in Government.

  4. To illustrate the shift needed some countries—notably Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands—have begun to explore the use of the concept of Environmental Space (or as the Danes call it, "ecological scope") to calculate quantitative sustainability targets. This approach starts from two fundamental principles: that to achieve sustainable development, humankind must live within the environmental limits of the planet, and that in a limited world, equitable access to the resources needed for sustainable development is the only practical and morally acceptable basis for distribution of resources.

  5. Environmental space is the sustainable rate at which we can use environmental resources without causing irreversible environmental damage or depriving future generations of the resources they need. Targets for countries are derived by dividing this environmental space amongst the world's population—and then calculating a national target according to the forecast national population at the target date. Our estimates for the UK, presented below, are based on the UN's central estimates of a stable world population of 9.8 billion, achieved by 2050.

  6. The extent of change needed for any one country, such as the UK, can be illustrated by comparing our share of global sustainable consumption with our share of the global population. With just 1 per cent of the world's people (and set to decline as a proportion of the global total), the UK currently uses 5 per cent of the planet's capacity for carbon dioxide absorption, over 2 per cent of its sustainable timber yield, and almost 5 per cent of its sustainable steel and aluminium production. In short, recognising environmental limits and the need for a more equitable distribution of the world's resources means that the UK needs to cut its use of resources by around 80 per cent.

  7. FOE has undertaken detailed work on the UK's consumption of Environmental Space, recently published by Earthscan as a book, entitled "Tomorrow's World: Britain's Share in a Sustainable Future". The targets suggested by this for a range of key environmental resources—which together account for over 90 per cent of the inputs into the UK economy—are summarised in the table below, and illustrated in Figure 1 (appended).[1] Interim targets for 2010 are derived simply as 25 per cent of the change needed by 2050. The precise accuracy of the figures is not especially important. What is clear is that such targets establish the right direction, order of magnitude and time-scale of change required. The book also explores how these could be achieved through technically, economically and politically practical measures to increase our quality of life whilst reducing consumption of environmental resources to the extent required.
Summary of targets for 2010 and 2050

Target 2010
Per cent
Target 2050
Per cent

Energy-30-88
Land-7-27
Timber-65-73
Water-15-15
Aluminium-22-88
Steel-21-83
Construction aggregates-12.5 -50
Chlorine-25-100


  8. These might seem too ambitious and challenging for a Government struggling to maintain a commitment to a 20 per cent cut in CO2 emissions by 2010. However such targets are now being adopted in other European countries where the motivational effects on businesses and the public are recognised and the adoption and logic of such targets helps governments explain what might otherwise be unpopular measures, such as new taxes.

  9. The German environment ministry has developed a framework programme on key environmental areas, including annual reporting on six "environmental barometers". These cover six areas: climate, air, ground, nature, water and resources. The ministry has set "ambitious but achievable" policy targets for each of the environmental barometers for 2010 or 2020, utilising concepts of improving resource efficiency to reduce overall environmental impact. For example the target for 2020 is that energy productivity be doubled from 1990 levels, and raw materials productivity increased by factor 2.5 from 1993 levels.

  10. Denmark has been exploring the environmental space approach since 1995, and has used it to set a CO2 reduction target of 20 per cent by 2005 (in line with the 2050 targets suggested by an environmental space analysis). It has also applied the approach in more detail in the energy sector, to derive a target for renewable energy as a share of electricity demand of 12 per cent by 2005 (several times more ambitious than the UK's renewables target).

PERVERSE INCENTIVES 1: MEASURE OF PROGRESS

  11. "The gross national product includes air pollution and advertising for cigarettes, and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our doors, and jails for people who break them . . . It grows with the production of napalm and missiles with nuclear warheads. And if [it] includes all this, there is much that it does not comprehend. It does not allow for the health of our families, the quality of their education, or the joy of their play . . . The gross national product measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion to country. It measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile". This was said by Robert F Kennedy in 1967.

  12. Yet we still use gross national or domestic product as our primary headline indicator of economic success. Indeed, in economic debate, no belief is more widely shared than the idea that economic growth is the central determinate of national progress. Political candidates from all main parties promise to deliver this. "We will raise the trend rate of growth", the Labour Government promises. Like metres and kilos, GDP appears to provide a universal, scientific measure. Yet, GDP has only been developed in the last 50 years on the basis of work, notably, of John Maynard Keynes and Simon Kuznets. From the outset, Simon Kuznets warned of the limits of GNP. "The welfare of a nation", he wrote, can "scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income." The architects of GDP simply could not foresee economic values becoming such a central determinant of social organisation, nor the extent to which a measure of national income is used as a proxy for overall progress and well-being.

  13. Today, it is common for commentators to acknowledge in one breath the limitations of GDP, yet in another they deny that any other approach will serve. The UK Office for National Statistics argues that any attempt to develop one, drawing on social and environmental factors, will be fraught with too many assumptions and too many value judgments. Yet, each of the assumptions and value judgments they decry is already implicit within GDP. GDP assigns all wider social and environmental issues an implicit value of zero.

  14. The Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) provides a way of looking at how sustainable welfare is changing over time. It takes as its basis the measure of consumer expenditure which also underlies the economic measure of GDP. The ISEW then makes adjustments to account for 18 aspects of our economic lives that GDP ignores. The ISEW has attracted broad public endorsement—but with some technical reservations. In particular, there was a significant time-lag in pilot versions. The new ISEW has been significantly improved and brought up to 1996, drawing on inputs from a wide range of economists, social scientists and environmental experts.

  15. The key differences between ISEW, as a measure of sustainable economic welfare, and GDP, as a measure of production, are that in the ISEW:

    —  longer-term environmental damage and the depreciation of natural capital are accounted for;

    —  the net formation of man-made capital (i.e., investment) is included;

    —  changes in the distribution of income are included, reflecting the fact that an additional pound in the pocket means more to the poor than to the rich;

    —  a value for household labour is included.

  Appendix 1 outlines the technical development of the ISEW.

  16. The results[2] show a striking difference between the trends in GDP and ISEW. Per capita GDP is 2.5 times greater in real terms in 1996 than it was in 1950, with an average year on year growth rate of 2 per cent. In contrast, the trend in the ISEW over the same period has been up and down. The level of the ISEW in 1996 ends up a modest 31 per cent higher than it was in 1950: an average annual growth of just 0.6 per cent. The difference between GDP and ISEW is particularly marked from the mid-1970s onwards. Between 1950 and 1975, ISEW rises, albeit more slowly than GDP per capita. After a period of stagnation in the late 1970s, however, ISEW has actually fallen—by around 22 per cent since 1980. GDP on the other hand continued to rise, by over a third. Over the last six years, per capita ISEW has declined at an average rate of 1.3 per cent a year (compared to per capita GDP growth of 1.1 per cent). The key factors which contribute to the decline are environmental degradation (in particular depletion of non-renewable resources and long-term environmental damage) and income inequality. The decline would have been greater, had it not been for positive factors in the ISEW, such as services from household labour, over the same period.

  17. The ISEW has been developed by academics and NGOs. It has been calculated for over 10 countries, including at least one developing country. These have all borne out the validity of alternative measure—diverging, often substantially, from GDP. The ISEW offers a clear basis, with mainstream support and development, for a much more accurate indicator of well-being to guide policy makers. It could be developed in ways which obtain public values to support and underpin the selection and weighing of factors. Moreover, the adoption and development of ISEW would help Labour fulfil its pledge made in In Trust for Tomorrow, to develop a new headline indicator of welfare.

PERVERSE INCENTIVES 2: THE TAX SYSTEM

  18. FOE has previously submitted evidence to the EAC on the need for reform of tax and spending priorities to support sustainable development. We have advocated a combination of measures for the elimination of perverse subsidies, the redirection of spending to investments which will help deliver sustainability (such as the elimination of fuel poverty through improvements in the housing stock), and broad tax reform, increasing taxes on environmental resources, waste and pollution, and reducing taxes on labour. Appendix 2 sets out our submission to the Treasury in advance of the 1998 budget.[3]

  19. In Budget 1998 the Chancellor has responded to pressure by touching—but not covering—a number of environmental bases. There are some signs of progress—more in the detail than in any big reforms.

  20. On Ecological Tax Reform, although the Chancellor did not link any rise in green taxes with cuts in employers' NIC he did one vital thinig in relation to ETR—accepted the principle that cutting employers' NIC "encourages job creation". Although the reform of employers' NIC was revenue neutral, the reform removed it from a greater number of the low paid by increasing the starting-rate from £68 to £81 to "remove barriers to employment".

  21. The changes to the Landfill Tax reflected several of FOE's arguments, notably for an increase in the rate (the rate for "active" waste was increased from £7 to £10); and in the intent to consider for further increases to "help meet targets" (in other words, the level of tax should reflect waste reduction and recycling targets, not some meaningless economic valuation of the "externalities" of landfill). However, the tax was not extended to incineration and some limited exemptions for "inert waste" were introduced.

  22. The Chancellor neither introduced nor ruled out an aggregates tax. However, the signs are hopeful for a tax, as the Treasury release states that the research indicates "environmental costs attached to quarrying which a tax might capture . . . further work is needed".

  23. The Road Fuel Duty escalator was kept at 6 per cent—lower than we believe to be necessary, but at least the Chancellor brought the rise forward to March, giving a one-off acceleration of the escalator to eight months rather than a year. Some positive changes regarding the rates of duty and VAT on different fuels were announced. The differential between diesel and petrol was reduced; there were increases in the differentials between unleaded and super unleaded, and diesel and ultra low sulphur diesel (the definition of which has been tightened). Duty on road fuel gases was frozen again.

  24. On company cars there was some, albeit too limited, progress, and signs of further positive moves in the future. Scale charges for fuel provided free to employees increase by 20 per cent over and above the usual increase and will increase by the same amount in the next four years, thus significantly increasing the cost of fuel to the driver. The Government is considering "replacing existing business mileage discounts with discounts for driving fewer private miles in company cars"—i.e., more tax relief if you drive less rather than if you drive more.

  25. The £50 cut in VED for "smaller" cars is a step in the right direction and in announcing the freeze on VED after this cut the Chancellor left the way open for further environmental reforms to VED. However, no matter what the definition of "small", the scale of change is unambitious. Drivers in Belgium, for example, will still pay £44 less road tax for a Suzuki Swift and over £900 more for a Ferrari F50.

  26. This Budget did not include a full public expenditure round because the spending reviews will not be complete until summer—however, the Chancellor did find some money for public transport even if it was a small amount—£500 million spent over three years, including a £50 million fund for rural transport schemes. The lion's share of the money, around £300 million, will go to London Transport for propping up the Underground for two years before the partial privatisation plans kick in. Thus increased spending targeted on buses, cycling and walking does not seem likely to result.

  27. There were also welcome tax changes to encourage cleaner buses and lower bus fares. VED for clean buses is to be reduced by £500 from January. The Chancellor also announced an increase in the rebate on fuel tax for bus companies (however, this comes after several years during which the level of rebate has been frozen, and thus the net effect on ticket prices over that period will remain negative).

  28. We were extremely disappointed that Gordon Brown followed a mention of the Kyoto Summit and the need for significant CO2 reductions with a far from adequate "flagship measure" of reducing VAT on energy saving materials only in Government schemes. This will affect only 40,000 homes a year, which compares badly with the Warm Homes Bill target of 500,000 homes a year. No estimate was given of the CO2 reduction this measure is likely to bring—because it is so small.

  29. FOE called for a Tax Commission into the options for a Carbon Tax and supporting measures. In this context Gordon Brown's announcement of a body to look just at industrial energy is a disappointment. A carbon tax should affect all fuel, no matter who the end-users are. Any regressive effects on households can and should be dealt with within the policy package. Even worse, making Colin Marshall (ex-BA chief) chair of the new review body is like putting a fox in charge of the henhouse. Aviation is the only industry which pays no duty and no VAT on its fuel, and continues to lobby against the introduction of such measures.

  30. The Chancellor made a first stab reducing short-termist investment with the changes to Capital Gains Tax but although he introduced a whole range of measures for increasing investment, it was still about "investment as usual". If he had been true to his pledge of putting the environment at the heart of the tax system he would have included tax incentives for investment in innovative environmental technologies as suggested in our Budget briefing.

  31. Overall the various measures sum to a net increase in "environmental taxation". Although this is a good thing, we are concerned that the Chancellor has largely failed to "earmark" the increased revenue for tax-cuts elsewhere or increased environmentally beneficial spending. As a result he runs the risk of increased public opposition to increased green taxation, whipped up by vested interests such as the roads lobby.

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

  32. We wish to use this opportunity to respond to the Committee's request for our views on the recently published "aid memoire" on Policy Appraisal and the Environment. These remarks should be taken with the context that if the perverse incentives and countervailing pressures on policy makers (such as spending limits and regulatory capture) are not also addressed, no amount of guidance—however simple and clear—will help. Similarly, a strategic perspective, covering social and environmental impacts, as well as economic, over a long-term time-horizon is necessary if sustainable development is to result. In other words, transparency of decision making must go beyond recording environmental implications.

  33. The new "aide-memoire" is an improvement over the previous guidance, particularly because it is clear and brief. However there remain some issues of concern. First, it still implicitly prefers economic valuation of costs and benefits. Because of the limitations of valuation techniques, this necessarily devalues environmental and social impacts, valuing impacts on the poor, future generations or other species less, or not at all. We believe that all values should be expressed and compared in a common political framework, through citizen's juries, for example. If such an approach was adopted, this would require consequential revision of the Treasury's "Green Book".

  34. Second, it does not require publication of environmental appraisals—which would be a critical step in ensuring appropriate accountability. Third it fails to recommend wider consultation with environmental or social interests where possible impacts are identified. This would help ensure effective participation and thus acceptance of policy changes. Finally, it does not ensure effective coverage of health issues related to environmental damage and pollution. It is not clear whether these would be covered by environmental appraisal or health appraisal, and it is thus possible that they would be missed by both.




Appendix 1: Development of the ISEW

  Since its original formulation, the ISEW methodology has come under considerable scrutiny, and a number of criticisms have been raised of particular aspects of the index. The updated UK ISEW has taken these criticisms into account and made some important methodological revisions to the original index. Full details of these revisions, together with an account of their effects on the index and a number of important sensitivity analyses, are to be found in a report from the Centre for Environmental Strategy at the University of Surrey (Jackson et al 1997, Sustainable economic welfare in the UK 1950-96(. In the following paragraphs the most important revisions are briefly described.

  Income inequality In the original index, the adjustment for income inequality was essentially ad hoc: an index of inequality was constructed from time series Gini coefficients by setting the 1950 coefficient equal to 100. Consumer expenditure was then "weighted" by dividing the raw data by the inequality index. In the updated index we have used a method specifically developed for measuring the economic impact of distributional inequality. The method determines a level "perfectly distributed" income equivalent to each unequal distribution of income (Atkinson 1983). The two incomes are equivalent in the sense that both incomes are deemed to deliver the same level of social welfare. The Atkinson income is thus ideal for use as a basis for the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare. The revised method allows for an input to reflect society's aversion or otherwise to income inequality. A factor epsilon ranges from zero (reflecting absolute indifference to income inequality) to infinity (reflecting complete aversion). For the purposes of this revision we have used the rather low figure of 0.8 suggested by studies of actual attitudes in the UK. However, we are not entirely convinced that it is appropriate to accept a judgment about social welfare inferred from existing patterns of consumption. The acceptance of (or aversion to) income inequality is an issue which legitimately ought to refer to a social evaluation (for instance by surveys of public attitudes) as well as to market behaviour, and such an evaluation is not yet available for the UK. Sensitivity analyses demonstrate that a slightly higher value of epsilon would considerably depress the index, particularly over the last 15 years of the study during which income inequality has reached "unprecedented" levels (Goodman and Webb, 1994).

  Long-term environmental damage A number of people have criticised the original ISEW method of accounting for the long-term environmental costs associated with fossil and nuclear fuel consumption. A simple tax of 50 cents (in 1972 dollars) was levied for every barrel of oil equivalent consumed by either fossil fuels or nuclear power. As a post hoc justification, the authors made comparison with certain estimates of the future costs of climate change, showing that in some cases, their provision was relatively conservative by comparison. The revised UK ISEW explicitly uses cost estimates for long-term damage from global warming, relating these directly to emissions of carbon. A marginal social cost (in 1990) of around £11 per tonne of carbon emitted has been derived from estimates by Fankhauser (1994). This cost is then used as the basis for determining retrospective marginal social costs which rise over the time period according to the cumulative level of emissions from past activities. Applying these marginal social costs to the actual emissions in each year has provided a stream of annual contributions to future damages. Since these future damages accumulate, year on year, the associated costs are accumulated through the index. The ISEW research team at the Centre for Environmental Strategy gave detailed consideration to the view expressed by some critics that only the annual contributions to future damages should be counted in each year. However, they decided against this argument for a number of reasons, principally because it is clear that, all other things being equal, paying off the damages associated with a single year (say 1990) would not reduce the present value of future welfare losses to zero. The accumulated debt of the past would still represent a very real loss to the future. The present value of that future loss is the very least that an index of sustainable economic welfare should measure.

  Further revisions Several other refinements of the methodology have been made. These include: re-basing the costs of ozone depletion to consumption of CFCs in the UK, instead of production; expanding the category formerly accounting for wetlands loss to include other forms of natural habitat loss; smoothing the year on year effects of certain financial factors which might legitimately vary from year to year without adversely affecting long-term economic welfare; and updating a number of columns for which better data have been found.

  Effect of the revisions The main effect of the revisions we have undertaken has been to present a slightly less dramatic picture of the change in welfare in the UK than was presented in the first pilot index. The principal reason for this has been the choice of a relatively low aversion to income inequality. nevertheless, the picture presented by the revised index is not different in kind from that revealed by the earlier version. Sustainable economic welfare rose in the UK from about 1950 to around the mid-1970s more or less in line with the rise in economic output. It has declined considerably over the last 15 years of the study, in spite of increasing growth in per capita GNP.


1  
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2   See Figure 2 p. 139. Back

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